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Geographical,
Historical,
and Textual
Notes
- • - Burma, China, and Singapore form the geographic
triangle that constitutes the Far East of this book. Once a
province of India, by 1940 Burma (to the immediate east of
the Indian subcontinent and directly south of China's west-
ern reaches) was a separate country, albeit under British con-
trol. Located south of both Burma and China at the tip of the
Malay Peninsula, Singapore in 1940 was a British crown
colony. Although Burma gained independence from British
rule in 1948, Singapore remained part of the Commonwealth
until 1963.
In the air war fought in Far Eastern skies, the Japanese
Zero fighter was a worthy opponent of both the American
P-40 Tomahawk and the British Hurricane. Its success
prompted an equivalent of the "Spitfire snobbery" preva-
lent among Luftwaffe pilots in the European Theater, for just
as German pilots preferred to identify their troublesome
opponents as being R.J. Mitchell's classic warbird, many
American and British flyers tended to report any well-per-
forming low-wing monoplane as the Mitsubishi Zero, when
in fact the adversary could well have been the Nakajima Ki-
43 Hayabusa.
In June 1941, the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC)
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was renamed the United States Army Air Force (USAAF),
which in 1947 became a separate service, the United States
Air Force (USAF). In the narrative that follows, American
forces are described by their name at the time and by the
appropriate abbreviation.
Publication dates are given at the first appearance of
works cited in the text. Thereafter, pagination is given in
parentheses. A full bibliography of books quoted is found at
the end.
Introduction
— • —
The War that
Wasn't First
- • - No universally common date marks the beginning
of the Second World War. Depending on when which of the
eventual Allied or Axis powers joined it, its commencement
can be years apart. The Soviet Union, for example, was a bel-
ligerent only in the European theater until August 1945, when
at the very end it declared war against Japan. Italy was in an
even more complex position, not declaring war on the Allies
until June 1940 and being taken out of the Axis well before
Germany surrendered. Britain's declaration in September 1939
and America's entry in December 1941 are more evident dates,
provoked as they were by Hitler's assault on Britain's ally
Poland and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, respectively.
When it comes to World War II in the Far East, starting
times are even more problematic. Is it July 7, 1937, when
Japan began a shooting war with China at the Marco Polo
Bridge? Or is the real date as early as 1931, when Manchuria
was declared a Japanese protectorate? If either date is ac-
cepted, it makes the Far Eastern theater the Second World
War's first scene of action. Adding credibility to this notion,
especially in terms of the air war that so distinguished the
entire world conflict, was that one of its major American fig-
ures was working on military aviation in China four and
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one half years before Pearl Harbor. But even if Claire Chen-
nault's employment by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is
considered a localized anomaly, his subsequent organiza-
tion of the American Volunteer Group, or AVG, must count
as a serious factor as China and the rest of the Far East be-
came a theater of globally important air combat.
Yet because the men in what became known as the Fly-
ing Tigers were a volunteer group, and even more so be-
cause hostilities did not come to Britain's territories in the
Far East until even later—beginning in December 1941, so
long after the Blitz on Poland, the Battle of France, and the
Battle of Britain had characterized England's air war as a
cross-Channel affair—conflict in the Far East was regarded
as the war that wasn't first. Claire Chennault and his AVG
personnel certainly felt that way as they struggled with ill-
supplied and worn-out equipment, facing a powerful en-
emy with numbers so paltry as to be laughable. Art Donahue,
an American in the Royal Air Force who'd already fought in
the Battle of Britain, knew he was similarly outgunned and
outnumbered when he and a handful of Hurricane pilots
undertook the aerial defense of Singapore. By the time the
few other RAF squadrons were routed from Burma in March
1942, history had codified what by this time had become a
strategic decision: that even though America's entry into
World War II made it a two-ocean conflict, securing the At-
lantic and putting the Allies in a position to defeat Germany
first had to be priorities. And so they were.
Because it was the war that wasn't first, the air combat
that American and British pilots fought in Far Eastern skies
during 1941 and 1942 was a vastly different experience from
what transpired elsewhere. Some of this had to do with tim-
ing, and even more with special geographic and climatic
conditions of the region. But most emphatic was the struc-
tural difference between the war in Europe and what was
happening in Asia. Between September 1939 and May 1940
England and Germany found themselves in an adversarial
standoff that pantomimed those that characterized the 1914-
18 war. There were no trenches, of course, but parallel lines
of opposition prevailed for eight months of the so-called
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Phoney War, in which from the fall of Poland to the invasion
of France the two major powers stood against one another
in a state of war without making moves toward the other's
territory. The face-off replicated the chessboard structure of
the First World War, one that from Britain's point of view
had characterized its last century and a half of orientation
toward Europe. As for America's presumed eventual entry,
it was visualized just as in World War I, coming in later as
active allies to a Britain and France it had previously sup-
ported in more tacit fashion.
For both the United States and Great Britain, the Far East
was a peripheral factor in its early planning. Both countries
had interests in the region and expressed them economically.
Because of its system of empire inherited from centuries pre-
vious, Britain maintained colonial relationships with India,
Burma, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Because this system had
been in place for so long and suffered no appreciable exter-
nal threats to its stability, military presence was not a major
factor beyond that of the garrison variety. Following Japan's
withdrawal from naval agreements and Britain's termina-
tion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the years following
World War I, it became evident that some defensive enhance-
ment was needed, and in 1921 Singapore was designated as
a fortress base for a permanent Far Eastern fleet. The for-
tress was built but never given the air defense it needed and
deserved, while government economies and subsequent in-
ternational naval treaties made major naval presence an
emergency rather than standing condition.
American participation in Far Eastern affairs was much
more limited, and as late as the 1930s and even 1941 itself
was undertaken less as firm policy than in the adventure-
some sense of England's eighteenth-century involvements—
a matter not for government leaders and great national
institutions to pursue but rather the business of individual
companies and colorful adventurers. The difference was that
an earlier era's sailing ships had been replaced by airplanes,
and it was as an open field for aviation development that
the Far East interested Americans. With its important popu-
lation centers separated by vast distances and having no
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modern transportation system to speak of, China was a natu-
ral place for air-minded persons to turn. Because so many
other nations had sent military air missions to China, the
United States did, too, under Colonel John H. Jouett in 1932.
Here an aviation school was established, the aim being less
immediately military than to establish a customer-base for
American materials and services. Salesmen soon followed,
including William Pawley for the Curtiss-Wright Aircraft
Company and Harvey Greenlaw for North American Avia-
tion. Both of these were to be involved in another venture
begun by an even more exceptional character, Claire Lee
Chennault, who after a frustrating career in the peacetime
U.S. Army Air Corps had retired as a captain in 1937 and
had immediately gone to work in China as Chiang Kai-shek's
chief air advisor. After several failed experiments at improv-
ing the Chinese Air Force, including supplementing it with
an International Squadron staffed by an odd collection of
European and American adventurers, Chennault decided to
form a volunteer group of service-trained professionals to
defend China from the air. In October 1940, he began ap-
proaching both U.S. government officials and British repre-
sentatives in Washington, D.C., about organizing and
supporting the group that would become known as the Fly-
ing Tigers. These recruits would have to resign their com-
missions, remove all insignia from their uniforms, and
become employees of a private company doing contract
business with the government of China. For a war that wasn't
first, this initial agreement for undertaking its air operations
was a decidedly unofficial and unconventional affair.
Because of these conditions at its inception, understand-
ing how the air war was fought in this theater of operations
could be difficult. Like the war in Vietnam that developed a
generation later, few structures from previous armed con-
flicts applied—certainly none of the official ones, because
the first shots fired in the air over China and then Burma
came from a force that wasn't officially there. Even when
the transition to regular forces was made, matters did not
become much easier, because the old irregular commander
was still in charge. The fact that his methods had succeeded
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and continued to do so did not impress the officers of the
USAAF he now rejoined (as a general, no less), for they rep-
resented a theory of air war that the service had rejected
during two decades of peace and which had been "proven"
only by a renegade in charge of a small band of ill-behaving
mercenaries. During 1943 and 1944 conducting operations
became no easier for Chennault; from theater headquarters
in India his old rival Clayton Bissell frustrated attempts to
get proper supplies, while the overall commander, General
Joseph Stilwell, disagreed with both Chennault's tactics for
the air war and his close alliance with Chiang Kai-shek.
It was no accident that General Claire Chennault was
excluded from surrender ceremonies on board the USS Mis-
souri at war's end. He had succeeded by working against
accepted practices rather than cooperating with them, and
this was a time to signify the end of disorder rather than
acknowledge or much less celebrate it. From the British side
there was similar, if less explicit, discomfort with how the
Far Eastern air war fit in the larger scheme of things: the fall
of Burma remained an embarrassment and Singapore's ca-
pitulation a major disgrace, while the RAF had repurchased
respect only by changing its mission radically from a sup-
posedly indomitable defensive force to a new style of war-
fare excelling in ground support and long-range air supply.
Neither country's conduct in the region, whether in losing
ground initially or regaining it in the long run, conformed
with the larger image promulgated in the more prominent
European theater. There, defense had been heroic and of-
fense carried through with the smashing weight of great four-
engine-bomber fleets, as if seeking to confirm prewar military
thinking that "the bomber will always get through." In China
it had been a Japanese bomber force that Claire Chennault's
ragtag fighters had defeated, while in its subsequent opera-
tions from India the RAF's four-engine force of Liberator
bombers carried far more parachutists on clandestine op-
erations than they did explosives. Covert operations, suc-
cessful as they may be, are rarely given contemporaneous
recognition with medals, commendations, and news stories.
As for the American Volunteer Group's work, it was like-
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wise off the record; its flyers received no U.S. decorations,
no record for their AVG kills in postwar victory totals, and
no credit for their service time with Chennault's outfit.
Therefore, official histories are not the place to look for
complete and compelling accounts of the war that wasn't
first. But a great number of personal narratives exist, from
General Chennault's autobiography to the memoirs of his
unranked pilots and technicians and the stories written by
flying officers and wing commanders who served in RAF
units during those first Far Fast air combats from December
1941 through March 1942. Here can be read much fuller and
more accurate accounts of what transpired during this cru-
cial period so atypical of the larger conflict. It is not unusual
for an individual veteran to read an accepted version of
events in which he or she participated and remark that no,
things were not really like that at all. For what happened in
the Far East at this time, such distinctions carry larger im-
portance, for what the individual experienced is more likely
not to have fit the official version of events. How, for ex-
ample, can British strategists admit that a lowly flying of-
ficer such as Terence Kelly might be right in saying
Singapore, Sumatra, Java, and even Burma could have been
held by the forces available, if only people such as those who
wrote the official histories had used them right? And how
can the leadership of the USAAF give proper credit to a
leader such as Claire Chennault, who fought the Army Air
Corps through two terms of service and from two periods
of retirement?
When it comes to individual stories, the very reasons
their actions do not fit well with the official picture make
them all the more valuable as narratives. Consider wing com-
mander Bunny Stone, an RAF officer who distinguished him-
self from his colleagues by taking the officially scorned AVG
advice on tactics and even more so by cozying up to these
egregious renegades. Within the AVG itself, colorful charac-
ters abound. Well beyond Chennault himself and his frankly
outspoken manner was Greg "Pappy" Boyington, who raised
hell with the Volunteers and went on to lead his own Black
Sheep Squadron in Marine aviation along the same lines as
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his old boss used with the AVG. There was the group diarist
and wife of Chennault's chief of staff, Olga Greenlaw, whose
The Lady and the Tigers reads as one of the most remarkable
memoirs from any operational theater—so remarkable that
it took her reputed lover, Pappy Boyington, two books of
his own to deal with the world she described, Baa Baa Black
Sheep and Tonya. Even the AVG's chaplain, Paul Frillmann,
was colorful enough to publish a commercially successful
memoir, detailing not only his work with Chennault but a
subsequent career with the CIA. As far as engaging in spook
work, Frillmann was not the only AVG alumnus to do so.
Gerhard Neumann was a German national working in Hong
Kong when the war broke out. After fleeing inland, he
hooked up with Chennault as a chief mechanic, rebuilding
a crashed Zero to flyability and after the war driving a Jeep
all the way to Jordan before working with the Office of Stra-
tegic Services and going on to direct jet engine development
for the General Electric Corporation. Erik Shilling, qualified
as the AVG's best reconnaissance pilot, stayed with his boss
through postwar Civil Air Transport (CAT) days and, in this
capacity, flew covertly supplied American C-119s in support
of the French troops besieged in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu. CAT
itself later became the CIA's private airline, Air America,
making the longer story resulting from AVG roots even less
of an officially accountable affair. Nor had the AVG's replace-
ment on July 4, 1942, by the USAAF's 23rd Fighter Group
brought an end to the monkey business and color, for the
group's first commander had an interesting history of his
own and told it in a series of best-selling books from 1943 to
1988. Robert Lee Scott Jr. was an aviator after Chennault's
own heart, fighting his way into combat service and even
then acting well beyond official channels to begin freelancing
with the AVG in the months before its scheduled retirement.
American adventuring had made its way into the RAF as
well. Not only did AVG pilots fly alongside their British coun-
terparts in defense of Rangoon, but one of the handful of
pilots on hand for the last days of Singapore was Art
Donahue, a volunteer in the RAF from a farm near St.
Charles, Minnesota. Like almost every other person involved
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in the Far East's air war at the time, he was operating con-
siderably out of conventional bounds.
This rich literary record is inscribed within the time lim-
its necessary for any analysis to make sense. The American
Volunteer Group was organized on paper in the early months
of 1941, with the United States letting one hundred of its
pilots resign their service commissions and two hundred of
its ground crew and technicians out of their enlistments in
order to join Chennault's project. As the first of three contin-
gents of these men (and two women serving as nurses) made
plans to sail the Pacific in the summer 1941, the RAF (which
had earlier considered supplying veteran flight leaders and
squadron commanders) agreed to turn over an airfield at
Kyedaw, outside the city of Toungoo in Burma, as a training
facility. Destined for active duty in China, the AVG had to
answer an emergency first, helping defend Rangoon from
Japanese air attacks beginning December 23, 1941. By this
time, the RAF was standing alone against Japanese bomb-
ers in Singapore, where attacks had begun almost simulta-
neously with the action against America's fleet at Pearl
Harbor. By mid-February Singapore had been surrendered
and the withdrawing RAF squadrons were on their way out
of Sumatra as well. Japanese forces landed in Java on March
1, while ever since the fall of Singapore their air fleets had
been directed in greater numbers against Rangoon. That city
was evacuated early in March and was taken by the Japa-
nese on the eighth of that month. Meanwhile, AVG squad-
rons had flown to Kunming, China, while their ground units
retreated up the Burma Road. Some RAF personnel who had
become friendly with the AVG wished to continue fighting
against the Japanese advance in northern Burma with their
American counterparts, but British plans dictated a with-
drawal to India, where as early as April 1 these remnants
reformed as 224 Group in order to continue a much differ-
ent style of air war. From China the AVG fought on until
July 4, 1942, when after an unsettled period of internal dis-
sension and controversy over whether it would be taken into
the United States Army Air Force (which had recommis-
sioned its leader Claire Chennault as a general) the original
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mercenary corporation was dissolved, most of its personnel
allowed to return home, and regulars from the USAAF took
over duties as the 23rd Fighter Group.
At the outside, then, the war that wasn't first covered
almost exactly one year, with British action and the tough-
est American air fighting taking little more than three
months. But the activities packed into this period rival that
of any single chapter in the larger story of how World War
II's air combat was written. And what a literary treasure it
is. From Claire Chermault fighting the Japanese on one hand
and his own superiors on the other to pilot Erik Shilling crash
landing on a primitive people's hillside and wondering if
he were to be eaten alive, the story is a rich one. Some of it,
like Chennault's studied and editorially assisted biography,
is crafted with the care given to a great document in history.
Other parts, such as Shilling's memoir, self-published to sat-
isfy the interests of his small-town California airport bud-
dies of the 1990s, draw their appeal precisely from such
informal candor. Some of the flyers were already profession-
als at the writing game: Kenneth Hemingway was an En-
glish journalist with a book on factory conditions already to
his credit, Barry Sutton had done a book on his Battle of
France and Battle of Britain exploits, and Art Donahue was
already known in both England and America as the author
of Tally Ho! Yankee in a Spitfire, the first such tale of an Ameri-
can in the RAF. That these three pilots knew their way with
pens and typewriters as well as with Hurricanes and Spit-
fires made the literary record all the better, just as Terence
Kelly's latent talents as a playwright (developing in post-
war years) make his three books about the Far East air war
all the more digestible.
By the end of 1941, thanks to an American news media
starved for good war news, Claire Chennault became a
widely known figure. Before the war's end, Robert L. Scott
did the same for himself thanks to his best-selling books,
one of which (God Is My Co-Pilot) was also produced as popu-
lar film. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was Pappy Boyington's
turn, with a memoir that formed the basis for a television
series, Baa Baa Black Sheep. A generation later it was time for
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more figures to be heard, as well, from pilots to crew chiefs,
radio operators, a group diarist, the unit's chaplain, and oth-
ers, from Americans and Germans and Chinese to English-
men and Australians. For them, the war that wasn't first
remains a priority in their lives, providing a lesson to be
learned today about making first things first.
- • - None of it was meant to happen as it did. The indi-
viduals recruited for pay and adventure by retired Army
Air Corps captain Claire Lee Chennault were supposed to
fly in China, not Burma; their ninety-nine Curtiss P-40C fight-
ers were intended to be just the escort for a larger bomber
force that would take Japan out of World War II, perhaps
preemptively. These planes were painted not as tigers but
as sharks, and even this enfiguration—triangular teeth cir-
cling the engine's air scoop and red-pupiled eye set just
ahead of its exhaust ports—did not emerge from local cir-
cumstance but was borrowed from newsmagazine photo-
graphs of similarly decorated Messerschmitt 110s and Royal
Air Force Tomahawks from the Battle of Britain and the
desert war, respectively. Chennault's men were the "Ameri-
can Volunteer Force," or AVG. It was the Chinese press that
called them "Flying Tigers," an appellation they took note
of only after it had been picked up back home, complete
with a logo professionally designed by the Walt Disney Stu-
dios. The name itself did not become an issue until after the
AVG disbanded and the label was transferred to successive
United States Army Air Force units operating not as volun-
teers but as regulars in China through the war's end.
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The AVG's shift in mission from China to Burma reflects
the acceleration of Japan's military aggression beyond the
pace Claire Chennault foresaw. By the summer of 1941, China
had already been at war with Japan for four long years,
driven back from its ocean ports far inland to the relocated
capital at Chungking. Here the Japanese proposed to bomb
their virtually defenseless victims until a total Chinese sur-
render was inevitable. Chennault's volunteer force was or-
ganized to defend Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's people
against these aerial attacks. But delays in getting U.S. gov-
ernment approval to recruit from its military forces and hold-
ups in shipping planes disrupted plans for training during
fair weather in Kunming. As a result, the AVG had to be
grouped at a borrowed RAF air base in Burma, where paved
runways allowed operations during the monsoon.
Here, in circumstances far different than they had imag-
ined, the one hundred pilots and two hundred support staff
fresh from the United States undertook preparations for an
air war that would depart even farther from expectations.
But as things would happen, they were fortuitously in the
right place at the right time. Japan's occupation of French
Indo-China had closed off Chiang's last access to the sea;
henceforth, he would have to obtain desperately needed
supplies by rail through Burma and thence via the Burma
Road to his territory. Only air power could defend this route
from attack, and the AVG had the only effective air forces
available. Yet just as they completed their training and be-
gan combat operations, the volunteers had to cope with an
even more immediate enemy move. On December 23,1941,
Japanese forces began heavy aerial bombing of Rangoon.
Because resident RAF squadrons were ill equipped and dras-
tically outnumbered, AVG assistance was requested and
given in the form of one squadron being sent into the fray.
Together, the newly allied forces beat back the aerial aggres-
sors by inflicting casualties too massive for sustainable of-
fense. The larger results were even more encouraging: by
settling the first real losses on Japan, Chennault's flyers had
given the United States its only bit of good news since the
disasters at Pearl Harbor and Wake Island earlier in the
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month. From this first major engagement with the enemy,
the Flying Tigers legend would begin.
Yet that legend was born from conditions far different
than any of its participants had foreseen. Fighting in Burma
rather than China, the AVG was in radically alien surround-
ings. Exotically foreign as it was, China had benefited from
American aviation for a decade. During the 1930s, as the
country emerged from an era of warlords and banditry to
its first form of modern political leadership under Chiang
Kai-shek, this once-remote country became an adventure
ground and a source of opportunity for pioneer flyers. Rus-
sians were there, as were Italians; an American mission ar-
rived in 1932, quite romantically so as one of its pilots was
the son of Christy Mathewson, famous pitcher for the old-
time New York Giants. Commercial pilots, as well, had a
world open to them, where vast distances and lack of con-
ventional transportation made what aircraft could do all the
more valuable. Militarily and commercially, China was the
new air frontier. Pilots, if they hadn't been there themselves,
had been hearing about it for years. Now, in the summer of
1941, it appeared as a way to fight for an ally's freedom and
get in on the ground floor of the new war. No wonder so
many hotshot pilots of the peacetime Air Corps, Navy, and
Marines wanted to head to this part of the Far East.
If China represented a land and people prospectively
within the American orbit, Burma was most definitely not.
Here was no potential new ally in trade and development,
but a culture long subjugated to the supply of raw material
(lumber, oil, tea) and serving as the military outpost of con-
querors who had won dominance a century before. Issues
of empire and colonialism were evident in every facet of
Burmese life. As in China, there was a movement toward
modernism and independence—but by virtue of their role
in supporting British power the AVG was on the opposite
side of it.
Apart from the alien style of colonialism, Chennault's
pilots found themselves in an uncomfortable environment.
Known from Battle of Britain lore as tough and resilient, the
Royal Air Force establishment in Burma and the rest of the
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Far East was dispirited and soft. Far from the European
battle, these elements had continued in the manner of peace-
time service in the tropics, where the drill consisted of pink
gins, polo, club life, and disavowal that war might ever come.
If it did, the putative Japanese enemies were presumed to
be as inferior as the native locals their grandfathers had sub-
dued. Not that being wary of danger did any good, for any
requests to have their forces strengthened drew only dis-
claimers from London that back home the mother country
was fighting for life, able to spare little or nothing.
The AVG's contribution was thus welcomed, but not the
manner of it. Even in wartime conditions their rough man-
ners and lusty bravado would have grated against British
dispositions; in a colonial post long used to the pleasures of
peace, the effect was deleterious. To make matters worse,
the British were unable to match their own elevated style
with power and performance in the air. Their forces were
obsolete and undermanned, their strategies for defense al-
most nonexistent. When war came, as so many refused to
admit that it could, the results from Hong Kong and
Singapore to eventually Burma itself were a series of igno-
minious defeats, the only cheers coming from native inhab-
itants rallying to their hated occupier's departure. This
judgment is evident in the titles of the two major British his-
tories of the Far East air campaign, Henry Probert's The For-
gotten Air Force (1995) and Christopher Shores, Brian Cull,
and Yasuho Izawa's Bloody Shambles (1992).
Thus, the iconography of air warfare was terribly out of
balance for these American flyers cast suddenly into the first
rumblings of Britain's loss of empire. As recruits to a China
eager for their services, they had been promised lavish ac-
commodation and adulation from a grateful people. That
would come in time, once they were established in Kunming.
But for the start of their adventurers' experience, conditions
were miserable, and local attitudes were not supportive—
critical from the British, sometimes hostile from the natives.
With the United States brought into the war by Japan's sneak
attack on Pearl Harbor, they could feel vindication at their
foresight and pride in their role at delivering the first effec-
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tive return blows. But much of this was overshadowed by
the fact that they were located more squarely within some-
one else's fight—a fight these people, whose country had
already been at war for over two years, should have known
was coming.
As it happened, there was more than enough heroism
on the British side. With inferior equipment and poor direc-
tion, the pilots of the RAF's Rangoon squadrons, flying hope-
lessly inadequate Brewster Buffalo fighters cast off by
America years before as almost useless for modern combat,
helped repel the first Japanese attacks. Then, using Hurri-
canes that had been replaced at home by the better perform-
ing Spitfire, additional forces delayed the enemy advance
through Burma until withdrawal to India could be effected.
From India the RAF rebuilt its forces and prepared the long
campaign to retake in three years what had been lost in three
brutal months. By July 4,1942, the American Air Force was
establishing itself in India as well, besides sending the 23rd
Fighter Group to replace the ragtag AVG being disbanded
in China that day.
Yet even with the military might of the United States on
hand, the AVG's help was still needed. To facilitate the
handover, Claire Chennault hoped some of his volunteers
would volunteer again for an extra two weeks, lest the Japa-
nese take quick advantage of the new rookie force. Nine-
teen pilots and thirty-six ground crewmen agreed, even
though their year's hard service made them eager for home
and despite the fact that the USAAF had been extremely dif-
ficult in dealing with them over matters of subsequent en-
listment. As bad luck would have it, two pilots died during
this fortnight of extra service, including one who had re-
cently married the squadron nurse. So even the AVG's exit
from World War II was flawed by mischance.
The most basic circumstances made it inevitable that
American experience in China and the Far East would be
different from the norms of aerial adventure and warfare. In
terms of World War II itself, Japan's entry as an aggressor
reshuffled the deck. Chennault's flyers were not the only
personnel to be repositioned. The RAF squadrons that in
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December 1941 and January 1942 had to be sent so hurriedly
to Singapore and Rangoon were diverted en route from pre-
vious assignments to the Middle East and Russia; one flight
of Hurricanes landed and was rushed into combat still en-
cumbered by its long range auxiliary fuel tanks and desert
warfare air filters. Already vulnerable because of their weak
positions and thin resources, American and British forces
suffered all the more from the first joint Allied decision made
after Pearl Harbor: that strategic policy would be directed
toward defeating Germany first. Quite practical military,
political, and economic realities supported this approach.
But underlying it was the unspoken assumption that from
both British and American points of view Japan's theater of
operations was the Orient, so alien to Occidental interests.
Anglo-Saxon attitudes of the United Kingdom looked to
Europe for their definitions, if only by contemporary con-
trast. And in the United States, citizens could identify with
combat taking place in countries from which their close an-
cestors had emigrated and whose culture they still in part
shared. Japan's ambitions were in another world, indeed.
How different was the Orient is clear from the way most
Americans knew about the doings of pilots and their air-
craft in these lands of the distant Far East: not from news-
reels and certainly not in the stirring speeches of an embattled
Prime Minister from the House of Commons in Westminster
that was itself a target for Nazi bombs, but rather from comic
strips that exaggerated what already seemed exotic. The ear-
liest narrative record of an American's experience flying in
China is by Royal Leonard. His I Flew for China (1942) details
his experiences dating back to 1935, when he left the United
States for a thousand-dollar-a-month job piloting a Boeing 247
airliner for Chang Hsueh-Liang, a warlord known as "the
YoungMarshal" who would eventually yield to Chiang Kai-
shek. Among the colorful characters he meets among the
scores of fellow Americans adventuring in this new land of
opportunity is Frank Higgs, already famous as the figure
"One-Eyebrow Higgs" in the comic strip Terry and the Pi-
rates drawn by Milton Caniff. Leonard's reference (p. 248)
would be a singularly familiar point to American readers
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just then learning about such strange new people as Claire
Chennault, the Generalissimo, Madame Chiang, and their
curious activities so far from home. Leonard and Higgs
wound up flying DC-2s and -3s for the Chinese National
Aviation Corporation, in the course of which they met an-
other adventurer, Olga Greenlaw, who as the wife of Chen-
nault's chief of staff and herself the AVG's diarist wrote The
Lady and the Tigers, a memoir as colorful as the real life comic
book characters she described (1943, p. 98).
Even the AVG pilots could not resist experiencing the
Far East in comic strip terms, as happens at a crucial point
in Erik Shilling's Destiny: A Flying Tiger's Rendezvous with
Fate (1993). When bad weather forces him to crash land on a
wooded mountainside fifty miles short of Kunming, Shil-
ling is not sure how to approach the primitive natives. His
most preposterous worry, that the tribesmen will hold him
for ransom, is only put to rest when he realizes he's con-
fronting the scene not as an aviator but as a creature captive
of his own fantasies. In a footnote to the episode, he tracks
things down and also clarifies Higgs's role as a source for
more than one character:
For many years, back in the states, I had been an avid reader
of Terry and the Pirates. It was a syndicated cartoon strip drawn
by Milt Caniff, of exciting adventure stories dealing with the
mysterious Orient. It was extremely well drawn, with an
intriguing plot. Many scenes depicted in the cartoon were
drawn from photographs sent to the artist by Frank Higgs, a
close friend and college chum. Frank was a pilot, flying for the
China National Aviation Corporation, called CNAC, whom I
met later.
During the war, Frank Higgs was portrayed in the cartoon
strip as the character Dude Hennick, a good looking ladies man.
The strip dealt with Chinese warlords, beautiful curvaceous
Chinese girls, and river pirates that preyed on the Yangtze
River traffic. Reading about the intriguing Orient was very
interesting to many Americans, including myself, who read
Terry and the Pirates religiously, (p. 139)
Milt Caniff's comic strips are as frequently cited in Fly-
ing Tiger narratives as are the more lofty Arthurian images
that in Battle of Britain literature characterize everything
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from Churchill's speeches and newspaper accounts to later
histories and memoirs. Each style has its own validity for
approaching a new situation and making sense of it, and
each indicates how the participants saw the nature of their
experience: in the Battle of Britain playing out the role of
cultural heroes in an epic of millennial proportion, in the
Far East being caught up by a fantasy world of danger and
intrigue that seemed more appropriate for cartoon charac-
ters. In A Flying Tiger's Diary (1984), Charles R. Bond Jr. can-
not help but call forth such images, even after he has been
abroad for over half a year, taking a peek into a high-class
Chinese brothel and meeting someone who "reminded me of
Miss Lace in the comic strip 'Terry and the Pirates/" (p. 195),
with all the silky curves and exotic stylings Erik Shilling had
described. As the American air experience in China contin-
ued beyond commercial pioneering and the AVG's adven-
tures to the more stable presence of regular USAAF units,
Caniff's cartooning kept pace. Robert Lee Scott Jr., who took
over from Chennault's volunteers when they headed home,
still could meet plenty of colorful characters, including the
combat cameraman Charlie Russhon; as recalled in Scott's
The Day I Owned the Sky (1988). Russhon's virtually all-des-
sert diet won him the nickname of "Charlie Vanilla" in
Caniff's new Steve Canyon comic strip (p. 152). Another Air
Force Wing Commander, Casey Vincent, appears in Donald
S. Lopez's Into the Teeth of the Tiger (1986) not just as one of
Chennault's most trusted regulars but as "the prototype for
the Terry and the Pirates character, Vince Casey" (p. 213).
As with Battle of Britain lore, reality and myth intertwine,
one feeding the other until the result exists in a world apart
from both. The best example of the new understanding be-
ing forged is that of Bert Christman. In civilian life, this young
man had been one of Caniff's illustrators, drawing panels
for Terry and the Pirates and soon establishing his own strip,
Scorchy Smith, which followed the adventures of a daredevil
aviator working as a mercenary in Latin America. Enlisting
as a carrier pilot for the U.S. Navy, Christman—like so many
of his colleagues aboard the USS Ranger doing affiliation
exercises along the Atlantic coast—jumped at the opportu-
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nity Chennault's AVG recruiters offered. As quoted in Duane
Schultz's The Maverick War (1987), Christman "volunteered
for China because he thought he could get 'lots of good
material for a comic strip out there'" (p. 85). However, no
Flying Tigers strip per se resulted, for life itself—and then
death—took precedence. Of the twenty-two American pi-
lots who died during their AVG experience, Bert Christman
was one of them, shot down on January 23,1942, when the
Japanese resumed bombing Rangoon. In the manner of his
death, he reflected both myths and realities that thanks to
American newspaper coverage had become as popular as
Battle of Britain reports a year and a half before. A handful
of AVG P-40s and a few hapless RAF Buffaloes had thrown
themselves against a vastly superior Japanese force. Of the
sixty bombers attacking Rangoon, Christman and his col-
leagues scored victories against a reported twenty-one. No
matter that postwar records account for only three Japanese
losses that day; inflated totals were inevitable in the confu-
sion of combat and welcomed for purposes of morale. How
this young pilot died also fits the mythology of war against
this newly hated, unchivalrous enemy and in his case can
be confirmed by medical evidence. Having bailed out of his
bullet-ridden plane, Christman began a parachute descent
to safety, at which point he was machine-gunned through
the neck.
Claire Chennault was not in a P-40 fighter over Burma
that day or any other. Somewhat surprisingly, he never vis-
ited his embattled men at Mingaladon airfield outside
Rangoon or took part in any offensive or defensive actions
elsewhere. Instead, his manner was to direct operations from
the AVG's main base, wherever that might be: first at
Toungoo, the Burmese air field borrowed from the RAF for
training, and later from Kunming within China. Though his
accommodations to Chinese strategy might later be ques-
tioned, his absence from the fight was never challenged. In
January 1942, he was forty-eight years old—a very tough
and battered forty-eight, mostly deafened by years of open-
cockpit flying and prone to debilitating bronchial afflictions.
His role was not of the hands-on leader but rather that of
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the teacher, the job he'd once had in civilian life and had
pursued, to his professional detriment, as an officer in the
peacetime Air Corps. Yet in this most unheroic of guises
Chennault had come to share the cartoon-like qualities of
the AVG life that by this time had begun defining him as an
image to the American people. As in the title of his autobi-
ography, Way of a Fighter (1949), his style was one of pure
aggressiveness, be it against an opponent in the air or be-
hind a desk. For much of his life he seemed to be fighting
the forces of history itself—until, as it did in the first months
of World War II, history caught up with his vision and proved
him at least momentarily right.
If the American Volunteer Group was a colorful outfit,
the deep shadings began with its organizer and command-
ing officer. Taking the AVG to the Far East in 1941 was not
the first outlandish thing Claire Lee Chennault did in his
lifetime, nor would it be the last. Indeed, the man's entire
career was a testament to persistent and sometimes flam-
boyant independence, almost always directed toward views
radically opposed to the conventional wisdom of his times.
Tactically, that view privileged fighters over bombers, just
the opposite of Air Corps thinking of the 1930s when
Chennault was trying to continue his service career. Strate-
gically, his position countered the defense-based orientation
within America's isolationist continental limits. Politically,
this first of the Flying Tigers was the loosest cannon of all,
not only counseling the earliest opposition to Japan's per-
ceived war aims but signing on as no less than a mercenary
to help Chiang Kai-shek, at the time Japan's only declared
enemy. When after so many years on his own he did get the
Tigers organized, it was much more than just another outfit
in a war soon assuming global proportions. As Robert Lee
Scott Jr. puts it in Flying Tiger: Chennault of China (1959):
He had planned this Volunteer Group as a father plans a family
of sons to carry on his ideals and his life for him. He had
dreamed of the tactics he would teach them and had worked
out every little turn and roll, dive and zoom, spin and maneu-
ver with almost slide-rule precision before he took them into
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the sky. He had prepared for them a decade back, and he could
close his eyes now and see each combat formation and what he
would do with this group of fighters and what he would do
with the [proposed] Second American Volunteer Group, as well
as the Third. With such forces he could help his beloved China
drive the hated barbarian from their soil and from the sky
above it. (p. 23)
Chennault's own character and the nature of his exploits
were colorful enough to inspire over two dozen biographies,
making him one of the most written-about air leaders of
World War II. His penchant for working the press when
needed, in such high-visibility venues as Time and Life maga-
zines, made him the American public's first easily recognized
aerial commander—all of this for someone who had retired
as a captain in the previous decade and well before the Air
Corps had taken him back (as a general, because his emi-
nence demanded no less). Everything about him lent itself
to colorful coverage: his highly spiced Louisiana Cajun back-
ground, his jauntily gamecock-style disposition and rugged
good looks, profile chiseled in granite and face deeply weath-
ered by open cockpit flying. Even his partial deafness added
to the appeal. Say something in his presence and one would
get a stare as if being deeply questioned and subject to no
small suspicion. The man looked every bit the peregrine fal-
con and lived out this role as well.
Before World War I he'd been a country school teacher,
where whipping recalcitrant country boys into shape was
as much a part of his duties as professing the three R's (his
solution to burning off excess energy was to organize the
youths into baseball teams with himself as captain and
pitcher). When war came, his application for flight training
was rejected, but as a stateside infantry lieutenant he
wrangled unofficial flying lessons at Kelly Field. With eighty
such hours under his belt he finally won a transfer to the
aviation cadet program, but too late to fly in the war. Out of
the service for less than three months, he reenlisted as a regu-
lar and began a career in fighters: flying, commanding, teach-
ing, and writing, all in a United States Army Air Corps that
had been won over by General Billy Mitchell's champion-
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ing of the bomber and that was unwilling to see this new
basis of interservice power challenged.
In several respects, the Depression-era Air Corps was right.
Increasing speed, weight, and armament made the dogfight-
ing world of those agile but flimsy World War I fighters a
thing of the past. Likewise, the high altitudes and great
speeds at which modern bombers could operate would seem
to put them beyond reach of single-engine pursuit planes
stationed near potential targets. Here Chennault's ideas an-
ticipated what would become the type of organization that
defined World War II as it was fought in the air. As early as
1920, when he first learned the era's tactics from aces such
as Frank Hunter and Carl Spaatz, Chennault saw little value
in the old-fashioned dogfight. Later, when he organized an
Air Corps aerobatics team for demonstrations on the barn-
storming circuit, he appreciated all the more how fighters
operated best not in groups or formations but as fast-strik-
ing pairs. As for reaching the bombers' high altitude in time
to defend their targets, fighters needed advance warning,
something impossible on site but obtainable if some type of
early warning network could be arranged. Although its best
success would have to wait, for radar was developed just in
time for the Battle of Britain, technology as simple as an
outlying network of ground spotters with telephones or ra-
dios could alert fighters in time to gain altitude from their
base. Once positioned above, these forces could be directed
against the oncoming enemy by a ground controller, him-
self filtering and digesting the various pieces of informa-
tion. Rather than engage aggressive aircraft in prolonged
fights, Chennault's defenders could strike quickly from on
high before diving away to regain altitude for another hit-
and-run pass with one fighter watching out for the other.
This would become the way most of World War II's air
battles were fought, and the RAF's organization of early
warning, ground controlled interception, and individual or
paired fighters swooping in for their attacks allowed for
amazing success with minimal resources against intimidat-
ing odds in the summer of 1940. Churchill was correct in
extolling the exploits of "the few," but the key to their sue-
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cess was the manner of organization. Claire Chennault had
foreseen the necessity and devised its essentials of design.
Even results in service war games during the 1920s and 1930s
proved the system's practical success. But Air Corps politics
were slanted the other way, and regardless of how well this
captain's ideas worked on paper and in practice they were
not to be given any serious attention. Having made little
progress in his military career and with even dimmer pros-
pects for the future, Chennault retired on April 30,1937.
Nevertheless, his career as an innovator and leader in
military aviation was far from over, for Chennault's retire-
ment was taken in view of an interesting new possibility.
The last performance of his aerobatic unit, the famous "Three
Men on a Flying Trapeze," was at the All-American Air Races
in Miami, Florida, during December 1935. In attendance were
Colonel Mao Pang-chu of the Chinese Air Force and an
American businessman, William Pawley, who was selling
Curtiss-Wright fighters and helping Mao recruit American
flight instructors to teach the Chinese how to fly them.
Chennault's partners, Sergeants Luke Williamson and Billy
McDonald, had been frustrated at Air Corps prejudice
against their status as noncommissioned officers and hence
jumped at the chance when General Mao offered them lu-
crative jobs. Through the coming year McDonald kept in
touch, and when his boss—a former U.S. officer and mili-
tary attache—died, he was eager to recommend Chennault
as the Chinese Air Force's chief air adviser. Salary was the
same comparatively astronomical thousand dollars per
month that Royal Leonard was earning as a warlord's per-
sonal pilot. Chennault's employer, Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek, was even more eminent as the emergent leader of
modern China and was soon to become a major player in
world politics, especially politics that included the United
States. With Chennault, whom he elevated three ranks to
become a full colonel, Chiang's importance in the evolving
importance of military aviation was assured.
At the beginning of his China service, just months be-
fore Japan's all-out warfare against Chiang's state would
mark what some historians consider the real start of World
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War II, Claire Lee Chennault could responsibly consider him-
self a self-invented man. Dedicated as a flyer, he hadn't been
wanted by the Air Corps, necessitating a back door entrance
through the infantry. Once in, he and his ideas, boldly revo-
lutionary yet accurately insightful as they were, suffered
rejection to the extent that, by age forty-three, he might well
have been considered a failure, service in his chosen profes-
sion having come to an undistinguished end. Now as the
world began organizing itself for a level of conflict unknown
before and most likely impossible ever since, this pioneer of
fighter tactics was about to be given a real-life laboratory in
which to perfect his experimental method.
It was China's weakness that made Chennault's labora-
tory experiment so necessary. By the end of 1937, the poorly
trained and weakly equipped Chinese Air Force had ceased
to exist as a meaningful fighting force. In 1938 Chennault
tried forming a mercenary International Squadron, using the
lure of big money ($500 per month salary with a $1,000 bo-
nus for each enemy plane shot down), but his motley group
of adventurers from the United States, Germany, France, and
Holland proved so dissolute and unmanageable that he had
to disband them after their own loose talk among spies led
to their undispersed aircraft being destroyed on the ground.
The experience, wild and unruly as it was, taught Chennault
that he needed the training and discipline of regular mili-
tary flyers for his ideas to work. By 1939 and 1940, with its
back to the wall, Chiang's government was actively seeking
American support; Soong Tse-ven, Madame Chiang's brother
and already a Washington, D.C., intimate known as "T.V."
to insiders, was lobbying the Roosevelt administration for
aid. It was here that Chennault would get involved. If the
United States would sell military aircraft to China, why
couldn't they sell pilots to fly them as well—or at least al-
low American pilots to sell themselves? By December 1940
a plan was made to purchase five hundred American planes,
many of them the latest B-17 bombers, and have this virtual
air force flown by American crews detached from regular
duties as volunteers for China. Strategy called for the retak-
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ing of Chinese bases from which Japan itself would be
bombed—preemptively, from an American point of view that
found its chief advocates in presidential legal counsel Tommy
Corcoran (who viewed Chennault as a Sir Francis Drake to
Roosevelt's Queen Elizabeth, privateering for self and coun-
try) and Treasury Secretary Henry Morganthau (who con-
sidered the firebombing of Japan's wood and paper cities
more economically advantageous than facing her air and
naval forces in years to come). FDR himself believed that
such a move could be achieved by China's agency, with U.S.
neutrality preserved. His Secretaries of War and of the Army
did not, and when Chief of Staff George Marshall and Air
Corps chief Henry "Hap" Arnold insisted that any B-17s
available should be saved for Britain, Chennault's rather
fantastical plan of wiping out the Japanese Empire with his
own private air force came to naught.
Instead, less as a grand strategy than as a symbolic ges-
ture to sooth the China lobby, a hundred P-40B fighters (re-
designated P-4OCs after their modifications for overseas
service) were sold to Chiang's government, with the prom-
ise of more fighters and some light bombers (Lockheed
Hudsons) to follow. More important, a presidential order
gave Chennault permission to recruit an initial three hun-
dred pilots and ground crew to man these first aircraft. This
inaugural recruitment, accomplished through the spring of
1941 and sent to the Far East that summer, was as far as
matters got. Crews for Chennault's light bomber force were
en route across the Pacific on December 7,1941, when Ameri-
can entrance into the war caused their diversion to Austra-
lia. The Hudson bombers themselves stayed at the factory
in Burbank, awaiting assignment to the forces of a now
openly belligerent nation. Except for the symbolic Doolittle
raid, mainland Japan would not be bombed for years. Even
China itself would have to await distractions in Burma be-
fore getting full service from Chennault's volunteers. But
what an adventure their service would be: for themselves,
suddenly freed from the confines of a restrictively peace-
time military, and for Chennault himself, who would at last
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be able to effect his personal vision through command deci-
sions, but most of all for the history of military aviation, which
would assume its most modern format almost overnight.
If everything happens for the best, Claire Chennault
would rank as one of that sentiment's greatest living proofs.
Spurned by the Air Corps and surpassed in both rank and
influence by his contemporaries, on the eve of America's
participation in World War II he was the only air commander
positioned to return blows with any effectiveness against
the Japanese; because he was, he became in the early months
of 1942 America's first air hero, the only image of post-Pearl
Harbor success until Jimmy Doolittle's symbolic force of B-
25s used the innovation of carrier launching to bomb Toyko
on April 18. Chennault, of course, had wished to do that
first and believed he could have ended America's war with
Japan before it started. But that would have meant a differ-
ent, much grander style of warfare than he'd developed on
the drawing boards and brought into practice with his three
slim squadrons of Flying Tigers. One of the first news me-
dia correspondents to cover his work, Eric Sevareid of the
Columbia Broadcasting System, assessed Chennault's abili-
ties as much stronger on the side of close tactics, as recalled
in Not So Wild a Dream (1946):
I was sharply impressed by this legendary figure, but won-
dered whether the legend was not more impressive than the
figure. He was a man who did not smile easily; he was a little
deaf and like many deaf persons gave the impression of being
somewhat humorless. With a pointer he showed me on the
maps his whole system of triangular defense by interlocking
airfields, and I was surprised to find that he had so many
alternative locations from which to work. (So, one may add,
were the Japanese.) If his opinion of the Chinese was much
higher than that of so many other American officers it was not
only because they worshipped him almost as a god, but
because the secret telephone and short-wave warning system
by which they reported enemy planes almost as soon as they
took off from Hong Kong really did work. Chennault was a
hard driver, and all his men respected him, but except for a few
close to him there was no feeling of affection; he did not
"inspire" the mass of his men in the Stilwell way. It seemed to
me that he was a man who had developed the arts of combat
Tigers over Burma • 27
tactics almost to perfection. But he was a limited technician—
not, I thought, a man of expansive imagination, capable of
handling the immense strategic and political problems which
American officers were contending with in all parts of the
world, (p. 332)
A similar view came from Joseph W. Alsop, the popular
columnist, Washington insider and Roosevelt family confi-
dant (he was a cousin of Eleanor during a presidential ad-
ministration in which such connections counted highly), and
eventual procurement officer for Chennault's improvised
American Volunteer Group staff. In his "I've Seen the Best of
It": Memoirs (1992), Alsop describes his boss as "something
of a military genius" but in the style of "homemade learn-
ing of the kind one might have found in one of Andrew
Jackson's commanders"—in other words, a tactician in the
command of another master not of grand strategy but fiercely
close-fought tactics. "Jackson himself must have been the
same type of man," Alsop admits: "More flamboyant, less
canny, but with the same saltiness and the same daring" (pp.
167-68). Self-taught, salty, daring men successfully command
regiments, or their equivalent in military aviation, air groups;
they are rarely the leaders of full armies.
It was a composite of the character sketched by these
two media geniuses who greeted the first contingent of AVG
recruits arriving at the Rangoon docks on July 28,1941. Paul
Frillmann was a former missionary hired by Chennault to
be the AVG's chaplain and recreation and local liaison of-
ficer, and in China: The Remembered Life (1968) he describes
the scene as it unfolded when his sometimes boisterous
charges for the trans-Pacific journey met the man who would
be their leader:
I don't suppose anyone could have called Chennault
"glamorous" to his face without being punched. But he was a
vain man, and obviously relished making an impression. Like
MacArthur, he had immense natural magnetism on which to
base his public figure. That day on the docks he was wearing
some slapdash adventurous costume as usual—mosquito
boots, officer's shirt with Chinese insignia, beat-up Air Force
cap—which emphasized his gamecock look. Watching him for
only a few minutes, anyone would get the impression of
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informality and lack of military pomp, plus a quick, sure air of
decisive authority. I don't think any of the men on our ship had
ever seen him before, and as I looked down the rail where they
were lined up, staring silently at him, I could see that for the
time being anyway, Chennault had them all in his pocket, (pp.
62-63)
First impressions did not necessarily last. Faced with the
more-than-disappointing conditions in Burma and still
months away from their chance to earn hefty bonuses for
downing Japanese planes over China, some AVG men turned
sour—resigning to go home or going native to work the lu-
crative Burmese black market. But as soon as Chennault
could institute his training regimen, things changed. "The
pilots found Chennault a good teacher," Frillmann notes, "and
his information about Japanese planes and tactics was new
and fascinating" (p. 70). The leader's autobiography is replete
with metaphors from teaching and coaching, his model of
organization not that of service life but of the university: "For
rigid military discipline I tried to substitute a measure of
simple American democratic principles. Rigid discipline was
confined to the air and combat matters. On the ground we
tried to live as nearly as possible under the circumstances as
a normal American community." As a result, he was pleased
to see that "the barracks at Kyedaw Field during the train-
ing period had much the atmosphere of a college campus
on the eve of a homecoming football game" (p. 116). Yet tes-
timony from his pupils characterizes the method as more
fatherly than professorial. In God Is My Co-Pilot (1943) Rob-
ert Lee Scott Jr. finds that the method can be employed via
the agency of duck hunting, when the older leader and
younger Air Force regular would in fact go through "lessons
in tactics, lessons he had learned the hard way against the
Japanese" (pp. 219-20), all without Scott thinking they were
doing anything else but bagging waterfowl from the Chinese
marshes.
It is no exaggeration to say that the Flying Tigers had a
lot to learn and that Chennault would have to be careful
how to teach it. Royal Leonard sums up the typical Ameri-
can attitude toward the Far East at the start of I Flew for China,
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when his arrival overseas merits this pithy paragraph: "Ev-
erything in Shanghai was as I had anticipated. I had seen it
all before in the movies" (p. 6). As far as the end result of
China service, Leonard's vision is also shaped by images
from the movies, this time the destination in a Ronald
Coleman movie: Shangri-La (p. 113), an actual city his Young
Marshal employer planned to build in a temperate moun-
tain valley. Chennault's flyers knew a war needed to be
fought and won first, but their mental pictures for it came
from the same sources. Russell Whelan's The Flying Tigers
(1942) uses references to Rudyard Kipling's poetry as an at-
titude-setting introduction for American readers, and
radioman Robert M. Smith thinks of the same poet's work
when testing out reality against expectations. Those expec-
tations are an admittedly motivating force, as he explains
early in With Chennault in China: A Flying Tiger's Diary (1984),
remarking on enlistment that "I have always wanted to see
more of the world and experience adventure with a big 'A'
ever since I read Richard Haliburton's The Royal Road to Ro-
mance. I would have signed up for $100 a month" (p. 16) as
opposed to the $300 plus benefits he was getting. Yet the
Burma he's taken to is not exactly Kiplingesque, as he notes
soon after arrival: "We spent last night in a Chinese-owned
hotel in Mandalay. The town was oriental, dirty and drab.
Kipling should have forgotten the name. I think the only
reason he used it in his poem was because it rhymed with
'flying fishes play.' The hotel was a hole. It will be better to
sleep in the open air on our cots beside the trucks" (p. 32).
Smith had been detached from ground service with the
20th Pursuit Group, United States Army Air Corps, but even
a seasoned Naval aviator flying dive bombers off the carrier
Ranger could be similarly driven, as Duane Schultz explains
in The Maverick War: "Edward F. Rector was interested in
the Far East because of his appreciation of the poems and
stories of Rudyard Kipling" (p. 84). Robert T. Smith, the sec-
ond of three Bob Smiths with the AVG, was an Air Corps
instructor at Randolph Field when Chennault's recruiter
made contact, and in his Tale of a Tiger (1986) he remembers
how his childhood reading of Kipling, Joseph Conrad, and
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Jack London "did much toward creating a thirst for adven-
ture in far-away places that only increased as the years went
by" (p. 31). Hollywood movies are a part of his storehouse
of images, too, as drawn on when he views the crew of their
coastal steamer about to transport the wary volunteers from
Singapore to Rangoon:
The Captain, First Mate, and Chief Engineer were Norwe-
gians, which was somewhat reassuring. The rest of the crew,
perhaps a dozen in number, were a mixture of Malays, Lascars,
and Chinese, a crew that could be described as "motley" in the
fullest sense of the word. They were about as mean a looking
bunch as might have been assembled by Warner Brothers; I
had the feeling they'd have been more at home aboard a pirate
junk in the South China Sea, and that even Errol Flynn would
have had the good sense to say "be my guest" as they drug
Olivia De Havilland off, kicking and screaming, to a fate worse
than death, (p. 53)
Yet Smith's funniest recollection comes not from the movies
but from their pertinence (or lack of it) to real life. "You may
not believe this, R.T.," says his squadron mate Bill Reed, who
draws him aside after the Lascars and others retire below
deck to share a pipe of opium, "but we didn't see a hell of a
lot of that sort of thing back in Marion, Iowa" (p. 54), a re-
minder that whether in fantasy or fact these young flyers
are surely strangers in an even stranger land.
Kipling remains the most frequent literary reference in
Flying Tiger memoirs. Robert Scott might rue the contrasts
these young volunteers were confronting between what
they'd read and what they were now encountering, but al-
most every one of them was grateful for the chance; as Erik
Shilling puts it in Destiny, "the name Irrawaddy encom-
passed all the romanticism of the Orient," and now he was
meeting this great Burmese river firsthand. "It was well
known by those who enjoyed Rudyard Kipling's poems,"
and even though "Kipling was screwed up on his geogra-
phy," the AVG pilot, an expert on the lay of the land thanks
to his recent photo reconnaissance experience, still under-
stands priorities when it comes to matters of the spirit. "I
had read many enchanting poems and stories by Kipling,
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AVG veteran Bill Reed from Marion, Iowa, pictured far left with his
P-40N in the Chinese-American Composite Wing. (Private collec-
tion)
Bill Reed's P-40N after a mishap during takeoff. (Private collection)
and now I was seeing the Far East through his eyes" (p. 80).
Such readings help him enjoy the region, unlike many of his
colleagues who come to hate it. In a similar manner, Donald
Lopez ends his Into the Teeth of the Tiger by checking off high
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points on the three continents and one subcontinent to which
his air adventures have taken him, a treasury of wonders
anyone would be envious to share. "About the only thing
I'd missed," he concludes, "was Kipling's great gray-green,
greasy Limpopo River, all set about with fever trees" (p.
236)—an omission that matters less because at least he has
the words for it.
The other side of romanticism is evident in Joe Alsop's
first view of the Far East, particularly the status of its mili-
tary aviation. On a supply expedition to Singapore, he's met
by the local RAF Squadron Leader, a man "with an enor-
mous mustache who was standing just in front of an open
hangar full of aircraft that seemed to have come out of a
British boy's book on the First World War." The whole scene
is there for him to appreciate: ungainly biplanes with huge
engines, none of them with streamlined cowlings, grotesque
cylinder heads jutting into the slipstream like ragged spokes
on a wheel; guns of a caliber for rabbit hunting; and a net-
work of thin wires knitting their top and bottom wings.
"That's one of our fighter squadrons, you know," the some-
what comic figure tells him. "They're a little old fashioned,
but they're jolly maneuverable. I think they'll make a good
job of it with the Zeros" (p. 176). That Chennault had been
submitting freelance intelligence reports on the Zero and other
Japanese planes was of no more pertinence to the British than
to the Air Corps offices in Washington, where no note was
taken. Granted, Japan might well have a powerful navy, mod-
eled as it was on the great British fleet. But an air force, devel-
oped all on its own and manned by buck-toothed myopic
pilots? There was no way either the RAF or the newly renamed
USAAF could take such reports seriously—they must be just
more propaganda from the overheated China lobby.
Yet if Washington and London didn't listen to Chennault,
his three squadrons of the American Volunteer Group surely
would. Part of it was his convincing method. An even larger
part was these men's awareness that they were out here,
more than halfway around the world, on a very thin string.
As Robert M. Smith came to realize, their only hands-on
experience with China, much less the even more exotic
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realms of Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China over which they
were flying to start, was the collecting of colorful postage
stamps as children. Chennault had been in the Air Corps all
the way back to 1918, serving shoulder to shoulder with the
men who'd been their own colonels and generals. More im-
pressively, he'd been flying in the Far East since 1937, dur-
ing almost all of which the air forces under his command
had been fighting Japanese aircraft these new men had
scarcely heard about.
The first lesson was about the plane they'd fly, the P-40C
Tomahawk. The P-40 was first flown in 1938 as an inline-
engine modification of the radial-powered P-36 Mohawk,
the prototype of which dated back to 1934. Mohawks and
Tomahawks were the most widely produced American fight-
ers of their time, but as their nascent era was a time of peace
these Curtiss fighters were designed for the country's present
isolationist stance: as implements of infantry support and
coastal defense. Without superchargers, neither plane was
much good above 20,000 feet, which was where so much
combat would take place once World War II started. As a
result, both planes were relegated to less important theaters:
Mohawks to the RAF as it rebuilt two squadrons in 1942 for
Burma, and Tomahawks to Chennault's AVG.
What could an AVG pilot do with a heavily armored
plane meant to take out tanks, gun emplacements, and na-
val craft while absorbing fire from the ground? Obviously,
he could not engage in dogfights with Japanese adversaries
whose own planes sacrificed armor and other defensive
weight in favor of quick maneuverability. Given what he
had to work with, Chennault was grateful his forces weren't
faced with having to defend the United States itself. "It is
indeed fortunate that the Battle of Britain in 1940 was not
the Battle of America," he observes in Way of a Fighter, "for
we would have had no Spitfires to win our battle" (p. 24).
But even with a backward-looking rather than futuristically
designed aircraft, things could be done, especially if weak-
nesses were turned into strengths (with the opposite being
done to the enemy's equipment).
The essence of what the AVG learned from their leader
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is reported by pilot George "Pappy" Paxton in historian
Daniel Ford's Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the Ameri-
can Volunteer Group (1991):
Chennault told us that we had a sorry airplane, as fighters go.
That it had two things: diving speed and gunfire. If we used
those, we could get by with it. If not, we were going to get shot
up, cold turkey.
He told us: never stay in and fight; never try to turn; never
try to mix it with them. All we could do was to get altitude and
dive on them, or take for granted that the planes you could see
were all there were because we would always be outnumbered.
We flew a two-plane formation. Chennault told us to stick
with our leader, (p. 78)
The two-plane element was essential for flexibility and quick
action—almost as flexible and quick as one fighter operat-
ing alone, but without the disadvantage of being attacked
from its blind spot below and behind. From his experience
with the Air Corps aerobatic team, Chennault knew that two
aircraft could work in close coordination; his own stunts
involved having three planes tied together with relatively
short pieces of ribbon. Observers marveled that the trio per-
formed with the mind of one, which is exactly how the leader
had programmed their performance, the number three key-
ing off the action of number two, who was in turn glued to
the first plane. Such quickness was mandatory for the turn-
around the teacher wanted to achieve, making the Japanese
aircraft's agile lightness a detriment and the P-40's cumber-
some weight a strong advantage.
In the contest to come, as Chennault saw it, weight could
be of use in three ways: for faster dives, for the sturdiness
needed to take the stress from quick pull-outs, and for the
ability to absorb enemy fire without the pilot being killed or
the plane exploding. Two main reasons why the Tomahawk
weighed as much as it did were its protective armor and
self-sealing fuel tanks. By design, Japanese planes had nei-
ther, for any number of reasons: to give their craft superior
climbing and maneuverability, in appreciation that it took
less time to train a replacement pilot than to build a sophis-
ticated aircraft, and in recognition of the traditional Japa-
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Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk fighters in two versions of Flying Tiger
livery. (U.S. Army Signal Corps)
nese fighting code that death was better than surviving de-
feat. AVG hit-and-run tactics would compensate for being
outnumbered, while diving from above made weight a
speed-building attribute. Altitude advantage had to be won
before the engagement started, since it would be impossible
to claim once the fight began. No matter what the enemy's
numerical superiority, each AVG pilot would be concerned
with only one of them at a time, getting in and out of the
fray before the larger forces could be organized and directed
against him. A highly stressed pull-out, such as the P-40
could handle, would zoom it right back up to altitude for
another quick pass. If this did not make the odds equal, it
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did account for the wildly disproportionate number of Fly-
ing Tiger kills to losses. Like the Revolutionary War's Minute
Men at Lexington and Concord, Chennault's small force was
turning the adversary's greatest strengths into fatal weak-
nesses, and vice versa. Japan had the strategy, Chennault
the tactics, and because his tactics undercut the strategy's
chief force, the latter won the day.
Another transformed advantage was concentration of
firepower. Here the paired fighters performed their second
function, not just covering each other's tails, but once di-
rected to a target, using their guns in tandem. The result, as
Chennault's studies and practical experiments had shown,
did not simply double the firepower's effect but squared it,
giving the effect of four fighters attacking individually rather
than of two. This knowledge dated back to World War I and
the exploits of German ace Oswald von Boelcke and was
part of the doctrine Chennault was angered to see rejected
by the postwar air corps, politically committed as it was to
the presumed invincibility of the mighty bomber. By 1941,
however, the leader's young recruits had been reading about
how Britain, so much better equipped than themselves, had
been forced to abandon daylight bombing of Germany, be-
cause RAF bomber groups were being cut to ribbons by the
Luftwaffe and their perfection of the hard-striking yet
quickly flexible rotte, von Boelcke's key element used anew.
What they had been taught in their own service flight schools
wasn't working anywhere else in the world, and against the
odds they faced straight off in Burma it was obvious that
they'd better listen to someone who knew. Having studied
Japanese forces firsthand for more than four years and hav-
ing dedicated his career to the previously rewardless task of
devising superior fighter tactics, Chennault had his students'
attention.
An important lesson involved a frank appraisal of their
own worth. As few as they were, positioned at the long end
of American air power in an almost impossible supply situ-
ation, and flying an obsolescent fighter no one else seemed
to want, the pilots of the AVG might well devalue them-
selves. When rags had to be wrapped around the hubs of
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standard sources to make their machine guns fire, and Japa-
nese Nates and Oscars flew circles around them when they
did get engaged, the Tigers might well decry their weary
P-40 Tomahawks as useless. Back home, these planes were
not worth much—which was why they were so easily let go.
But here in Burma, and even more so to come in China, they
were the only effective air instrument available. Hence, ev-
ery plane, clapped out as it was, became worth more than
millions. Pilots were the same. Their high salaries, fantastic
bonuses, and relief from confining regulations were testa-
ment to that. Their small numbers made them even more
precious, for with America's entry into the war so imminent
there would not be any more of them as volunteers and not
anywhere near enough regulars once the U.S. Army Air Force
did move in. As late as March 1943, when Lt. Vernon J.
Henderson arrived in China as part of the 16th Fighter
Squadron in Chennault's new command, the same pedagogy
was still in practice, as Henderson states in Carl Moles-
worth's Sharks over China: The 23rd Fighter Group in World
War II (1994):
As I recall, he not only explained how the P-40s could best be
employed against the Japanese fighters, but expressed a
broader point of view. Pilots, airplanes, fuel and ammunition
were exceptionally precious here at the end of a very long
supply line. Conceptually, do all the damage to the enemy you
can, but remember there is always another day if you stay alive
and your airplane remains flyable. Dead heroes have very little
capacity to do further damage to the enemy. Much different
from most of the European scenarios, where the "homeland"
was involved. Then it was, "Good luck,gentlemen, you are
dismissed." (p. 97)
The final component in Chennault's method for using
his inferior forces against the Japanese involved an even
greater use of flexibility. Just as his planes would attack as
pairs rather than in full squadron formation, his three squad-
rons themselves would never be all in the same place at the
same time. Even for the initial Burma conflict, when the RAF
was pitiably outnumbered and outgunned and Rangoon lay
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virtually open to aerial bombardment, he put only one
squadron at a time into the city's defense. Another detach-
ment remained further north at Kyedaw Field where they
had trained, outside Toungoo, while most strength remained
in Kunming, their original Chinese destination and where
the AVG had moved once the monsoon period abated in the
fall. Here was the first example of a plan that would work to
Chennault's advantage not just with the AVG but with the
slim assets the USAAF never could improve on even later in
the war, given problems of long-range supply and more criti-
cal situations elsewhere. "It was this ability to shift my com-
bat operations six hundred and fifty miles in an afternoon
and a thousand miles in twenty-four hours that kept the
Japanese off balance for four bloody years and prevented
them from landing a counterpunch with their numerically
superior strength that might easily have put my always
meager forces out of business," he would note in Way of a
Fighter (p. 127). To operate this way meant he'd have to rely
on skeletonized resources, pilots sometimes doing their own
ground crew work, and with himself and his few close asso-
ciates functioning as an entire staff. But doing so gave him
the swift mobility that made the full potential of air power a
reality. Weak as they were, the three squadrons of the AVG
made such practice not only possible but absolutely neces-
sary to have a fighting chance against the Japanese.
Thus, Claire Chennault had turned adversity to his ben-
efit, using the counts against him as ways to gain points
ahead of the Japanese. In time, his ground crew and pilots
began seeing advantages in their battered P-40s as well—
perhaps, in the light of unanticipated success, imagining an
advantage, but responding in spirit nevertheless. One of the
few Flying Tiger memoirists wryly skeptical of the Toma-
hawk is Greg "Pappy" Boyington. But it is instructive that
throughout his iconoclastic Baa Baa Black Sheep (1958) he can
fault it only in comparison with German and British planes
rather than against his Japanese opponents. In each case his
source is anecdotal: from North Africa, a story about how a
Messerschmitt 109 pilot surprised a P-40 by passing it in a
dive and then flashing a victory signal, and from Singapore
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reports that not only had the RAF's Brewster Buffaloes been
chewed up by Zeroes but that "Even the Spitfire had been
shot full of holes in trying to turn in dogfights with Japa-
nese fighters" (p. 52). Granted, the Spitfire was vastly supe-
rior to the P-40, and if the Zero could best it, any hopes for
the Tomahawks were dashed, but there were no Spitfires at
Singapore. What Boyington must have heard about was its
inferior cousin, the Hurricane. Yet the lesson was well taken,
and Pappy, much more vaunted for his recklessness and ill
discipline than for his flying prowess at this time, resigned
from the AVG before its year abroad was over.
Pilots who stayed, and even the USAAF regulars who re-
placed them, had more time to see the Curtiss-Wright Toma-
hawk do well against the Japanese again and again. Eventually
a Zero was captured and rebuilt to operational standards,
making comparisons easier and with some measure of preci-
sion. The work was done by Gerhard Neumann, a German
national who had been adventuring in China since 1939. Start-
ing off as an automobile mechanic in Hong Kong, he had fled
inland as the war began, signing on with Chennault's forces
as a crew chief. After the war's end and some consulting with
the Office of Strategic Services, he repaired an Army Jeep and
with his wife drove over an almost impassable route from
China to Jordan, from whence he flew to the United States
and an eventual career with General Electric as director of its
jet engine division. In his autobiography Herman the German
(1984), titled for his Air Force nickname, Neumann confirms
this plane's strengths and weaknesses, crediting its equal
horsepower at half the weight and understanding its fatal flaw:
"The rugged and heavy P-40 could be shot full of holes like a
Swiss cheese and still keep on flying. The Zero, in contrast,
exploded in a ball of fire when hit by American incendiary
and explosive shells from fast-firing .50-caliber machine guns"
(p. 91). Bruce Holloway was the Air Force colonel chosen to
test Neumann's reconstructed Zero, and in Sharks over China
Carl Molesworth quotes his report:
First, I flew alongside a B-25 so official and news cameras
could get some shots. Then I tested it for climb and high speed
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at 10,15, 20, and 25,000 feet. This airplane is greatly overrated.
It is highly maneuverable; the P-40 and P-43 are both much
faster, sturdier. After these tests, I had a series of dogfights and
acceleration tests with both a P-40 and a P-43.1 went along in
line formation at 200 mph indicated with the P-40. On signal,
we both poured on the coal. For a few seconds we stayed
together, then the P-40 pulled away so fast it was thrilling—
nothing before has ever assured me so much as to who is going
to win the war as comparing the Zero and the P-40. The best
short definition I can think of for the Zero is a "cheesebox with
an engine." (p. 90)
Holloway's test took place on February 2,1943, a year and a
half since Chennault's ninety-nine Tomahawks arrived on
the docks at Rangoon. It would be December 1943, at the
end of an especially long year of continuing fierce struggle,
before the last of these outworn AVG fighters would leave
Army Air Force service.
Understanding what they were supposed to do from
their side of things, Chennault's pupils also had to learn what
to expect from their adversaries, the Japanese. In China, their
leader had seen that Japanese fighter pilots could be tricky,
leaving one of their colleagues "foundering in sloppy aero-
batics while his mates waited in ambush, generally hiding
above in the blinding sun" {Way of a Fighter, p. 57). Another
ploy was what Americans came to call the "squirrel cage," a
formation Pappy Boyington describes in Baa Baa Black Sheep.
A squadron of Japanese fighters would be encountered mak-
ing a big lazy loop, revolving like a pet rodent's exercise
wheel. As the Americans approached, the Japanese would
loosen up and spread out a bit, yet staying in the circle. "Their
idea was to suck the P-40s inside this beehive, in hopes that
we would turn with them. I became so familiar with this
change in the Jap formation when about to be attacked that
it made them look like a flock of vultures as they hover over
a single spot" (p. 63). Forever the bad boy, Boyington ig-
nored Chennault's advice to avoid such tricks and instead
devised a way to stay on top and only work his way down
as each enemy fighter was picked off. When strafing ground
targets, these same fighters would not use the standard West-
ern method of a flat approach followed by a low-level pass
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but rather flew a figure eight pattern of shooting at their
target from a dive, winging over into a climb, then descend-
ing for another attack.
Enemy bomber forces made matters simpler by their tight
discipline and generally predictable tactics. When attacked,
the formations (almost always of twenty-seven planes each)
held closely together; any bomber shot down quickly had
its place taken by another. The raids were often telegraphed
by the regular appearance of reconnaissance flights exactly
the same number of hours in advance of each day's raid.
The raids were also systematic; if something worked, it
would be repeated as an exact duplicate until it didn't work
any longer. Advances, when they came, were made with a
ground commando mentality, objectives taken in a rush and
then held with great patience until supply lines caught up.
If there were consistent weaknesses among the Japanese pi-
lots, Chennault taught, they were limited to bomber crews'
habit of lowering their guard after they thought danger had
passed and fighter pilots' reluctance to improvise when origi-
nal plans went wrong. At the time of their first combats with
the AVG, Japanese forces had not yet learned the need of
dispersing their craft at home bases, making the initial AVG
attacks more easily effective. Other than that, Chennault's
volunteers had to appreciate that their enemy was well-
trained, suitably equipped, and strongly dedicated to their
objective, which most immediately meant closing down the
Burma Road at its origin.
Much has been made of the Flying Tigers' motivation.
When their first successes were reported in late December
issues of Time and Life in 1941, another group of American
volunteers viewed their exploits with some skepticism. Al-
most as many—244, and every one of them a pilot—had
enlisted in either the Royal Air Force or Royal Canadian Air
Force in 1940-1941 to become members of the three RAF
Eagle Squadrons, flying Spitfires in defense of England, tan-
gling with the already well-tested, fantastically successful
Luftwaffe, and submitting to full RAF discipline as officers
in the King's forces. Even compared to what flyers earned
in the United States Army Air Force, their pay was piteously
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small; and when considering that Chennault's men had in-
creased their Air Force pay seven times over and stood
chances of multiplying that by getting fat bonuses for kills,
the question of whether the Tigers were mercenaries became
an apt one. Some of the Eagles asked it, especially in light of
their respective foes. Britain was America's closest ally,
united by language, tradition, and very real economic bonds.
Her plight at the hands of the Luftwaffe was personally un-
derstandable and aroused great sympathy; it was almost as
if America itself were being attacked. China, on the other
hand, was distant and foreign; even when resident in the
United States its people were considered an exotic minority.
Except for the widely publicized attack on Nanking and vi-
cious treatment of the population, Japan's war against China
was by no means as widely acknowledged as the struggle
between Germany and England. To President Roosevelt,
Prime Minister Churchill was not just an ally but a valued
friend; from the world's remote other side, an almost incom-
prehensible distance away where even the calendar date was
different, Generalissimo Chiang was a pesky nuisance. To
make comparisons even more individious, the Flying Tigers
were in this first stage not even fighting for the defenseless
folk romanticized by the China lobby. Instead, they were at
an outpost of British colonialism that even the RAF had char-
acterized as scarcely worth the effort to defend, so thin were
its allocated resources. To the Eagle Squadrons, the purpose,
glory, and very meaningful sacrifice were in their part of the
action, not a world away. They themselves would have given
anything to be in American military aviation; nearly all of
them had tried and been rejected, either because of peace-
time quotas or their own physical or educational deficien-
cies. To them, the AVG consisted of Air Corps or Navy officers
who had thrown their careers away to chase the almighty
dollar where neither the United States nor Britain thought it
worth serious effort. In such light, the Flying Tigers were
mercenaries, indeed.
The memoirist who got to know them best was their
chaplain, Paul Frillmann—not that after the heat of battle
these flyers confided their secret fears. Evidence from the
Tigers over Burma • 43
pilots themselves suggests he was regarded as somewhat of
a lush, more interested in caring for the group's liquor stores
than for their souls. But he was given other important jobs,
the first of which was supervising the initial large group of
recruits shipped out from San Francisco and arriving at
Rangoon on July 28, 1941. The trip wasn't easy, as accom-
modations were not the plush luxury the men had expected
and no workable system for discipline existed. Having a
chaplain in charge only compounded the lack of serious-
ness. Yet in China: The Remembered Life, the former mission-
ary made jackleg staff officer admits there was something
here that he could at least try to understand:
On the long haul from Honolulu to Manila, with the ship
creeping westward in beautiful tropical weather, we all got to
know one another better. I liked nearly everybody, but a
pattern was clear. Most men were escaping from frustrations or
disappointments, as perhaps I was. They hoped an unknown
future in unknown places would somehow give them a second
chance. One of the oldest was a tough former sergeant major
about forty-three, irreconcilably divorced. One of the youngest
was a boy of nineteen who had enlisted in the army, then got
right out again for this junket; he was longing for adventures
with lots of shooting, perhaps because he was small for his age.
A majority came from the South and West, and Texans were the
largest group from any state, (p. 60)
More specific are the statements of motivation in indi-
vidual pilot's memoirs. R.T. Smith begins his Tale of a Tiger
with the steady half-muffled roar from what he calls "The
weary old Wright Cyclone up front" grinding away on a
practice flight over a bleakly arid south Texas that "wilted
in the heat and humidity of early summer, 1941"—descrip-
tions indicative of "the persistent feeling of boredom and
frustration which I felt in my role as flight instructor" (p. 5).
Assigned to Randolph Field when his friends were sent off
to postings with fighter squadrons, Smith felt trapped by a
new regulation which set height limits for such duty: five
feet ten inches, well below his towering six feet four. When
Skip Adair, the AVG recruiter making rounds of Air Corps
bases, passed through San Antonio, Smith and a friend used
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a bottle of whiskey to help equivocate their way through an
interview meant to determine their proficiency in flying the
P-40 (they had none whatsoever, never having seen this type
of plane). Once accepted, however, they fit in as well as any
of the volunteers, some of whom had trained to fly dive
bombers or flying boats. Gathering at a San Francisco hotel
prior to their Far East departure, the AVG recruits hit it off
well. "And for the first time in a long while I felt completely
at home," Smith sighs. "These were my kind of guys, all of
them, seeking adventure and willing to accept the risks and
pay the price" (p. 38). By September 17 he's in the cockpit of
a P-40, "grinning and chuckling to myself like a kid with a
beautiful new toy, and feeling terribly self-satisfied. Some-
how I'd managed to beat the system and the eggheads in
the pentagon with their silly rules" (p. 68). By late Decem-
ber, when his old military colleagues are celebrating Christ-
mas on such lonely, boring duty as guarding the Panama
Canal, Smith is shooting down Japanese bombers over
Rangoon, fighting a war they wouldn't see for almost an-
other year.
Boredom, rather than a shoot-'em-up mentality, is also
what brought Charlie Bond into the AVG. Enlisting in the
Army as early as 1935 with hopes of becoming a pursuit
pilot, he wound up being trained on bombers instead. With
nothing to bomb, the Air Corps assigned him to the Air Trans-
port Command, ferrying Lockheed Hudsons from the fac-
tory in Burbank, California, to a base in Montreal, Canada,
from where the British would accept them as Lend-Lease.
The job was "dull" and "routine," as Bond complains at the
start of A Flying Tiger's Diary (p. 16). There seems no way
out until a friend of a friend (the ubiquitous Skip Adair)
makes contact with the AVG pitch. Bond's enthusiasm over-
shadows his lack of time on fighters. In sorting out his mo-
tives, he admits that "the lure of adventure in a foreign
country on the other side of the world was exciting," but
"more important, however, was the unique and ideal man-
ner in which this opportunity served to satisfy my dreams:
a chance to get back into fighters, a chance for combat expe-
rience which might help me secure a regular commission,
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and a chance to earn fast money which would put me in a
position to buy my parents a home" (p. 20).
And so there it is, last but important among all the en-
ticements to China, money. More than one Flying Tiger will
link such earnings, large as they are, with the desire to buy
his folks a home; as often as not, the home is for a widowed
mother, replete with gardens for vegetables and flowers,
sentiments whose context (letters home on the eve of battle)
argues for their sincerity. In one case, money wasn't even
the volunteer's idea, but that of his commanders: Pappy
Boyington was almost literally drummed out of the Marine
Corps until he could catch up on alimony and pay off a host
of other debts that had made him a disgrace to his unit. Yet
in a few others, economics were more bald faced and merce-
nary than going after Japanese bombers for pay. Shortly af-
ter Paul Frillmann's group of fresh recruits reached Burma,
several resigned—a few because the rough conditions
weren't what they bargained for, but many as part of a pre-
meditated plan to get out of their military enlistments so
that they could accept high-paying jobs with the airlines,
eager to hire now that experienced pilots were becoming
scarce.
Ironically, it was as a private corporation doing its busi-
ness in the air that the American Volunteer Group was orga-
nized. It would be kept in order not as a military outfit but
as an airline, the critical nature of flying being the determi-
nant for order rather than any abstract military code. Charlie
Bond, with some of the longest service experience and per-
haps the firmest plans for a lifetime Air Force career (he even-
tually retired as a major general), writes optimistically of
this intent in his diary for November 13,1941, the day after
his own group of AVG personnel reached Rangoon:
The setup is not as bad as some of us were led to believe by
rumors from disgruntled ones. The American Volunteer Group
is headed by Colonel Claire Chennault with a very small
administrative staff of selected men from volunteers from the
Navy, Army Air Corps, and Marines. We have about one
hundred pilots and about two hundred maintenance and
support personnel. No military titles. Everything is run like a
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civilian business, somewhat like an American airline company.
However, there is an underlying, subconscious aura of military
relations between the officers, pilots and staff, and the enlisted
men, maintenance and support people. Discipline is more a
matter of each individual's own behavior and his personal
regard for the other man. (p. 41)
R.T. Smith credits the same ideal as working toward what
he calls "a much more democratic atmosphere" in which
these freedoms were seldom abused. "Actually," he notes,
"I think it tended to keep us on our toes," citing one of his
bad landings for which he was comically chewed out by his
ground crew. "Imagine something like that happening in the
Air Corps or on the deck of a carrier!" he exclaims (p. 71).
Olga Greenlaw sums up the motivational inducement by
emphasizing the "one vital difference between the AVG and
a regular service unit," one that eclipsed any question of
discipline: "Our boys were free to resign whenever they
wished—which can't be done in the Army, Navy or Marines"
(p. 50). Her final proof of their merit is how few of them
failed to stick it out.
Like Paul Frillmann, Olga Greenlaw had a chance for
special insights into the Flying Tigers. Together with the
group's nurses, she was one of just three women working
with these three hundred men for a year so far from home.
As wife of Claire Chennault's chief assistant, she was privi-
leged to inside information and present when important
decisions were made. As group diarist, she kept track of
everything official that happened; with several pilots she
shared deep emotional attachments, serving as their confi-
dant and learning more about them than their leader ever
could. She was happy that Chennault was "by no means a
spit-and-polish general" but felt that among all the freedom
from restrictions he allowed "that he was too lenient about
the use of liquor, particularly with the men [serving as
ground crew], and that the Group as a whole would have
benefited by a bit more iron-handed discipline" (p. 96). The
worst examples of rowdiness, to the point of brutal assaults
and other outright criminal activity, happened among what
in a military unit would have been the enlisted men; the fly-
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ers themselves were former officers in a day when the Air
Corps and Navy demanded a minimum of two years of col-
lege before being accepted and when college itself was more
restrictive. Yet even the flyers could shock an upper-crust
blueblood such as Joe Alsop, whose first words for them in
his own memoir are that "The pilots were a motley bunch,
largely untrained as fighter pilots and hardly disciplined as
men" (p. 173). Olga Greenlaw was prone to dismiss their
misbehavior as having a few too many drinks at the Bur-
mese railroad station restaurant and shooting up the village
"Red Gulch style" (p. 55), a reputation Robert Lee Scott char-
acterizes in Flying Tiger: Chennault of China as that of "pi-
rates, or western bad men, and they were just about as hard
to handle" (p. 21)—a judgment he later modifies as an act
put on to scandalize regular service personnel, including
himself (p. 58). Much of the worst behavior was attributable
to the ugly American syndrome, as when a crew chief beat
up a French doctor who refused to perform an abortion on
the chief's Burmese girlfriend. Part of it was the tit-for-tat
game played with authority: when Chennault appointed a
formal provost marshal, two technicians beat him up on prin-
ciple. But at least a few of the goings on were serious. Innu-
endoes from other memoirs are given full treatment by
Pappy Boyington in his novel Tonya (1960), in which Chen-
nault is a wencher, Olga Greenlaw shares his bed and many
others', Harvey Greenlaw is a petty martinet, Paul Frillmann
is a drunk, and one of the pilots of the AVG's communica-
tions flight is a big-time drug runner on the international
scene. And before the AVG left Burma there was no small
amount of black marketeering, fueled as it was by the abun-
dance of military stores being abandoned in retreat. When
Chennault fired the culprits it only gave them more free-
dom in which to conduct their illicit trade.
"There are many 'red asses' and 'independents' in this
outfit," Charlie Bond complains to his diary on January 16,
1942, after almost a full month of hostile operations. "It is
pathetic! I get quite frustrated and enraged" (p. 76). These
are the words, of course, of a future major general. But even
as a flyer disposed toward adventuring with the Flying Ti-
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gers he finds his patience tested by lapses in performance
that could have been so easily prevented with a minimum
of service discipline. Animosities developed between Rob-
ert "Sandy" Sandell and the men under his leadership in
the 1st AVG Squadron, weakening the unit's effectiveness.
In the 2nd Squadron, pilot Raymond Hastey had a rough
experience after taking off from the base at Mingaladon to
defend Rangoon on January 28,1942. Not only was his plane
hit, but after bailing out he was shot at in his parachute;
startled by such realities of war, he refused to fly again, ask-
ing for and getting ground duties instead. This was the same
day and at the same field where a Japanese pilot deliber-
ately crashed his disabled fighter into a just-landed Toma-
hawk, sacrificing himself in the samurai tradition of jibaku,
which in modern times had become part of accepted mili-
tary practice. As Daniel Ford notes of this occasion, "The
contrast with Chennault's free-wheeling mercenaries could
not have been greater" (p. 210).
Most examples of less than ship-shape behavior, how-
ever, tend to be comic and derive in fact from the AVG's
essentially good nature. Their casual, even loose, conduct
was characteristic not of malcontents but of people having a
good time, of young men supremely enjoying what they are
doing. At Kyedaw, the training base borrowed from the RAF,
Chennault's flyers found themselves guarded by a platoon
of Gurkhas, sturdy little Nepalese troops symbolic of
Britain's colonial armies and quite in character by only know-
ing a few words (for minimal commands) of English. In Tale
of a Tiger, R.T. Smith enjoys telling how he and his friends
would be returning late at night from celebrations in
Toungoo and have to answer the Gurkha guard's challenge,
"Halt! Who goes there?" To the tough little soldier standing
there with rifle at ready, a tipsy Flying Tiger might yell back,
"Japanese spy!," a formulation which inevitably prompted
the Gurkha to lower his rifle and sing out cheerfully, "Poss,
Jopponese spy!" (p. 73). A similar language game was played
later on in China, when the operations of Chennault's new
regular air force were hampered and harassed by the leader's
old nemesis from service days, Colonel Clayton Bissell, serv-
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ing in India as a temporary brigadier general simply so he
could outrank Chennault and keep firm control over his
supplies. Frustrations got so bad that the second generation
Tigers sought comfort in teaching their Chinese ground crews
just a minimal three words of English, a phrase each innocent
crewman thought was a pleasant greeting, so pleased did each
American visitor seem when pulling up for a refueling and
being hailed with a hearty "Piss on Bissell!" When the acting
brigadier was eventually received this way himself, the Ti-
gers' hilarity could scarcely be contained.
If these pilots did not take a prissy, regulation-conscious
officer like Bissell seriously, neither did they demand heavy
formalities for themselves. After all, they were flying worn
out, poorly maintained, ill-supplied aircraft in a region with
some of the worst flying weather in the world—monsoons
in the summer, haze and dust other times, with an inhospi-
table landscape below should anything go wrong. Even navi-
gation was a joke, as electronic aids were nonexistent and
accurate maps unobtainable. They described their flying
standards as IFR: not for "Instrument Flight Rules," as might
apply were there facilities for using their instruments, but
rather "I follow railroads." Good hearted as they were, the
AVG met almost everyone with good humor. Consider how
on February 4, 1942, Ed Liebolt and Einar Mickelson of the
3rd Squadron welcomed two unexpected visitors to their
base at Kunming. As one was a beautiful Chinese woman,
Chennault's men were hospitable to the point of putting the
make on her. As she responded with courtesy that to a young
American might seem flirtatious, they suggested she ditch
the older gentleman who seemed to be with her. Only when
Chinese servants at the AVG hostel recognized her as Ma-
dame Chiang did a shocked Liebolt and Mickelson scramble
to retrieve the Generalissimo they'd left stranded on the run-
way. A month later, as the rest of the AVG left a collapsing
Burma for safety in China, Paul Frillmann's contingent met
up with the U.S. Army ground commander, "Vinegar Joe"
Stilwell, who lived up to his nickname by dressing down
the volunteers for their poor image. Frillmann's men were
in fact the most presentable contingent thereabouts, as in
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the middle of Stilwell's diatribe a carload of unsupervised
ground crew drove up with a supply of contraband, Anglo-
Burmese girlfriends, and bottles of liquor, the last of which
they were waving merrily from the window. No account
survives of the general's words to them.
Boozing with party girls was not an atypical image for
flyers, particularly irregular adventurers like the AVG. Ho-
mosexual behavior was more unusual, but it too made its
contribution to the group's image, eventually in a very big
way. Among the troublemakers Chennault weeded out were
clerks Ken Sanger and Larry Moore; the colonel's objection
was that they were lovers and therefore unsuited for ser-
vice. Their revenge was to take their firsthand knowledge
of the AVG and concoct it into a story saleable to Hollywood.
By June 1942, while their former colleagues were still flying
and fighting in China, Republic Studios had their movie in
production, and even though Chennault's intercession with
Republic got the two men removed from active participa-
tion in the filming, much damage was done. Starring John
Wayne, the film as released drew great attention to the AVG's
exploits, but very little of director David Miller's Flying Ti-
gers conformed with fact. No pilot in Chennault's squad-
rons ever caused the death of colleagues by selfishly going
after kills for bonuses, and none of them ever practiced their
own version of jibaku by making his copilot bail out before
he sacrificed his own life by diving their aircraft into a Japa-
nese supply train. As an apotheosis of male love and tran-
scendental bonding, the flyers' behavior made for a stirring
plot, thoroughly convincing if one ignored the fact that
Chennault's American Volunteer Group flew only single-seat
fighters.
Other media also did their best to enhance the Flying
Tigers legend. As matters of fact, while operating as just one
squadron at a time AVG flyers had inflicted such high losses
on Japanese bomber groups that Rangoon was held three
months longer than anyone might have hoped for, allowing
a somewhat more orderly retreat by the British into India
and giving Chennault more time to establish operations in
his original destination, China. Also established as fact were
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the extremely long odds at which the Flying Tigers fought;
to merely survive, their success ratio would have to be high.
As it happened, the inflation of claims inevitable in the con-
fusion of battle produced figures that let American newspa-
per correspondents have a field day. In The Flying Tigers,
Russell Whelan describes the formula one reporter used and
adds his own exuberance to stir his book's 1942 readership
at a point when American successes were still an exception
rather than the rule:
Leland Stowe, in Rangoon for the Chicago Daily News foreign
service, essayed a breakdown of the results attained by the
AVG, and reached a total of one hundred and thirty Jap planes
as "truly conservative." Of this number, Stowe figured that
about forty per cent, or fifty-two planes, were bombers, with
crews from five to eight men each. Striking an average of six
and one-half men for each Jap bomber, he placed the Japs'
personnel losses in bombers at three hundred and thirty-eight
men, plus seventy-eight Jap pilots killed in single-seat fighters,
or a total of four hundred and sixteen crew losses for the
Japanese.
"In these engagements the AVG lost five pilots killed in
action and one believed taken prisoner," wrote Stowe. (One of
these, Bert Christman, was "murdered" while descending in
his parachute.) "That number of six Americans lost can be
placed alongside of more than four hundred Jap airmen who
have been wiped out by American fighter pilots in the Burma
war theater.
"All feelings of national pride can be put aside in reporting
this outstanding and historical achievement of the AVG in
Burma during the last seven weeks. It is an achievement which
certainly has very rarely been equalled anywhere since the war
began, and possibly not equalled by the same number of
airmen operating with ground crews which are very far below
the regulation size used by the U.S. Army Air Forces.
"Nevertheless, despite the Nazis' flair for making exorbitant
claims for their pilots, even the Germans have never claimed
that their squadrons have eliminated enemy air personnel at
anything remotely approaching a ratio of six pilots lost against
four hundred or more in enemy flying personnel.
"Fortune gave the AVG an opportunity to turn the air war's
tide over Burma, but to these young Americans belongs credit
for having risen magnificently to an opportunity in which odds
seemed seriously against them."
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In that dispatch Leland Stowe was straining for conservativism
with both fists. Four hundred-odd against six! Shades of Frank
Merriwell, Tom Swift, Tarzan, and Superman! There had never
been anything like this since Cain tackled Abel in the first
recorded battle of history, (pp. 120-22)
Other reporters used such images as the Spartans at
Thermopylae or a few rowboats engaging the Spanish Ar-
mada. In these cases imagery told a more accurate story, for
Chennault's men were indeed grossly outnumbered. But no-
where near 130 Japanese planes were shot down, and no Japa-
nese bomber carried a crew of eight. Even the lurid reference
to Christman's death ignored the fact that international law
and the covenants of war allowed for the shooting of enemy
airmen in parachutes if they were descending over their own
territory, from which they could presumably return to com-
bat. As for numbers, the validity of their rhetoric is confirmed
by Olga Greenlaw, who for her own readers in a 1943 still
suggestive as being a long way from victory was able to put it
bluntly and accurately:
The situation looked gloomy indeed when all of a sudden
out of nowhere came a blazing flash of light. A handful of
unknown American youngsters in airplanes which had been
much maligned by the British and Americans, completely on
their own and constantly heckled by a hundred official,
political and international stupidities, slashed through the blue
Burmese skies and not only kicked the daylights out of all the
Japs in sight but proved, mathematically, that one good
American is a match for any twenty Japanese—and thereby
saved the white man's ego from a total breakdown, (p. 49)
Whatever the imagery, there was more than enough real
success in the Flying Tigers' exploits for them to become
genuine heroes. Hometowns across America that previously
could look only to casualty lists from Pearl Harbor for a lo-
cal connection to the war now had boys in the AVG to be
proud of. When Ken Jernstedt of Yamhill, Oregon, took part
in a successful attack against the Moulmein airfield now in
Japanese hands, no less a figure than the governor of Or-
egon responded with an internationally transmitted radio
message, asking the young man what type of airplane his
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fellow citizens should buy and send over to his squadron in
Burma. Like the Spitfire Funds that rallied patriotic support
in Britain, this gesture would let Americans feel they were
participating. That the contribution was to a winning effort
was clarified by no less a personage than Winston Churchill,
who in February 1942 described the AVG's efforts in defense
of Rangoon as comparable in character to the RAF's efforts
in the Battle of Britain. From this man, whose noblest ora-
tory had been inspired by the heroism of that particular fight,
no higher commendation was possible.
Almost half a century later, and writing from the respon-
sible position of a retired Air Force major general, Charlie
Bond could look back on this first success. Postwar docu-
mentation let him get the numbers right; even in their lesser
scale they still seemed overwhelming, for by any measure
they most certainly were. More important, the perspective
he took then and takes again now, as he prepares A Flying
Tiger's Diary for publication, clarifies the AVG's importance:
The first taste of battle—just three engagements over China
and Burma—demonstrated our ability and training as fighter
pilots. During that first week of action the AVG destroyed fifty-
five enemy bombers and fighters while losing only five
Tomahawks. Unfortunately, two of our colleagues were killed,
but at the same time two hundred enemy airmen were either
killed or captured.
We were shattering the myth that the Japanese Air Force
was invincible, (p. 78)

At Odds
in China
- • - From the ground in Burma, matters looked less san-
guine than they seemed in the air. When the 3rd Squadron
of the AVG was relieved from its initial defense of Rangoon,
one of its ground crewmen confessed his terror to radioman
Robert M. Smith.
"It was horrible, Smitty it was horrible," the man reports
in Smith's With Chennault in China. "Sixty-five tons of bombs
were dropped on Rangoon. It was worse than anything the
British saw at London. I never want to see another like it"
(p. 46). Everything the squadron crew had on the ground
was flattened; safety could be found only deep in a slit trench.
One of the volunteers never made it out of the operations
office, which took a direct hit: "I saw parts of him hanging
from a barbed wire fence. Oh, it was horrible, Smitty, hor-
rible. I never want to see it again" (p. 49).
But it did happen again, and again several times over,
between late December 1941 and early March when the city
eventually fell. With the first raids Chinese coolies aban-
doned the docks and large numbers of Indian office work-
ers and shopkeepers packed up and headed home. "That is
a sight," Smith's friend marvels, "Rangoon walking back to
India" (p. 49). Chaplain Paul Frillmann complains of an even
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more pervasive weakness, extending to the British who he
felt no longer had the heart to care for their colonial system.
"Inside Rangoon," he notes in China: The Remembered Life,
"it was appallingly clear that this capital and single metropo-
lis of Burma was crumbling in defeat before a single Japa-
nese foot soldier had crossed the border" (p. 105). When time
for evacuation came, civil order had almost totally broken
down. "Most of the whites were gone," Olga Greenlaw re-
calls in The Lady and the Tigers. "The lepers and the insane
had been turned loose. Rioting, thieving and looting were
going on. The police had lost control over the natives. No
one was safe in the streets at night" (p. 101).
Colonel Chennault's volunteers were part of this exo-
dus. With an avalanche of supplies abandoned on the docks,
they grabbed what they could, later uncrating their loot to
discover, according to Duane Schultz in The Maverick War,
"a five-year supply of shoelaces, a year's worth of facial tis-
sues, and a small mountain of kitchen cleanser" (p. 209). But
no toothpaste—for brushing their teeth the men would have
to use something from another case, a hoard of Bristol cream
sherry. To reach their new base in Kunming, China, ground
elements of the AVG would have to negotiate the tricky
Burma Road, the route they had come to defend and over
which more serious supplies were supposed to have made
their way to Chiang Kai-shek's beleaguered people.
Along with the losses of Hong Kong and especially
Singapore, the fall of Burma put Britain in a dangerous po-
sition. Were Japan now to take the next step and capture
India, an assault could be made onward to the Middle East,
attacking Britain's desert army from the rear and securing
the Mediterranean for the Axis. If China, too, were removed
from the conflict, Japanese resources could be directed more
powerfully toward maintaining early gains in the Pacific.
Allied strategy recognized both elements in reorganizing for
a China-Burma-India theater; the middle factor had been lost,
but if each end was secure a more reasonable situation in
the Far East might be obtained. In the Royal Air Force, squad-
rons that had been wiped out in Singapore and Rangoon
were reformed, albeit with more obsolescent equipment:
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Mohawk and early marque Hurricane fighters flew through-
out 1942 until Spitfires replaced them in 1943, while
Blenheims did the heavier work until modern Beaufighters
and a few Mosquitoes arrived. In China the American Vol-
unteer Group continued in its efforts to prevent a Japanese
free hand, only near the end obtaining a few Curtiss P-40E
Kittyhawks, a plane better equipped for the unit's enhanced
duties in ground attack. Still, the core of Chennault's outfit
was what remained of his original one hundred P-40C Toma-
hawks and pilots to fly them.
Away from the rat race of Burma and reestablished in
their intended role, the AVG became even more aware of
the long odds at which it fought and difficult conditions in
which it had to operate. Small as it was, the original number
of one hundred planes and pilots had suffered from hid-
eous attrition even before the first enemy bullet was fired or
bomb was dropped. Of his one hundred pilot recruits, only
ninety-nine embarked from the United States. The man
Chennault wanted most was not among them, his attempt
to get a passport foiled by the State Department's worry over
the very talents his new boss wanted to employ—for Albert
"Ajax" Baumler had already flown as a mercenary for the
Loyalists during the Spanish Civil War, shooting down eight
German and Italian planes in 1938. There were only ninety-
nine P-40s as well, for one was inadvertently dropped into
Rangoon harbor during the unloading process. The ranks of
both men and planes thinned rapidly, thanks to resignations
either planned from the start (using military releases for AVG
service to get freed for lucrative airline employment) or be-
cause of dismay at local conditions; P-40s were lost in flying
accidents and severely damaged during training mishaps
on the ground. By the time the volunteer group disbanded,
on July 4,1942, Chennault had been forced to discharge ad-
ditional men for disciplinary reasons. All told, twenty-two
pilots and forty-three ground crew did not serve out their
contracts, a failure rate of almost twenty-five percent.
A large part of the problem with both men and planes
was the way the AVG had to be trained. Time limits made
for severe pressures both on the American Volunteer Group
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and the USAAF's 23rd Fighter Group that beginning in the
summer of 1942 replaced them. The latter was the first U.S.
combat group to be formed in a combat zone during World
War II. Such formation even in peacetime is a major organi-
zational job. As Carl Molesworth notes in Sharks over China,
"It was standard practice for USAAF fighter groups to form
in the United States and train for six months or more before
they ever reached foreign soil, much less encountered an
enemy aircraft" (p. 5). Chennault did it in combat areas twice,
with minimal breathing space for the AVG in Burma and
none whatsoever for the 23rd Fighter Group in China.
At least his Army Air Force pilots in the 23rd had taken
their Primary and Basic Training according to the same
method and in Advanced were given extensive experience
in fighters. Less than a fifth of the AVG was so qualified.
Many were Navy or Marine flyers, whose expertise with
single-engine planes was directed to operating them from
carrier decks. Others were trained as dive bombers, while
a few had flown mostly multiengine bombers, transports,
or—most preposterously, considering what Chennault
would be asking of them from day one—flying boats. Air-
craft losses due to accidents outstripped what would be a
normal group's anticipated attrition from combat. Less than
two months before his flyers would be facing hundreds of
Japanese aggressors, Chennault's men were piling up their
P-40s in alarming numbers. Such doings prompted one cal-
endar date, November 3, 1941, to be long remembered as
"Circus Day," on which during the hours of daylight one
Tomahawk leveled off too early, dropping so hard it burst a
tire and veered from the runway (a flaw typical of flying
boat pilots, by habit thinking of their cockpits as being much
higher up), another angled off into the trees where its land-
ing gear collapsed, a third ground-looped on landing, dam-
aging its wheels, while at dispersal a pair of P-40s chewed
off the tails of two others while a third plane braked too hard
and nosed up. The day's net loss was eight planes, a greater
number than the Japanese would take down in any single
action.
The particular batch of P-40s purchased for the AVG
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made for further hardships. At the Curtiss-Wright factory
in Buffalo, New York, they had been manufactured for Brit-
ain and hence came off the line with RAF specifications. That
meant wing guns that took .303-caliber ammunition, instead
of .50 caliber like American fighters of the time. There were
no .303-caliber bullets in China, however, and getting them
supplied from abroad was a continuing problem. Because
the RAF used a different type of radio and would be doing
installations themselves, these Tomahawks left the factory
with none whatsoever. Chennault had hoped to get what
the Army Air Force was using, but those were denied to
Chiang's buyers; all they could purchase were "Piper Cub
sportplane radio sets," as radioman Robert M. Smith de-
scribes in With Chennault in China, "providing us with an-
other hazard in our operations because these could not stand
up in continual combat and often failed at embarrassing
times" (p. 11). There were no bomb racks or drop tanks ei-
ther, and so these had to be improvised. Worst of all, the
three squadrons of Tomahawks were delivered with no spare
parts whatsoever, not even a spark plug. As replacements
were needed, they had to be scrounged from all over South-
east Asia. This was one of Joe Alsop's jobs, seeking help from
MacArthur in Manila and from the British in Singapore and
Karachi. He was returning through Hong Kong when that
city fell to the Japanese, putting him in alien internment for
several months before he could use his old connections in
journalism to talk his way out, eventually making his way
back to Chennault's staff.
Compounding the problem of flying American planes
built to British specifications in the nether reaches of a China
almost completely cut off from supplies was the fact that
the purchase and maintenance of these planes was from start
to finish a commercial, rather than a military, agreement. As
a neutral when the AVG was organized, the United States
could not sell military equipment to a belligerent air force.
Put bluntly, there had to be a cover organization with whom
to do the dealing, and thus CAMCO, the Central Aircraft
Manufacturing Corporation, was formed by H.H. Kung, one
of Madame Chiang's brothers-in-law, and the American
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William Pawley, a businessman with interests in Chinese
aviation. Chennault had known Pawley since 1935, meeting
him at the Miami Air Races where the Air Corps' aerobatics
act made its first contact with recruiters for the Chinese Air
Force, the seed that later brought Chennault to China.
From the very start of AVG planning Pawley made
trouble. Because another hat he wore was that of agent for
Curtiss-Wright sales in China, he demanded his customary
ten percent commission, even though he had nothing to do
with agenting the deal and was himself, in legal terms, the
purchaser. This wrangling set schedules back several months,
forcing the AVG to train in Burma rather than China and
throwing it almost at once into the battle for Rangoon. Once
the AVG was established, dealings with Pawley only got
worse. With the planes taking a terrible beating during train-
ing and by December suffering combat damage as well,
CAMCO reneged on its agreement to repair P-40s at its base
in Loiwing, where Pawley was making better money assem-
bling trainers and CW-21 Demon fighters he'd sold directly
to China. A vicious war of words erupted between the two
men, each feeling his reputation was being damaged by re-
percussions reaching to Chiang and Roosevelt.
Because of his success with the AVG and heroic leader-
ship of the air war in China all the way to the summer of
1945, Claire Chennault had the last word against Bill Pawley.
Way of a Fighter is not a mean-spirited autobiography; Gen-
erals Bissell and Stilwell, who caused the Flying Tigers much
trouble and often for relatively petty motives, are handled
with surprising equanimity and understanding. But for the
general partner of CAMCO Chennault has no good words
at all:
I have always suspected that Pawley, like the Japanese,
thoroughly believed the British and American intelligence
reports that the AVG would not last three weeks in combat. At
any rate on the occasions when he had a chance to provide the
AVG with badly needed assistance, Pawley exhibited what I
considered a remarkable lack of co-operation. It was only after
the AVG's combat record had made the organization world
famous that Pawley made strenuous efforts to have himself
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identified with it, even to the extent of attempting to secure an
honorary membership of the Flying Tigers Incorporated, the
only authentic postwar organization of former AVG men, by
offering a ten-thousand-dollar contribution to the corporation's
funds. His offer was flatly rejected by the membership, who
apparently felt that a few repaired P-40's during the dark days
of 1941-42 would have been more valuable to them than a
postwar check. After a succession of wartime manufacturing
ventures, Pawley embarked on a diplomatic career as ambassa-
dor to Peru and Brazil. No doubt he found the Medal for Merit
awarded him for "organizing the Flying Tigers" useful to his
new work. (pp. 132-33)
In early 1942, with Pawley off to a new venture in India,
Chennault turned to the Generalissimo for help. Chiang ar-
ranged for the Chinese manager of CAMCO to continue re-
pairing AVG planes while plans were made to have the
Chinese government buy out Pawley's interest in the corpo-
ration. This militarized the operation, but that was no longer
a problem because the United States had entered the war as
China's ally.
Having fought a withdrawing action from Rangoon
northward toward the border, the AVG spent its last three
months operating more systematically against the Japanese.
Their first operation, on December 20, 1941, had defended
Kunming from Japanese bombers who heretofore had en-
joyed free reign over the city. Now that the defense of
Rangoon was over, Chennault's pilots could use China as a
base from which to take the war back to the Japanese. Sup-
ply lines via road and rail were interdicted; Burmese bases
that had once been the RAF's and AVG's own were attacked
as enemy forces used them as staging areas for their advance
toward India. Thailand and French Indo-China, occupied
by the Japanese early on, now became Flying Tiger targets.
Chinese bombers were being escorted as far as Hanoi and
Haiphong. Kill ratios remained high, but the stress of op-
erations, especially under adverse conditions, took its toll
on morale. The fact that the United States was now in the
war did not help; at best, the AVG could pride themselves
that they had been ahead of the time in their sentiments and
were now vindicated, but the more predominant attitude
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was one of feeling abandoned, because so far American
might had supplied them with next to nothing and sent in
no pilot reinforcements at all. By spring of 1942, only about
half of their original ninety-nine Tomahawks were still fly-
able, and most were in miserable shape; not a single one
would have been let off the ground, much less sent into com-
bat, had this been a regular outfit operating in the USAAF.
When on April 15, 1942, Colonel Chennault of the Chinese
Air Force was taken back into the American military as a
colonel in the Army Air Force and almost immediately pro-
moted to brigadier general, some pilots were resentful. As
far as his relations with the AVG, a general's stars meant
nothing positive. His flyers were still civilians, not subject
to military orders; persuasion and the discipline of a well-
run business remained the only ways to get things done.
Negatively, their leader's new status made some men feel
the Army was taking over with no benefits to themselves.
Aggressive, ill-tempered, and loutish behavior, such as had
been restricted before to ground crews and technicians, broke
out in several instances among the pilots. Six of them quit,
including Pappy Boyington on April 20; though later hailed
as a hero both for his Flying Tiger and subsequent Black
Sheep Squadron service with the Marines, he was written
off the AVG books by Chennault with a dishonorable dis-
charge, for the record considered a deserter.
Strains and stresses had been obvious for some time, start-
ing with Charlie Bond's diary notations and surfacing through
various attempts to revise the command structure. Oddly
enough, Boyington emerged as Bond's partner in trying to
maintain tighter order, at least during duty hours. Bond him-
self worried whether the AVG could survive a concentrated
Japanese attack and became well enough known for his views
that other concerned flyers flocked to him, while Dr. Lewis
Richard and chaplain Paul Frillmann sought him out for late-
night sessions devoted to seeking the larger good. As early as
January 2,1942, one finds Bond confiding to his Flying Tiger's
Diary that "I went to bed wondering if I were now becoming
another 'chaplain' along with the Padre" (p. 70).
Provocation for a more serious type of revolt arrived on
At Odds in China • 63
April 9 in the person of Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo
was visiting Kunming with some bad news and an even less
heartening request. His Chinese ground forces were being
beaten back through Burma. Already pushed past the former
AVG training base at Kyedaw Field near Toungoo, these
troops would have to rally or everything would collapse to
the north, putting the enemy on Chiang's doorstep. British
forces, more concerned with preventing a quick Japanese
thrust toward India, felt the Chinese were not doing enough
to stem the larger tide. Therefore Chiang reversed roles with
Chennault and sought to give his chief air advisor advice on
how to best use the AVG. Could not low-level flights be made
above the front lines to inspire the Chinese troops? There
was not much enemy air action at this juncture, but as "mo-
rale missions" the sight of P-40s sporting the Chinese Na-
tional star could make a real difference to how the ground
fighting went.
As events transpired, the low-level morale missions led
to the greatest internal crisis in AVG history. In a footnote to
his own first diary entry about these missions in Tale of a
Tiger, R.T. Smith lays out the essentials from the pilots' point
of view: "Toungoo was more than 300 miles from Loiwing,
which meant having to stop and refuel enroute, then fly into
enemy territory at low altitude with several Jap fighter bases
nearby. Perhaps it's understandable that we were not terri-
bly enthusiastic about this idea" (p. 260). Navigation was
never easy in Burma, and the end-of-winter stubble-burn-
ing practiced by the local rice farmers produced a haze that
made any operations below customary safe altitude a nui-
sance to fly and a dangerous risk. In a contemporary entry
Smith writes that "Chennault wants the Toungoo job done
still, but we're all agin' it. Think we'll go down + strafe Jap
fields instead" (p. 263). It was this style of freelancing insub-
ordination that prompted Chiang's visit to AVG Headquar-
ters up in Kunming, urging that the Loiwing squadron get
serious about orders. As a result, nine planes from the 2nd
Squadron (seven of them new P-40E Kittyhawks) came down
to fly three-plane patrols to Toungoo three times a day, rack-
ing up numbers meant to impress the Generalissimo. "It's a
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foolish mission with lots of risks," Smith complains again,
"+ not much chance to do any good" (p. 273). Yet it had to be
flown, for Chennault himself accompanied the fighters in a
CNAC transport and settled down to stay a while.
Within a week, Chennault was a very angry man, which
was understandable, for no sooner had he arrived to ride
herd on the independents at Loiwing than other pilots started
filling out their resignations back at Kunming. With pres-
sure mounting on both sides, something had to snap, and it
did on Saturday, April 18. Some Tomahawks, which by tacit
agreement between Chennault and his pilots were reserved
for local defense, were ordered to join the better-equipped
Kittyhawks to escort six RAF Blenheims on a low-level raid
against the Cheng Mai airfield deep in enemy territory. Un-
expected Japanese fighters had made a shambles of the mo-
rale missions, as the P-40s were drawn up too high to be
seen by the Chinese troops yet still positioned with inferior
altitude. Now a low-level escort mission would expose
Chennault's pilots to antiaircraft fire as well. Luckily the
mission was scrubbed when the Blenheims were delayed.
But inspirational flying over the front lines was to continue—
"Our twelve ships against the whole damn Jap Air Force,"
as R.T. Smith put it. "It seems mighty futile to all of us," he
continues, "+ we're wondering what's taking the United
States so long to get something over here. At this rate, our
morale won't be very good fast. Phooey!" (p. 282).
"Off duty today," Smith notes for the day following, April
18, "+ all hell broke loose." There had been a Japanese ob-
servation plane over the field to shoot down, but the real
fireworks came that evening when Chennault, still ostensi-
bly a colonel in the Chinese Air Force and exercising only
civilian control over his contract employees, called a meet-
ing with his AVG flyers who were more and more acting
like men soon to be out of control:
It was to tell us that we were expected to go on any missions
assigned or else resign. Some of these missions planned we
consider pretty bad—suicide in fact. Col. Chennault said he
was now a Brig. Gen., U.S. Army taking orders from Gen.
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Stilwell. We all got a load off our chest as to how we felt.—
About not getting any reinforcements + being expected to fight
the whole Jap Air Force etc. So, all pilots here got together, had
a meeting, + voted to resign in protest. Twenty-eight of us out
of 34 signed the sheet, + it is to be given to the Col. tomorrow.
So, either we'll get some concessions or be going home soon.
We all want to stay + fight back, but we can't go on an offen-
sive with twelve airplanes, especially ones in their condition.
Motor failures are becoming frequent, plenty other troubles.
Charlie Bond, whose insight into what became gener-
ally accepted as "the pilots' mutiny" would have been espe-
cially valuable, given his fear that something of this order
was coming, was a continent and a half away at this time, in
Karachi to help ferry back a flight of new P-40E Kittyhawks.
Paul Frillmann had been in Loiwing for a few days just be-
fore and could see how desperate the men had become; yet
by April 18 he had returned to headquarters at Kunming
and other than understanding how the showdown seemed
inevitable his own China: The Remembered Life can offer no
firsthand account of the confrontation. Olga Greenlaw, how-
ever, reports uniquely on its immediate aftermath, indicat-
ing exactly what set the pilots off. She and her husband had
been coming up the Burma Road with the last AVG forces
withdrawing to China. The Greenlaws met up with Chen-
nault at Loiwing, near the Burmese border, where they re-
sumed their staff duties and picked up on all the doings of
the days before.
First to interest Olga was news of Pappy Boyington's
resignation. There is ample evidence in both her memoirs
and Boyington's novel that the two were lovers—one of sev-
eral such relationships maintained by this exotically beauti-
ful wife of a much older and laughably remote husband.
One of Chennault's most trusted squadron leaders, David
Lee "Tex" Hill, told her how it happened. "He got into trouble
with Bob Neale," another pilot to whom Chennault had del-
egated authority; "—reported drunk at night alert. Greg is
easy going, but something happened to him that night."
Accused of drinking on duty, Pappy had taken offense and
resigned on the spot, claiming, "Guess that's what you all
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want" (p. 148). This wasn't surprising to Olga, as her lover
had confided these sentiments not long before. But Tex Hill's
next story was flabbergasting to someone who'd been away
and not seen the more recent tensions building:
"We had a little insurrection here, did you know?"
I told him I didn't know anything.
"The Old Man planned a mission escorting some RAF
Blenheims. The fellows refused to go, saying it was a suicide
mission because the Blenheims are too slow and undepend-
able. We have thirty-two pilots here, and only five of us
volunteered to go. Twenty-seven submitted their resignations
on one piece of paper."
"Come outside," I said. "I want to hear the whole story."
(p. 249)
And so what has begun as a murmured conversation in the
squadron mess hall, where the film Border Town has been
showing, turns into a major piece of exposition reported by
one of Chennault's chief loyalists but augmented by one of
the renegades as well.
Outside the hall, Greenlaw and Hill bump into R.T.
Smith, one of the signers who can explain precisely why Hill
and each of his cohorts stayed clear of the revolt. "Tex, you
wouldn't refuse the mission because you are a new Squad-
ron Leader, and you thought you might lose your squad-
ron," Smith observes. "Ed Rector," Hill's close friend,
"naturally followed your lead." As for Tom Jones and Frank
Schiel, the former was returning from an injury and eager
for action, while the latter felt obliged "being Intelligence
Officer" (p. 249).
Smith continues with his own side of the story: how be-
ing made to strafe the Japanese airfield after the Blenheims
had bombed would have meant flying into a stirred-up hor-
nets' nest, all surprise having been sacrificed for nothing,
because the Blenheims were notoriously inaccurate. As they
had before, Smith's cohorts preferred to formulate their own
mission plans, in this case hitting the field before dawn. This
was less a refusal to obey orders than a case of experience
and initiative coming up with a better way to do the job. But
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as Smith tells Greenlaw, Chennault opened his meeting by
laying down the gauntlet in terms that shocked them much
more than the original orders:
"The Colonel said: 'If you want to show the white feather,
you can all quit!'
"My God: the white feather!" continued Smith, after what
guys like Tex Hill, Lawlor, Keaton, Older and even I have
shown we can do in the air, with all the odds against us. I came
right out and said he knew damn well we were no cowards.
The Colonel said: 'By white feather I mean insubordination.' I
insisted it meant 'cowardice.'
"The whole trouble in a nutshell was that we didn't want
to escort the Blenheims—not at the time they would be ready.
We wanted to get off long before dawn and surprise the Japs.
The Blenheims wanted to start at seven! They're late risers."
(p. 250)
To an American public eager for reports about the fabled
and colorful Flying Tigers, news of the mutiny could not be
kept secret. Almost coincidental with the 1943 publication
of Olga Greenlaw's memoir came With General Chennault:
The Story of the Flying Tigers (1943), the first inside account of
the AVG operation. The author was Robert B. Hotz, assisted
by three pilots who had been central to the group's action:
George L. "Pappy" Paxton, Robert H. Neale, and Parker S.
Dupouy. As the title indicates, Hotz's story portrayed
Chennault not just as central character but as the locus of its
point of view; the author's own loyalty extended to serving
with Chennault's staff for the balance of the war and editing
his leader's memoirs for publication in 1949. Hotz handles
the situation by citing Pappy Paxton's diary: "The pilots are
bitter. They feel Chennault is bloodthirsty and will sacrifice
the AVG to the last man. The situation is so hopeless. The
demands made on him and the AVG [by the Chinese and
British commanders] are so great as to be absolutely impos-
sible, except that Chennault will never admit impossibility.
They are expecting us to fight the whole war out here.
Chennault is desperate. He keeps telling us the most impor-
tant thing is to beat the Japs. That is more important than
any of us personally, including himself" (p. 216).
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By balancing all the accounts and being aware of
Chennault's emerging role in the USAAF eventual takeover,
it is possible to interpret Paxton's last analysis in broader
perspective. Chennault had not been taken back into the
Army Air Force, especially at the rank of brigadier general,
because of anything he'd done on his own. His claim to fame
was the American Volunteer Group and its unique success
in an impossibly difficult theater. Were he to lead the subse-
quent air effort by regular U.S. forces, it would be because
he brought the AVG's experience with him as a core of the
strategy and hopefully as the backbone of these new forces
as well. Without his pilots, mutinous as they were, he was
nothing.
Of course the pilots didn't consider their act a mutiny;
instead, in the labor-management schematics that were in
fact more appropriate to their contractual situation, they
considered themselves on strike. Perhaps a wildcat strike,
and certainly as an action meant to win concessions rather
than end a working relationship, but a labor action none-
theless—which allowed their boss to play his trump card.
"You men realize that this action while facing the enemy
can be considered desertion," Hotz quoted by him as saying
in a second meeting, one called to answer the pilots' mass
resignation. "Under the Articles of War, the punishment for
desertion in the face of the enemy is death. Think it over"
(p. 216).
If the "white feather" implication of cowardice had been
a volatile suggestion, this second charge was inflammatory.
But no further outburst came from the disgruntled pilots.
Perhaps they had taken to heart Tex Hill's exhortation that
although they had come to China as mercenaries, they were
now citizens of a country at war with the same foe; at least
some thought to duty must now be a consideration. Perhaps
it was Hill's rhetoric that prompted Chennault to change
the terms from cowardice in the face of danger to desertion
under fire. Whatever the motivations of Chennault and his
men, the confrontation passed into history with no further
reference to their troubles. The resignations were forgotten,
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and there were no more plans for either Chinese morale
missions or low-level RAF escorts.
In postwar years, when the participants had become
icons not just of air war history but of American popular
culture, accounts of the pilots' revolt outdo each other with
open mindedness and generosity. In Tonya, Pappy Boyington
sets the stage for Tex Hill's speech by making the AVG not
just originally mercenary but chasing the dollar as a motive
for refusing the escort mission. It was, after all, a ground
target in Thailand. "Our contracts state we'll only be called
upon to shoot down planes," one of his fictive flyers pro-
tests, "and that we'll only get paid for ones the Chinese con-
firm." It is this objection that prompts an even more noble
statement from the Tex Hill stand-in, to the effect that "Maybe
I can answer this. Things are different now our country's at
war. We're going to have to make sacrifices which weren't
originally in the plan" (p. 244). Even the supposedly factual
Baa Baa Black Sheep embroiders the situation, having Pappy
volunteer for the escort mission because extra pay has been
offered (p. 94). And so from the pilots' point of view as taken
by Boyington, neither the renegades nor the loyalists look
good. For his part, Chennault dismisses the incident in just
a page and a half of his lengthy Way of a Fighter, taking no
time for self-justification and admitting that "Personally I
agreed with the pilots' views. The missions were unneces-
sarily dangerous and, with the exception of strafing enemy
airdromes, offered no compensating results" (p. 156). But
orders were orders, especially when they came to him from
the respective Chinese and Anglo-American commanders.
With a general's stars on his shoulders, Chennault was pre-
sumably becoming a good soldier.
And so with less than two and a half months remaining
on their contracts, the men of the AVG got back to fighting
their own style of war. Tired and dispirited, with equipment
worn out past all hope of even minimally dependable ser-
vice and facing a strategic situation years away from any
hope of major Allied success, they were still able to make a
difference in the closer tactical picture. A bridge crossing in
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the Salween Gorge was crucial to the Japanese advance
against retreating Chinese forces, and in May improvised
bombing attacks by AVG Kittyhawks blocked the enemy's
progress. At a time when China's collapse seemed a possi-
bility, time was bought for more orderly regrouping. By May
1942, the RAF was also reforming squadrons in India to take
the air offensive back to Burma. With the Burma Road long
gone, air supply over the Himalayas—"the Hump"—was
devised as an originally outlandish but ultimately expedi-
ent way of keeping China supplied and therefore in the war.
This, however, was the larger strategic picture, and nei-
ther Chennault or his men often thought in such terms. Their
leader was devoted to perfecting tactics against a well-stud-
ied enemy, and the pilots themselves had enough trouble
even personalizing their foes. Having left the States in the
summer of 1941, a world away from what would become
the very different post-Pearl Harbor era, these peacetime
careerists had little clear notion of who their enemy was.
When combat did ensue, momentarily over Kunming and
then most dramatically in the skies above Rangoon at the
end of 1941, they could not picture their adversaries as clearly
as did the RAF flyers in England, who had seen newsreels
of their future foes in action during the Spanish Civil War.
The RAF had been on guard against them since the Munich
crisis of 1938 and shuddered with the rest of the world at
the lightning efficiency of the aerial bombardment of War-
saw. They had been chased off the Continent in the Battle of
France, and finally won a stand-off, the Luftwaffe's first, with
the Battle of Britain. That last conflict had many qualities of
a face-to-face engagement, one in which sportsmanship and
occasional acts of chivalry played their part. High-ranking
officers from the rival air forces had met at air shows during
the 1930s; younger men flying the British and German planes
may have vacationed from school terms near each other's
home towns. When both took off for action, their own homes
lay beneath them. And their front line of action, the English
Channel, was the strategic determinant for taking direction
toward the war's end, whichever direction that might be.
No such conditions existed in the skies where the Ameri-
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can Volunteer Group and Japanese air forces met. Both were
flying from strange lands, the Japanese from captured bases
in Thailand and Indo-China, the Americans from borrowed
fields in a China and Burma they may have never thought
about until half a year before. Strangest of all, they were two
groups that up to this time had experienced relatively little
cultural contact. If there ever were a situation for realizing
the militarist's dream of fighting an impersonal, faceless,
dehumanized enemy, the air war developing here in 1941
provided it.
R.T. Smith's memories of his first kill are vivid, albeit in
a particular way. The occasion was on December 23,1941, in
defense of Rangoon. The contemporaneous notation is ad-
equately descriptive of the event: "Found a bomber away
from the formation, made about 3 passes, and on the last
one went in to about 50 yds., firing all 6 guns, and he blew
up right in front of me + down in flames" (p. 159). The "he"
concerned is not a human being in this language but rather
the two-engined airplane. Reliving the experience for his
diary's amplification and publication inl986, Smith clarifies
this intent:
I learned after only a few passes at the enemy bombers that
deflection shooting was for the experts; I was sure I was
scoring some hits, but the results were not at all satisfactory.
And so I picked out this one bomber, got directly behind him
and just under his prop-wash, and opened fire at about 200
yards. I could see my tracers converging on the fuselage and
wing roots as I rapidly undertook him but kept firing until he
blew up right in my face. His gas tanks exploded in a huge ball
of flame, the concussion tossing my plane upward like a leaf. I
fought for control, flying through the debris, felt a thud as
something hit my left wing, let out a shout of triumph into my
oxygen mask and thought By God, I got one of the bastards no
matter what happens from now on! I was thinking strictly in
terms of "one" plane, not the six or seven faceless individuals,
seen only as shadow-figures if at all. (p. 160)
The analysis is technical, the reaction almost scientific in
terms of the physical properties of what happens. As the
memoirist says, "the bastard" he gets is singular, the plane;
the score is now 1-0, not 6 or 7-0 as would be counted in
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human terms. He does not even pause to consider that the
"something" thudding against his wing is the body of a hu-
man being, the torso of which would have stayed intact as
everything else blew to pieces. As such, the anonymity of
Smith's protestation of hatred recorded the day after Pearl
Harbor, in which he relishes engagement conditions "made
to order for those little yellow Japs" (p. 145), becomes a char-
acterization of the enemy that fails to survive even the first
minute of combat.
As part of the first effort to defend Rangoon, Charlie
Bond reacts the same way. His diary entry for December 20
records his own actions and those he can see of the enemy:
P-40 sight and gun switches flipped on, rear-gun emplace-
ments on the bombers lowered into fighting position. "I was
tense but more excited," Bond recognizes. "I was about to
taste combat." Yet the motive is impersonal: "I thought in
terms of shooting down airplanes and gave no thought to
the fact that there were men in those ships" (p. 61). The ab-
straction of the enterprise shouldn't be cause for dismay.
American military flyers were trained to shoot down enemy
aircraft, not enemy personnel; far from being hand-to-hand
combat, one extremely powerful and complex machine is
being engaged against another. Memoirs from the air war in
Europe are characterized by similar attitudes, to the point
that the writer sometimes expresses surprise to see a person
emerging from the plane being shot at. But at that point in
narratives from RAF, Luftwaffe, and United States Army Air
Force pilots flying in the European theater, human qualities
almost at once make a welcomed entrance. Little of that if
any happens in stories from the Far East.
Instead, when he could be seen, the enemy was immedi-
ately dehumanized. Charlie Bond himself makes the distinc-
tion in a diary entry for February 21, 1942, after a ground
attack mission. Such engagements were an anomaly for
fighter pilots, for in such cases they were able to see the in-
dividuality of their enemy and take close account of the dam-
age they were inflicting. They could see men die, men they
themselves were killing—just as thoroughly but immensely
more observable than an adversary in the air. Yet if Bond
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could be abstract about his enemies in airplanes, he was
much more blunt about victims on the ground, as his diary
records:
I had really been in combat—a lot of it, all kinds, and all day.
I had seen war at its worst. That Jap column had been wrecked
by .50-caliber slugs tearing the trucks to bits. I saw one Japa-
nese on his horse ducking for cover and I had grinned as I
passed over to get a bead on a truck down the line. I'm sure I
would have gunned him down just like a truck had I been in
the right position. What a business. Like beasts. No thought for
life whatsoever. Instead, a feeling of hatred for the Japanese
that becomes deeper day by day. (p. 106)
Here the contrasts with memoirs from the European theater
are pronounced. Extremely few British or American pilots
attacking ground targets on the continent enjoyed seeing their
human targets; most abhorred it. Testing their skills against a
similarly equipped enemy in the skies was more of a fair fight,
and the kill was envisioned as against the machine, not the
man in it. In this passage Bond reverses such conventional
sentiments by grinning at the sight of a potential victim and
admitting that he'd just as soon destroy the individual as the
machine. True, after four months overseas in the worst pos-
sible conditions he hates the Japanese. From his point of view,
they might as well be beasts. But the person with "no thought
for life whatsoever" is Charlie Bond, who thereby admittedly
lowers himself as well from human status.
In the air, at least, pilots can hope to remove themselves
from such sentiments. Bond makes the distinction three
weeks earlier, when he taxis past the remains of a Japanese
fighter destroyed by its pilot's suicidal crash into a parked
Blenheim. "An RAF airman held up a leather helmet with
the pilot's head still in it and with parts of his throat hang-
ing down in a bloody mess. With his other hand the airman
pointed two fingers skyward in the usual V-for-victory sign.
I returned the V-sign and taxied on. I could not, however,
return his broad grin" (p. 88).
A grin for the Japanese cavalryman he'd shoot just as
soon as the enemy truck, but no grin for the airman with his
grisly trophy—from these two passages the value system is
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clear. Bond has seen himself in bestial terms and deplored it,
flying away from an occasion best left on the ground. In this
other incident, however, he can maintain a superior position.
The ghastly business is done not by him but by an airman,
not a flyer but a creature of the ground. The man is not an
AVG comrade but someone from a different force, the RAF,
where his actions speak of the English lower classes rather
than the service's well-bred officer pilots: from a proletarian
British perspective, two fingers raised means first of all "up
yours," a crudity being conveyed to the deceased Japanese.
Bond, however, chooses to take it in the finer sense of
Churchill's famous double entendre. Most emphatically he
skips the grin and lets his plane once again carry him away.
When a Flying Tiger does involve himself with the messy
aftermath of combat, it is never on its own terms but always
within a mythic code. Robert L. Scott Jr. describes one such
scene in God Is My Co-Pilot, where the flyer involved is Tex
Hill, one of Chennault's most reliable men throughout the
AVG and USAAF periods. The occasion is a shootout over
Hengyang, a very literal shootout in which the pilot of a
Japanese Zero engages Tex Hill's P-40 in a terrifying head-
on attack. The planes converge within the lines of each
other's fire and disappear in a central explosion. From the
clouds of fire and debris emerges Tex's Tomahawk, miracu-
lously intact as the Zero plunges in flames to crash below.
Preparing his readers for what will follow, Scott builds a
convincing picture of Wild West imagery. Tex is so nick-
named, we learn, not simply because he's from that state
but because his father has been chaplain to the Texas Rang-
ers. He himself looks and acts the part of a cowboy if not a
Ranger, long and lean with a loping gait only slightly en-
cumbered by the Colt .45 revolver low-holstered at his side.
The shoot-out itself has transpired just like a face-off in the
streets of old-time Laredo. All of this embroidery is needed
to justify what Tex Hill actually does when he lands and
approaches the crash site:
Tex's blond hair was blowing in the wind, his eyes were
looking with venomous hate at the Jap, his jaw was set. I had
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opened my mouth to congratulate him, for he had shot down
two enemy ships that day, when I had a closer look at his eyes.
. . . Tex strode over close to the fire and looked at the mutilated
lap where he had been thrown from the cockpit. Then, without
a change of expression, he kicked the largest piece of lap—the
head and one shoulder—into the fire. I heard his slow drawl:
"All right, mister—if that's the way you want to fight it's all
right with me." (p. 176)
The words are not those of an AVG pilot but of John Wayne,
conveniently so, as Wayne had already appeared in The Fly-
ing Tigers as produced in Hollywood. But even more so these
are the words and actions of an American folk figure, the
frontier lawman who has been tried too hard and been
pushed far, and who after killing his brutal enemy fair and
square can be excused for expressing his feelings.
Yet there are plenty of times when animosity is expressed
with a studied callousness rarely found in European theater
descriptions. By the time of Donald S. Lopez's Army Air
Force service with Chennault in China, the Flying Tigers had
acquired more than just an attitude toward the Japanese.
Unlike their earliest AVG predecessors who had to whip up
hostile sentiments based on four-year-old newspaper ac-
counts of the rape of Nanking and Chennault's character-
ization of the Chinese as helpless victims of systematic air
raids, the latter-day Tigers could name colleagues shot in
parachutes, tortured, and then butchered when captured and
relate it all to the infamy of the Pearl Harbor attack. News
from Bataan had been even worse, and listening to the arro-
gance of propaganda broadcasts from Tokyo was infuriat-
ing. Reading their accounts today, one is struck by the
memoirists' ability to distance themselves so completely
from any shared sense of humanity with their adversaries.
After a supply convoy with horse-drawn equipment is ma-
chine-gunned into oblivion Lopez takes time in Into the Teeth
of the Tiger to explain how such things could be done. "Prob-
ably because of our deep enmity toward the Japs," he con-
siders, "no one ever expressed anything but satisfaction at
the success of a mission like this, except that many pilots
regretted having to kill the horses. Killing the men bothered
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no one" (p. 148). A current of racial distinction runs through
books written at the time, where not only are the Japanese
crudely denigrated but the Anglo-Indian and Anglo-Bur-
mese women who became the flyers' girlfriends are dis-
missed with smug references to dark skin. In this respect
Olga Greenlaw's The Lady and the Tigers reads awkwardly
fifty years later in an American culture more sensitive to di-
versity. But it is instructive nonetheless to see such attitudes
anticipating later conduct. Writing in 1942, for example, the
author of God Is My Co-Pilot can take great pleasure in his
first major bombing raid, yelling, "Okay, Hirohito—we have
lots more where those came from!" while revelling in the
vivid bursts on his Japanese target below (p. 27). In such a
context, it is understandable how firebombing, controver-
sial when used in the European theater against Dresden,
became an accepted practice in the air war versus Japan.
Indeed, Curtis LeMay was hailed for choosing it as the only
effective method. But Robert L. Scott's feelings are even more
suggestive of the future when they take the form of telling
Chennault "how I wished I could press a button and kill all
the Japanese, to end the war, so that we could all go home"
(p. 220), a premonition of how the mass destruction of atomic
warfare would in fact become the Allies' final measure.
In a desensitized climate, it is remarkable how Chen-
nault's flyers were able to write as beautifully and as lyri-
cally as they often did. They had little inspiration for nobility
when it came to the enemy they fought, nor could they share
immediate kinship with those they defended, such as moti-
vated Battle of Britain pilots both in their fighting and in
how they wrote about it. Even when it came to representing
America in the war, there reflected a sense of abandonment.
On December 6,1941, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, R.T. Smith
sits in Burma fuming over his confused role: "If the Wiz-
ards of Washington ever make up their minds what to do
about the Japs maybe we'll know when the hell to go to
China" (p. 142). Not that Japan's attack made things for the
AVG any easier. On the balance, it made matters worse, with
vital supplies now prioritized by regular service demands.
On February 25, 1942, when he'd been at war for twice as
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long as his country, Charlie Bond could be comically bitter.
"Heard a rumor today that an Axis submarine hit some
coastal city in the States," he notes. "Good, maybe that'll
wake 'em up at home" (p. 110). Chennault's Way of a Fighter
has him quoting a March 17, 1942, cable to T.V. Soong, his
representative in Washington, complaining that he's "com-
pletely discouraged [at the] War Department failure [to] take
advantage [of] China opportunities for air offensive against
enemy. After three and a half months" (p. 153). Yet the Colo-
nel soldiered on, Smith and Bond kept flying, and they and
the rest of the Flying Tigers continued accumulating details
of a unique experience that at the time or later they'd trans-
form into almost breathtaking literary language.
Consider Lopez, who just a chapter before had boasted
how he and his colleagues could shoot up Japanese men and
horses and pity only the horses. For a more properly abstract
night mission his writing becomes almost lovingly aesthetic:
Four jeeps were parked across the left side of the runway
with their lights shining across the runway. The leaders of each
two-man element used these to line up the takeoff, while the
wingmen flew formation on the leaders. We flew with our
running lights on and climbed straight ahead until above the
mountains, then made one circle to form up and headed north.
We climbed to about 12,000 feet and flew well west of the river
and railroad running from Hengyang to Kweilin. It was quite
beautiful, with the gently bobbing running lights and the soft
blue-red glow of the exhaust stacks, and it became more
beautiful as the sky lightened and the P-40s emerged from the
darkness, first as silhouettes, then becoming whole airplanes
bathed by the faint light of dawn. As soon as we could see
well, we turned off our lights. This was the first time most of
us had ever flown formation at night, and it was a strangely
tranquil experience, (p. 165)
Or listen to Olga Greenlaw, elsewhere so quick to note if a
local woman befriending the AVG were "a little too much
on the dusky side for me," here at the same Hengyang base
describing what it's like to be on the receiving end of a night-
time bomb attack:
I remember most vividly one brilliant moonlight raid—twenty-
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seven Japanese bombers looking like silver toys and in perfect
formation until furious anti-aircraft fire scattered them and
brought four tumbling to earth in streaks of red flame. They
dropped their bombs haphazardly and as no one place seemed
safer than another we all thought we would be killed, (p. 23)
Danger certainly does sharpen one's attention, mortal
danger making one all the more responsive to physical de-
tail. In truth, physical details seem all that these writers no-
tice, the moment's harsh immediacy eclipsing any chance
for rhetoric or other forms of verbal posturing. Later in the
war, Charlie Olson flew escort missions with B-24s to Hong
Kong, and in Wanda Cornelius and Thayne Short's Ding Hao:
America's Air War in China, 1937-1945 (1980) he describes the
experience as it happens:
I mean you've trained for combat and all of this stuff, and
finally the day arrives—your first encounter with the enemy.
Your whole flight arrives down at Hong Kong, and all of a
sudden "Varoom" come the Zeroes, the bombers' bomb-bay
doors are open, bombs and belly tanks start raining down, and
you drop your belly tank. And they start hollering, "Five
o'clock, there's seven of them. Look at that slant-eyed . . . look
out, here come those slant-eyed sons of bitches at three o'clock
and there's about eight of them. Oh, look out somebody, My
God. They got hit!" Then pretty soon you see a B-24 burning
and spinning in, and you know it's full of men. Then two
planes collide in midair—pieces of engine falling down, wheels
flying through the air. Hell, finally a Zero goes by and you
squeeze the trigger and nothing happens. You squeeze it and
you don't even realize you have your gun switch off.
You don't know what to do. You're not even aware that you
are there. There are no sounds. You're deaf from the time the
engine starts back at the field. You're really deaf, you know, to
normal sounds. You've got your phones on so when they talk
you hear it because the sound is concentrated, but normally
your only sensations are sight and touch.
The only message you get from the engine is vibration. You
don't hear if the engine is missing. You don't hear it, you feel it.
You feel the vibrations through the stick, through the throttle
quadrant, through your feet on the rudder pedals, and through
your seat—the contact points with the machine itself.
The moment the thing misses three licks you feel it. You pick
up the vibrations instantly when you lose rpm's. You pick it up
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instantly if you've got something else, if you've got a hunk of
metal missing somewhere, a rip, a tear, or something in the
metal. You can feel it. You know this on your first contact
because you've learned this through your training, how the
plane normally feels and flies.
But you are overcome by the vastness of it all only once—
the first contact. After that you're conscious and you know it's
going to be hell to pay and you know people are going to be
hurt. I mean that's part of the game. I mean you know people
are going to get killed. You expect that, I mean—you just hope
it isn't you. (pp. 408-9)
As Lopez and Greenlaw foreground color, light, and other
aspects of atmosphere, Olson recasts his experience in terms
of its rhythms. All three writers privilege the reader's senses,
just as their own ability to sense the adventure was sharp-
ened to an acute sense of perception.
Writers bring their own personalities to the task, and de-
scriptions of common aviation phenomena can be as distinct
as their authors. Take the simple matter of contrails, those
lines of writing in the sky that signify an aircraft's presence.
For Pappy Boyington in Baa Baa Black  Sheep, they are mun-
dane, even when the survival of Rangoon is at stake: "During
one of these battles the air above us would become so full of
vapor trails the sky gave the appearance of some giant bird
leaving chicken tracks in the barnyard mud" (p. 61). Robert
L. Scott, prone to give his books titles such as God Is My Co-
Pilot and The Day I Owned the Sky, reads contrails differ-
ently, admiring in the first work how their "criss-crossing
vapor paths . . . almost covered the sky in a cloud" yet re-
mained discernable as records of action, including the in-
scription of "darker lines that could have been smoke paths
where ships had burned and gone down to destruction"
(p. 230). An irony of such memoirs is how combat has its
aesthetic qualities, such as when Scott observes a bomber
formation at night and sees "their exhausts, looking like ten
bushel-baskets of fire" (p. 178), or when Lopez, about to be
bombed himself, studies the Nakajima Ki.48 Lilys bearing
down on his field: "Although I had studied them in silhou-
ette and model for the past year, seeing them in full scale,
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approaching with their bomb doors open, was quite a differ-
ent thing," he appreciates, momentarily disregarding danger
to note how "the dark and light green mottled camouflage
and the enormous red ball insignias gave them an ominous
beauty" (p. 84). Even crashes have their stark beauty, as does
one near the home field where the ground crew can observe
what the narrator of God Is My Co-Pilot describes. Under at-
tack from a lone fighter, one bomber is hit, takes fire, and spins
away. A second explodes and turns over, spectacular in the
nighttime sky. "The third one tried to turn, seemed to hang
for seconds against the full moon, then dove in flames in a
pitch that got steeper and steeper," he writes. "Several thou-
sand feet below our level it exploded and burning petrol fell
with it. The light of the three burning bombers combined with
the brilliant moonlight to make the night like day" (p. 179).
In the thick of combat, language further animates the
action—nose guns thudding like twin jackhammers ripping
up pavement, incendiary tracers from a bomber sailing out
like burning pieces of paper being dropped from the tail,
enemy fighters being strafed on the ground and seeming to
shake themselves to pieces as the attacker's bullets strike.
But then the adventuresome young men who flew for
Chennault were given to speaking in ways that could ani-
mate anything. Gerhard Neumann cites an example in his
Herman the German as part of his introduction to the AVG in
Kunming. Walking down a city street with several pilots,
the group comes up behind what the author describes as
"an attractive Chinese girl in a tight silk dress." A volunteer
from Texas, however, puts it another way, exclaiming to
Neumann's great confusion that "I'd like to bite her in the
ass and let her drag me to death!" (p. 81).
Most of all, the care taken in writing this group of mem-
oirs reflects their authors' appreciation of how unique their
perspective was. With previous knowledge of the Far East
often limited to what they'd read from Kipling's poems, ful-
some romance novels, and even high-adventure comic strips,
they appreciated what they were experiencing in a strange
land fighting a new war America had yet to acknowledge as
deserving close attention, attention that they alone were able
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to pay. As such, their narratives joined a little known but
now emerging tradition of accounts by people in the flying
business taking note of this region created as it were for their
careers. Paul Frillmann, who before the war had been a mis-
sionary to China, knew well the sense of living on the edge,
and when despite the AVG's and RAF's valiant efforts at
defense the Burmese capital begins to falter, his eye for de-
tail and feeling for the rhythms of existence let him capture
the experience perfectly:
For a few days the streets were lined with merchant trucks
unloading, then they drove off and Rangoon was noticeably
more deserted. Later I was sorry I was too busy to keep a
journal of the steps in the city's death, but as I remember it was
the buses and taxis that disappeared next, driven off full of
refugees. Then the newspapers died, the restaurants closed, the
street-sweepers and garbage-collectors disappeared, and the
street lights and electric signs went dark. Then the electricity
itself was turned off, so was the water. The telephones went
dead and the police deserted. In Hankow we had always
known many of us were neutral; so was part of the city, but in
Rangoon nothing was safe. Each day the emptying streets
slipped back a little farther toward jungle, (p. 109)
When the last devastating bombings come and a city falls,
an aviator's view is even more privileged. At the start of
Japan's war against China, Royal Leonard found himself
making an approach to Nanking in the last hours before its
fall, a sight that inspires some of the best descriptive lan-
guage in I Flew for China:
The death of a city is always an awesome sight from the air,
great in its sadness. I have seen it many times. The sign is
always the same, infallible and changeless. Look only at the
lights. When a city is in full health, free of war, its lights are
gay and bright, even in China. There is no fear in its illumina-
tion. From the air it is the most cheering and inspirational sight
possible. But when it begins to be frightened the lights, some-
how, become dull. Perhaps the householders step outside,
switching off their lights, blowing out lamps and candles, the
better to see the sky. Perhaps the merchants close up. When the
last convulsion comes there is only blackness before the
burning. The whole effect is as if the city were a theater just
before a grim performance. The house lights go slowly down,
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and then the thick dark. It may take weeks and days for this to
happen. It makes no difference. Time is immaterial to anyone
who has been as familiar with a city as I had been for months
with Nanking.
Flying now, on this night of its dying, I saw Nanking's lights
dim, shrouded in smoke and glimmering like will-o-the-wisps.
Parts of the city were already dead in darkness, (pp. 190-91)
This is at almost the same moment Chennault, only recently
put to work as Chiang Kai-shek's chief air advisor, is pre-
paring to fly himself out of his employer's doomed capital.
Here, in Chennault's Way of a Fighter, the writing style com-
plements Leonard's:
I went out to the bomb-cratered airfield at midnight to gas and
warm up the Hawk for flight. The sound of its roaring engine
momentarily drowned out the angry growling of the guns,
hourly growing louder. I taxied out to the end of the runway in
the dark and waited with engine idling and hand on the
throttle for the first faint streaks of dawn to break over the city
wall and light my take-off. The air-raid warning net had
crumbled before the Japanese armies. Enemy fighters were on
the prowl. Shells were bursting near the field. As I roared over
the city wall, the sun was just beginning to rise, casting a pink
glow over the stricken city, which gradually changed to a
prophetic bloody red. (p. 60)
When the flyers of Chennault's American Volunteer
Group left a more secure China five years later in July 1942,
conditions of departure did not seem appropriate for such
valedictory sentiments. Fighting the Japanese had inspired
their best writing, but in the way they had to leave AVG
service their enemy became the United States Army Air
Force. The matter concerned when and how they might be
made part of this new force. The issue first presented itself
with the news of Pearl Harbor. In England, the American
volunteers in the RAF flying as the three Eagle Squadrons
reacted quickly, sending representatives to the U.S. Embassy
in London on December 8, 1941, with the offer of enlisting
en masse. Ambassador John Winant phoned President
Roosevelt, and though promises were made to accept them,
nothing happened; it would be almost a year before the
USAAF could establish any real presence in England, and
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in the meantime the Eagles, as RAF squadrons, were excel-
lent for both propaganda and morale. Still eager to fight their
own country's enemy, they next requested transfer to
Singapore, where the RAF was desperate to hold off the Japa-
nese. This request was turned down by the Royal Air Force
itself, with Air Chief Marshal William Sholto Douglas de-
claring that the Far East was crumbling, Singapore was about
to fall, and nothing out there merited squadrons being taken
out of the first line at home. As it happened, the Eagles did
not join the USAAF until September 29,1942, when they were
transferred into the Eighth Air Force's 4th Fighter Group,
among which the individual pilots were soon dispersed to
become its backbone as experienced flight and squadron
leaders.
From their bases in China and Burma, members of the
AVG felt the same patriotic promptings as did their cousins
in the Eagle Squadrons. But from the start their motivations
were overswept by a tide of politics and policy wrangles
that made their own experience go sour. First, it was a sur-
prising initiative from the British, who as America's new
allies wanted the AVG to operate under RAF command.
Chennault "opposed this transfer . . . stubbornly," as he re-
calls in his autobiography (p. 125), though as time went by
his motives for doing so showed the influence of personal
ambition: having run the show in China since its start, he
wanted to continue in that capacity right through to the end,
and his sole convincing reason for being able to do so was
as the commander of the only effective unit in place. An in-
dependently intact AVG was his main asset, and so its im-
mediate induction into either the USAAF or the RAF was
nothing he wanted to encourage. Not that the Army Air Force
was eager to have these men back in the ranks, accustomed
as they had become to high pay, loose discipline, and the
feeling of being superior to their former service colleagues.
With their leader's reputation of having been the black sheep
of military aviation and a large number of old enemies just
now assuming high staff and command positions them-
selves, the prospect of any sort of integration with the regu-
lar services looked to be an extremely problematic matter.
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As it happened, the business of the AVG and the USAAF
developed even worse than could have been imagined.
Whereas in England the Eagle Squadrons and the 4th Fighter
Group melded with the greatest ease and best publicity pos-
sible, newsreel cameras cranking as the Union Jack was low-
ered, the Stars and Stripes raised, and the top figures from
each command smartly saluting the hand over, the scene in
China played out through months of curiosity, confusion,
worry, insult, anger, and eventual bitterness, with petty ret-
ribution on the military's part closing an unfortunate action
that some commentators say broke Chennault's heart, for
the Old Man was to continue the fight he had pioneered with
just a few of the young flyers he'd nurtured and placed in a
primary position to fight America's air war in the Far East.
Many say he felt abandoned and betrayed—first by the po-
litically careerist Air Corps, then by an America unwilling
to see war imminent in the East, and finally by almost all of
his own men.
Charlie Bond's diary is a good index to these develop-
ments, because of his longer prewar service and continuing
hopes for a regular commission and lifetime career in the
Air Force. When on December 16, 1941, the RAF sends a
Blenheim to take Chennault to conferences in Rangoon, Bond
wonders naively "if plans are being laid to induct us into
the U.S. Army Air Corps" (p. 55) when in fact the AVG leader
was being asked to put his men in British service. On Janu-
ary 2,1942, he hears a rumor that Lieutenant General George
Brett, USAAF chief in the Southwest Pacific, is talking about
induction. "This has started lengthy discussions through-
out the outfit," Bond notes. "The general consensus is to stay
the way we are, but I doubt if we will. I am willing to go
back into the Air Corps right now if they will give me a regu-
lar commission" (p. 69).
Here, less than a month after Pearl Harbor, Bond reveals
what would be the flaw in AVG thinking. It doesn't matter
that his career plans set him apart from the group's attitude,
which in itself was by no means unpatriotic—in England
the Eagle Squadrons as well wanted to enter the USAAF as
a unit and continue to fly that way; even giving up their
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Spitfires was regretted, and when soon after transfer they
were split up to distribute their experience throughout the
fledgling 4th Fighter Group there was much disappointment.
From the military's point of view, one can see how such
ambitions as the Eagles' and the AVG's are impractical. An
air force must operate uniformly to the same standards and
with interchangeable parts; letting a group of three squad-
rons continue with its unique practices would be detrimen-
tal to the larger group's purpose. In their hearts the Eagles
knew this, and the members of the AVG must have known
it, too. But Chennault's men made the mistake of thinking
they were dealing with the Army Air Force from a position
of strength, whether it be to maintain unit integrity or nego-
tiate for regular commissions. As it turned out, they had no
power beyond the threat they'd held over Chennault him-
self: to quit and go home. And when they did that, the mili-
tary would make things miserable for them, indeed.
As January ends, however, prospects as reported in
Bond's diary are still looking good. Sandy Sandell, close to
the center as a squadron leader, tells Bond that induction is
assured, with Chennault's individual recommendations set-
ting each man's rank. This puts Bond in a very good mood,
and when later in the day he lands at Rangoon and sees a
USAAF B-17E bomber parked across the field he's prompted
to exclaim "Damn, it looks good!" (p. 81). Yet nothing hap-
pens for the next two months, beyond the deterioration of
both equipment and spirit, the resignations and firings of
more pilots, and the increase in tension that would lead to
the April mutiny over morale missions and low-level escorts.
On March 26 Bond describes a meeting called by Chennault
to discuss induction—after a full winter of rumors and specu-
lations, the first formal consideration of this crucial matter.
Bond asks about the chances of getting regular commissions;
Chennault dismays him by stating that there's been no talk
about that whatsoever. Other pilots say they'd like to either
go home immediately or stay in China only to fulfill their
AVG contracts as civilians; Chennault implies he can fill their
vacancies with replacements. From this very unsatisfactory
discussion only one clear point emerges, that "there was no
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doubt that the Old Man's first and foremost desire is to keep
us together as his AVG" (p. 146)—his AVG, readers will note.
From this point on, and especially in the wake of the
abortive mutiny, alternatives come up in Bond's consider-
ations. On April 11 a DC-3 comes through, flown by an old
service buddy from MacDill Field, who says any ex-AVG
pilots would be snapped up quickly by Pan American Air-
ways for $750 per month, more than thrice USAAF officer
pay and as good as most were making with Chennault. "I
am making a mental note of this," Bond confides. "Things
are still uncertain for my future" (p. 152). On April 19 he's
given a direct job offer, $800 monthly to fly for CNAC, the
China National Aviation Corporation—another paramilitary
operation paying its civilian contract employees hefty bo-
nuses that let them clear $1,200 per month. "It is enticing, I
have to admit, but I turned it down for the time being," Bond
confides. "I asked him to let me think about it for a while"
(p. 157).
As part of Chennault's headquarters staff, Olga Greenlaw
had a closer feel for what was going on and a larger per-
spective when it came to the national interest. As early as
mid-February she could note the increasingly frequent vis-
its from military personnel and take a different view toward
it than prevailed among the AVG. "With the coming of so
many American Army officers, the boys were certain we
would be inducted," she writes. "That, they didn't want, and
for that reason they resented the presence of the American
Army officers. I didn't. I thought we needed the moral sup-
port of the American Government and liked to see the inter-
est that was being taken in our group" (p. 140). But her
broader view neglected the different interests among the
pilots. Some, like Charlie Bond, saw the more rarified do-
ings of general officers as guiding lights of policy. Others,
such as Pappy Boyington, thought policy was politics and
that politics stunk. Yet in Baa Baa Black Sheep he succumbs to
military politics of the lowest order, that of interservice ri-
valry, vented in almost the same breath as his condemna-
tion of careerism:
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At this particular period the AVG, as small as it was,
happened to represent the only citizens of the United States
who had not only held their own but had gone on to create a
most enviable record. Their success, not defeat, was by far the
greatest in the war to date. So, a high-ranking general in the
Air Corps recognized personal glory to be within easy grasp if
he could but annex this group of civilians to his command.
One other minor little detail had to occur to make this
proposed annexation complete before this general would be
able to boost his stock and yet give a legal appearance. All of
the AVG pilots had to be inducted, as it was so aptly worded
for lack of better words, into the Air Corps. I personally
considered this to be the rottenest kind of a farce, for, though
Chennault himself was a dyed-in-the-wool Air Corps man, he
had earned his reputation with a crew of pilots of which better
than 50 percent had come from Uncle Sam's Navy and Marine
Corps, (pp. 78-89)
Chennault, of course, was far from dyed in the wool; to bor-
row a different part of Boyington's extended metaphor, he
was the black sheep of the Air Corps and had been so since
Pappy wore diapers. As renegades together, Army, Navy,
and Marine flyers had gotten along well in the AVG, though
their distribution into squadrons had partly reflected their
native branches. But the idea of naval aviators going back
into the regular service as Army Air Force flyers grated
against Boyington's deepest feelings, and perhaps for good
reason. Pappy had been shamed in the Marine Corps, and it
was there that he wanted to recover his good name. The way
he did it, by running the Black Sheep Squadron in a manner
reminiscent of Chennault's way with the AVG, could never
have happened in a branch of service where he was an alien,
a rival much as he was seeing the Air Corps now.
In Tonya, Boyington sets this unhappy affair in exclu-
sively political terms. The high-ranking general eager for a
career boost is a fictitious version of Clayton S. Bissell, here
called Gen. B.S. Sittel, all puns intended. Although his argu-
ment against letting the AVG retain its contractual status
while fighting alongside units of the USAAF holds water—
that it would be impossible to run a war where one pilot
would serve under military discipline for low service pay
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while another earned so much more, with bonuses for kills
as well—this character's disposition is so venal as to over-
shadow any moneymaking by the AVG; in emphasizing this
trait, Boyington alludes not just to Bissell's wartime stingi-
ness with supplies but his later shame in being forced out of
the service for embezzlement, a story Robert L. Scott recounts
firsthand in The Day I Owned the Sky as a member of the Air
Force's board of review. Though more formidable a man,
the stand-in for Chennault fares no better, for at the end of
Tonya he's shamed when his pilots learn he has lied about
their induction as a way of keeping them counted as his own
forces while he maneuvers for command authority in the
USAAF. Although his own exploits make Pappy Boyington
an unlikely spokesman for ideals, his distaste for the poli-
tics of the induction affair represents what by the end was
an almost universal feeling.
Diary entries by two of the AVG's three Bob Smiths ex-
press the noncareerist but also unpoliticized feelings of most
Flying Tigers. On January 25,1942, R.T. Smith mentions that
there's a "rumor running around about the Army taking over
our group," but moves on to a more interesting topic: a hunt-
ing trip tomorrow. Footnoting this page as he prepares his
Tale of a Tiger, R.T. recalls that for months nobody really knew
what was going to happen; "Meanwhile, all we wanted was
to be left alone and allowed to continue the fight under the
terms of our original agreement, though we knew that this
could not continue indefinitely" (p. 198). Much later in the
process, radioman Robert M. Smith expresses a similar de-
tachment in his entry for With Chennault in China on May 4,
when terms for reenlistment had been proposed: "Radio-
grams were sent by our headquarters to all radio station
masters offering them technical sergeant. The consensus was
a definite no. We all want to go home" (p. 83).
It was just when the AVG's eagerness to join and fight
cooled down that the Army Air Force finally made its move
to take them into the fold. On May 7,1942, the Commander-
in-Chief, Franklin D. Roosevelt himself, sent a special mes-
sage to the volunteers asking them to stay in China at least
until a regular wing could arrive to take their place. "Most
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of the guys think lightly of the idea," Charlie Bond reports.
"All want to return to the States as soon as possible. I am not
sure how this is going to turn out" (p. 175). By May 11 he is
noting "more and more talk about an official induction of
the AVG on July 4" and countering it with the sentiment
that "most of the guys just want to go home" (p. 176).
Finally, on May 21, 1942, the Army Air Force came to
address Chennault's men. Its representative was the worst
possible choice, General Clayton S. Bissell, famous from the
ubiquitously innocent Chinese greeting "Piss on Bissell!" and
having already taken shape in Pappy Boyington's imagina-
tion as "General B.S. Sittel." Meeting him that day, R.T. Smith
is able to gauge that the man "had all the charm of a cobra"
(p. 318). In Flying Tiger: A Crew Chiefs Story (1996), Frank S.
Losonsky charges that "the Air Corps made a serious mis-
take sending Bissell to recruit. His pitch had little effect. He
was rude, arrogant, and projected an attitude of indifference
toward myself and my comrades. The man turned us off."
Although Bissell would be staying around to conduct inter-
views, Losonsky realizes from the start that "most of us felt
we'd been shafted and had no desire to serve under his com-
mand" (p. 94). Even Charlie Bond, who would become a
major general in the postwar United States Air Force, leaves
the meeting "steaming mad" (p. 178) and gathers with his
friends to "cuss a lot" and hear their intentions "to go back
to the States and take the chance of being drafted" (p. 179).
For Bond himself, the moment is the saddest in A Flying
Tiger's Diary:
I haven't made up my mind. I lie awake until the wee hours
of the morning trying to decide. Here I am within reach of
what I have come over here for. It has turned out exactly as I
had thought: I would get combat experience by the time the
U.S. got into the war and be in a perfect position to parlay that
into a regular commission when the time came to integrate the
AVG into the USAAC. In the meantime I would have saved up
some money. And now my key and most important goal is
going down the drain. What to do? (p. 179)
What had Bissell done to so infuriate the men—every
one of them, from Chennault loyalists and future Air Force
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career officers to the most carefree renegades in the group,
from pilots to ground crewmen and technicians? The prob-
lem was with both his bad news and the way he had chosen
to convey it. He was not there to ask for the volunteer's re-
enlistments; instead, he informed them that they had no
choice, that they were going to be inducted into the USAAF
whether they liked it or not. If they refused, lots of luck get-
ting back to the States—no transport service, either a part of
the military or one doing business with it, would sell them
passage. Nor would Pan Am, CNAC, or any other airline
operating overseas or in the United States hire them—he'd
see to that (and by having Chennault write the airlines with
a personal appeal, he did). Once they did get home, a draft
board notice would be waiting to put them in the front lines
of the infantry as buck privates. Yet even if they did submit
to induction, there'd be no sweet deals: just minimum rank,
reserve rather than regular commissions (meaning no Air
Force future after the war), and no furlough before active
service in the USAAF's new China command.
Making it all the worse was Bissell's attitude toward the
AVG. These were not heroes he was addressing—they were
the rabble who needed to be whipped and hammered into
military shape. They were not combat-weary fighters who'd
been struggling at odds in terrible conditions at the mercy
of deteriorating equipment—they were playboys of the air,
"flying fools" as the hometown newspapers liked to call them
or, worse yet, the swashbuckling adventurers pictured so
often in Time and Life and the newsreels that in the mean-
time had only failures in the regular service to report. Above
all they were mercenaries, fighting by their own rules (or
none at all) for fun and profit. It was probably the unruli-
ness that bothered Bissell most of all, for spit-and-polish by
the rulebook were his specialty; cases of bianco and brasso
and typewriter ribbons sometimes outweighed the ammu-
nition he requisitioned for his command. And so his ap-
proach to the men of the AVG was especially harsh. Anything
he had to say to them came with the voice of iron authority;
whatever his listeners asked of him was shrugged off as be-
ing impossible because of rules, regulations, and red tape—
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just the things that had driven many of these men out of the
service and into Chennault's employ.
Yet after all of this, many if not most of the volunteers
would have stayed had only General Bissell made them feel
welcome. Almost every memoirist's account of his personal
interview reads the same: not just being refused minimal
courtesies but being rudely cut off even before asking. Frank
Losonsky's experience replicates what they all went through
and represents the group's sentiments:
I remember the 27th [of May] well. It was one of the few
direct times I talked to General Chennault. He called us in, one
at a time. I told the General I wanted to fly. Chennault didn't
have a chance to reply. General Bissell spoke up and said
"Look the General doesn't have time to give you a recommen-
dation to go to flying school." I replied, "But that's what I want
you to do. I have flying experience, and I'd like to go to flight
school." Bissell replied, "Stay here or else when you get home
you will be drafted." I told him I'd take my chances with the
draft. It was over in 4 minutes. I would have stayed had they
given me flight school, a commission, or the promised thirty
day leave, (p. 95)
Did the Army Air Force really want Chennault's men at
all? For publicity purposes for the folks back home they
surely had to ask, and a wonderful transfer ceremony such
as happened with the Eagles four months later in England
would have been a great boost for morale. But from geo-
politics and larger strategy to the most personal of animosi-
ties, China and the AVG were different from England and
the Eagle Squadrons. England was an old and stable ally,
linked to the United States by language, culture, history, tra-
dition, and complementary national aims. China was a new
factor in the world, and far from stable; American policy
makers were already arguing over whom to support,
Chiang's Nationalists or the Communists emerging under
Mao Tse-tung, a debate that would unsettle U.S. conduct
toward China during the war and make larger trouble for
postwar times. Strategically, this was no longer an ignored
or forgotten theater, but the Allies' firm agreement was that
in terms of defeating enemies Germany, not Japan, came first,
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so prime attention stayed directed to England's and not
China's war. Then there was the matter of Chennault's stand-
ing with his former service. Deep down, he didn't want the
Air Corps, and the Air Corps didn't want him. In the after-
math of Pearl Harbor he fought the notion of USAAF induc-
tion as stubbornly as he rejected having the RAF take over
his command. Only when it became clear that his sole chance
of keeping a leadership role in China depended on the AVG
did he submit to the idea of assimilation, wisely getting his
general's stars before his men knew what was happening.
"Why were the Flying Tigers disbanded if they were doing
so well?" Gerhard Neumann asks in Herman the German.
"Because Chennault was boycotted by the U.S. War Depart-
ment. No replacement aircraft, no ammunition and no spare
parts arrived for him in China to support his tiny volunteer
group of 253 men and two nurses. Many Air Corps generals
in the States were jealous of the former schoolteacher and
retired Army Air Corps captain who had become a world
hero" (p. 93). Finally, and as Neumann had to agree, the Ti-
gers and newly trained service personnel would make for
an uncomfortable if not impossible mix, radically different
as they were. Even Erik Shilling, given a rare attractive offer
of major's rank and a smoothly unhassled interview, could
see the truth of things when "as a parting question I asked
Bissell what my chances would be of continuing in the Air
Corps after the war." As noted in Shilling's Destiny, "His
answer was blunt and to the point with an emphatic 'NONE.'
It was not that he knew me, but only that I was a member of
the AVG." So defined, Shilling reacts in character, standing
up and saying "You can damn well shove it, Colonel" (p.
190), even in the moment's heat getting in a dig by address-
ing Bissell by his permanent rather than acting rank. As for
how the group was approached, Shilling reports that "Al-
most to a man, the Flying Tigers I have talked to about
Bissell's induction speech feel the same way as I did. That
the intent was to discourage the AVG's induction into the
military rather than encourage it" (p. 191).
It is hard to imagine any of the American Volunteer Group,
other than the five exceptional pilots who accepted commis-
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sions, doing well in a China air war being run by the military.
Chennault himself would struggle for three long years, not
just with Bissell in terms of supply but with General Stilwell
about strategy. The type of AVG energy that had brought these
men to China a year ago now motivated them toward simi-
larly independent approaches, whether it be further adven-
turing with CNAC or petitioning generals, senators, and the
President himself for a regular commission, as did the inde-
fatigable Charlie Bond. "We had been out of step with our
complacent, isolationist country the year before, when we
volunteered," Paul Frillmann realizes in China: The Remem-
bered Life. "Now we were out of step again, when the conven-
tional thing was to rush to the colors" (p. 158).
One heroic act prevented the AVG's story in China from
closing on a thoroughly sour note. When June ended with
only five pilots and twenty-two ground crewmen agreeing
to join the Army Air Force and begin regular combat as the
23rd Fighter Group, Chennault realized that July 4, 1942,
would dawn with an extremely vulnerable unit asking to be
wiped out by the Japanese. To augment this number and the
handful of USAAF people just beginning to arrive, he made
a seemingly impossible request: that as many of the AVG
who could please stay on for an extra two weeks to make
the transition something other than absolute chaos. To their
enduring credit, a surprising nineteen pilots and thirty-six
ground crew members agreed—becoming for the first time
literal volunteers, making a sacrifice for their successors, for
their country, and most of all for Claire Chennault himself.
Charlie Bond was one of them, cursing his conscience for
making him do it. But he did, and fortunately survived. Two
pilots did not, including the just-married and father-to-be
Johnny Petach, whose pregnant wife, the former nurse Emma
"Red" Foster, had to suffer the same travel indignities as the
rest of the departing Tigers as they struggled to make their
way home. When born, her daughter was named "Claire."
In later years, there was much bitterness to be recalled.
In Tiger Tales (1984) Milt Miller, a bombardier with
Chennault's subsequent Fourteenth Air Force in China, men-
tions a "good old days" conversation with his leader a de-
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cade later: "I'll never forget how, at one point in our discus-
sion, he paused, his eyes hardened, his jaw stiffened, and he
quietly said: 'I never had trouble with the Japanese. It was
those bastards in Washington I had to worry about'" (p. 109).
The hard eyes, the stiffly jutted jaw, the posture of defiance—
Miller's words fit almost every photograph taken of Claire
Chennault, especially the portrait poses such as the one that
appears opposite the title page of the appropriately titled
Way of a Fighter, as if this complaint is what was on his mind.
In Flying Tiger: Chennault of China, Robert L. Scott expands
this sentiment to the AVG at large, writing in 1959 that "for
the men who flew for Chennault there remains to this day a
bitterness that has been and will be felt for a long, long time,
a bitterness such as must have been rarely, if ever, felt by
soldiers who fought in other theaters of war." Why so? "For
they saw the human jealousies and ignorance kill their own
friends and, worse, render their sacrifices useless" (p. 236).
Useless might well be the men's feeling, but more ad-
equate measures of the Flying Tigers' usefulness exist. Even
in the least heroic terms, the mercenary economics by which
they were recruited and for which many of them served,
their cost effectiveness was remarkable, if not to say even
fabulous. At the time and for half a century afterward, the
American Volunteer Group was, over six months of combat,
credited with 296 kills—the number confirmed by the Chi-
nese government and paid for as bonuses to the respective
pilots. In his exhaustive and authoritative Flying Tigers: Claire
Chennault and the American Volunteer Group, historian Daniel
Ford revises this total down to the level of between 110 and
120 Japanese planes lost to the AVG in Burma, Thailand, and
China. "The toll in lives was far higher," Ford adds, noting
that these planes carried more men, operated over enemy
territory, and rarely held parachutes, making for losses in
excess of four hundred men (p. 370). For AVG losses, three
pilots died in training and twenty-two others were killed in
combat, captured, or missing. Material losses were much
higher—eighty-six AVG planes never flew again—but then
nobody else had wanted them in the first place. In dollars
alone, China had bought in for $9.3 million and sold out (to
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the USAAF when it assumed responsibility for what re-
mained on July 4, 1942) for $3.5 million credit on its Lend-
Lease account. As Ford calculates, "the net cost to China for
the services of the American Volunteer Group was $5.8 mil-
lion for aircraft and $3 million for salaries and combat bo-
nuses, or a bit more than $75,000 for each Japanese plane
destroyed." Was this a good deal for China? Yes, because "it
was one of the rare instances in modern warfare where the
instrument of destruction cost less than the objects de-
stroyed" (p. 374). Budgets of ten times as much and more
would be required for the USAAF to take over the job.
Beyond numbers was the AVG's psychological impor-
tance. Though they themselves did not defeat the Japanese,
they accomplished several actions that undoubtedly contrib-
uted to the success of later forces in achieving that victory.
In their very first combat operation, on December 20, 1941,
they caused such havoc among Japanese bombers over
Kunming that such attacks, which had been a fact of life for
the previously defenseless Chinese, ceased altogether. Then,
just a few days later, another AVG squadron undertook the
defense of Rangoon, holding off the fall of that city for
months beyond what the RAF alone, with its inferior equip-
ment, could have done. Then, in May of 1942, its interdic-
tion of the Japanese column advancing through the Salween
Gorge stopped the potential invasion of Chiang's last secure
portion of China. After Pearl Harbor, there had been rumors
that China might make a separate peace. This would have
left the Japanese free to concentrate more of their strength
against India and onward as far as Egypt, where they would
have joined forces with the German Afrika Korps. Had that
happened, the question of which war came first and which
came last would have been immaterial.
As happened, the AVG held China in the war until regu-
lar forces could be sent there. Its successor, the 23rd Fighter
Group, maintained the healthy success ratio against just as
long odds, destroying over a thousand enemy aircraft while
losing less than two hundred of its own. As Robert L. Scott
writes in The Day I Owned the Sky, "I feel honored to have
been the first group commander, and despise Bissell for de-
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nying it so many other good men; had he been even half-
way diplomatic, as General Arnold must have expected him
to be, the entire AVG might have remained" (p. 74-75). But
even so, they would have faced the same old obstacles of
poor equipment, insufficient supplies, command hassles
(made worse by Bissell and Stilwell), and conflicting strate-
gies from different camps in Washington. Chennault him-
self had to carry on the same way, writing President
Roosevelt when all else failed and threatening publicity
stunts that would have damaged the Army immensely had
they not backed down. There is no doubt whatsoever that
neither the volunteer nor regular Flying Tigers could have
operated successfully without him.
And so the fight at odds in China is not only remem-
bered as a war conducted by iconically striking figures, but
after close study turns out to have actually happened that
way. Not only at the time but for decades afterward, Pappy
Boyington and Robert L. Scott would represent the alter-
nately devilish and pious sides of such iconography, but the
most impressive (and impressively effective) figure remains
Claire Chennault himself. At the Trident Conference, the
single time his superiors made the mistake (for them) of let-
ting Chennault return to North America and take part in
strategy discussions, he caught the eye of Britain's chief rep-
resentative, Prime Minister Winston Churchill. "Who is that
man?" Churchill asked, indicating the hawklike visage of
the AVG commander so apparent among the U.S. delega-
tion. When told, the Prime Minister simply growled, "I'm
glad he's on our side."
The RAFs
Less than
Finest Hour
- • - The American Volunteer Group's first view of the
Royal Air Force in Burma was a revealing one: there was no
one to be seen. The scene repeated itself as the three succes-
sive travel groups of AVG men arrived in Burma after their
ocean crossing from the States. Before traveling up to the
Kyedaw airfield outside Toungoo where they would under-
take their training, Chennault's recruits all had at least part
of a day if not more to explore Rangoon and learn what this
new place was like. There were sights and sounds, smells
and textures galore, all of them exotic, from the colorfully
dressed Burmese to the wide range of novel goods being
sold by the mostly Indian shopkeepers. But during these
midday adventures, there were no English people in evi-
dence. That was something to be learned as well: that dur-
ing the heat of day the British kept to their clubs for
prolonged lunches or returned home for a nap.
The picture is drawn best by R.T. Smith in the commen-
tary that prepares his diary, Tale of Tiger, for readers a gen-
eration hence. On this first day in country he has purchased
the blank diary itself, a guidebook to Burma, and two tins of
Players cigarettes. But before trying to comprehend Burma
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he organizes a perspective of the people who rule it, who at
this moment of the day are not on station at the helm:
Here, as in Singapore, the British residents lived at a very
leisurely pace in comparative luxury. Most had spacious,
comfortable housing provided by the government, in the case
of civil employees of the crown, or by the many companies
engaged in commerce. Native servants could be hired for the
equivalent of fifteen or twenty dollars per month, and most
British households had at least three or four of them. Food and
clothing were plentiful and inexpensive, and considerable time
off was allowed for vacations in the highlands of northern
Burma during the hottest part of the year, which must surely
include the present. Later we learned that much the same
applied to the British in India and other colonies, and it was
easy to see why so many chose to accept employment in the
Far East. This far from the action and the struggle going on in
Europe, it was hard to believe that England was fighting for
her life against Nazi Germany, (p. 57)
This sense of ease and isolation from danger becomes a
recurrent theme not just in the AVG memoirs with respect
to the British but in nearly all of the local RAF narratives as
well. Everyone from the air officer commanding to the low-
est ranked pilot officer in these colonially based squadrons
might well plead for more commitment to the war effort.
But until war eventually came to localities such as Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Rangoon, resident English populations
refused to acknowledge any danger. When Japan did make
its move, any amount of local consternation was too late, for
an embattled Britain still too weak to launch a major offen-
sive at home was in no position to send more than token
forces to its far outposts of empire.
Looking further back, historians argue that the fall of
Singapore and Rangoon had been ordained almost twenty
years before, when the defenses prepared for each city were
oriented exclusively toward the sea. This refusal to believe
that an enemy army could advance down the Malay penin-
sula (to capture Singapore) and across Thailand (to threaten
Rangoon) invited a Japanese strategy that made victory for
the emperor almost a foregone conclusion. By December
1941, London must have known this, for no effort to save its
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colonies seemed worth contemplating. But from a Flying
Tiger's point of view, the lack of a serious attitude was quite
apparently a local fact of life. On December 22, for example,
when R.T. Smith and his squadron had already been sent
back to Rangoon to patrol against expected Japanese bomb-
ers—for a raid that would in fact come the very next day—
the young American pilot still finds everything in the city
functioning as usual, with no evidence whatsoever of con-
cern for war. When Smith stops at a jewelry store to pick up
the gold signet ring he's ordered, the British manager re-
fuses to take cash payment, saying he'll bill the flyer at the
end of the month. "Little did either of us know that before
that time the store would be in ruins and the city evacu-
ated," Smith indicates in a footnote to his original entries
for that day. "I still owe somebody for that ring, which I wear
to this day" (p. 158). Even after two weeks of bombing, the
city remained ill prepared to deal with hostilities. On Janu-
ary 6,1942, radioman Robert M. Smith comments on this in
his own diary, With Chennault in China. "The AVG were ready
for war. We have been in intensive training since August,"
he rightfully boasts. "The British at Rangoon were not. They
were poorly organized. There was no food for the AVG or
British pilots. For three days their rations were bread and
beer. They had butter on the bread for one breakfast" (p. 53).
Regard for the King's forces in Burma ran no higher at
the head of AVG command. In his own memoirs, "I've Seen
the Best of It," Joseph W. Alsop replays an early staff meeting
between his boss and the local hierarchy to clarify why
Chennault "had no great liking for the British" (p. 179). The
gathering is characterized by the high commissioner's
drowning of defeatism in a tide of the largest gin gimlets Joe
Alsop has ever seen; it is characteristic not only of this Wash-
ington insider's chauvinism but also of his appreciation for
Chennault's staying power that the AVG leader is portrayed
as the only one to resist drifting off to lotus-eating land. In
his Way of a Fighter, Chennault regrets that the battle for
Burma "was a disaster that nearly knocked China out of the
war and sowed bitter seeds of dissension among the new
British, Chinese, and American allies. The most tragic as-
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pect of that bloody campaign was the utter lack of Allied
unity." Here the blame is apportioned equally, the British
thinking only of India (as a more securable dominion) while
the top-ranking American military men made the Chinese
feel equally abandoned by dealing with them "as a frontier
cavalry commander of 1870 handled a tribe of friendly but
untrustworthy Indians" (p. 140). Yet others on Chennault's
staff were prone to blame the British, including Olga Greenlaw,
AVG diarist and wife of the commander's chief-of-staff who
with her husband had become something of an old hand at
the Far East. "We had seen enough of the smug complacency,
lethargy and ostrich-like head-in-the-sand attitude of the
French in Indo-China, the Siamese, the Dutch, and the British
in Hong Kong, Singapore and Burma to be convinced that
they, tragically too late, would discover that they were also at
war," she rues in The Lady and the Tigers. Even though the AVG
was present to augment their own RAF squadrons and the
docks of Rangoon were piled high with the materials for fight-
ing a very real war, "These people simply would not believe
anything could or would happen" (p. 31).
Face to face, the attitude of the AVG pilots toward their
RAF counterparts was only a bit less problematic. "My first
impression is that they are sissified dainties," Charlie Bond
records after he and his colleague share scotch and soda with
the English flyers at their club. So much for "first opinions
about the British fighter pilots," although "others say they
are gutsy guys" (p. 81). Two weeks of contact with the en-
emy doesn't help, as on February 2,1942, Bond is dismayed
to learn that the crucial RAF base at Moulmein "was evacu-
ated ahead of the incoming Japs. They said only sixteen hun-
dred Japanese troops took the place" (p. 92). As many other
pages of A Flying Tiger's Diary report Bond's AVG squadron
succeeding against astronomical odds, the implication is
clear. Before Pearl Harbor, some Americans chided the lo-
cals that they were doing nothing and expected the United
States to stop the Japanese for them; after December 7, speak-
ers of this persuasion, rude as they were, felt they had the
evidence behind them.
Not helping relations was the fact that on November 19,
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1941, well before the Rangoon operations, when the entire
AVG was still in the thick of its training at Kyedaw Airfield
near Toungoo, representative British and American flyers
engaged in a dogfight. It was arranged on friendly terms,
was not inspired by any test of competition on national
grounds, and was of course conducted without any ammu-
nition, the goal being simply to outmaneuver the mock ad-
versary by getting position on his tail. Erik Shilling was the
AVG pilot chosen, and in his Destiny he explains how the
matter came up not as any rivalry with the RAF but because
of an ongoing debate about the plane they flew. The Brewster
Buffalo that the RAF's Burma squadrons operated was not
only an American plane but had been used earlier by the
U.S. Navy. Many of the AVG pilots were former Navy fly-
ers, and some of them thought it a better fighter than the
P-40s their leader had obtained. To settle the argument and
also to relieve the stress of training with a bit of a sideshow,
Chennault arranged to have an RAF pilot bring one up and
face off against the AVG's equipment.
Shilling's account of the dogfight is fair and even com-
plimentary. His opponent, a squadron leader named Brandt,
was a Battle of Britain ace who had outfought Messerschmitt
109s, so the Brewster was in capable hands. Shilling, how-
ever, was able to outturn it by slanting their circle to a 45
degree plane. "Each time at the top of the turn, with the
Brewster below, I would pull back hard on the stick, doing a
one quarter turn spin cutting across the circle and gaining a
little each time" (p. 112). Brandt has his own tricks, includ-
ing dropping landing gear and flaps in the hopes Shilling
will overshoot. But the American sees the flaps lowering and
so pulls back on the stick rather than reducing power, gain-
ing altitude as he loses speed and therefore staying ready to
jump back on his adversary's tail. Each pilot is gifted and
gets the best from his machine, with the better plane, the
P-40, winning.
Unfortunately for RAF-AVG relations, this was not how
the contest was perceived. In R.T. Smith's diary there is no
sign that the author knows that the issue is an Army-Navy
contest rather than an evaluation of the RAF. "Shilling beat
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him," Smith notes, "but we all agree the RAF guy did a lousy
job of flying. Looked like he wasn't trying and he made some
lousy mistakes" (p. 123). Charlie Bond puts it even more
bluntly, saying "Shilling clobbered his opponent" (p. 40),
sharing Frank Losonsky's sentiments as expressed in Flying
Tiger: A Crew Chief's Story that, as far as the RAF plane went,
"the P-40 whipped the hell out of it" (p. 63). Another con-
temporary account brought this news (and the attitude be-
hind it) to the American public in the form of Robert B. Hotz's
With General Chennault: The Story of the Flying Tigers. Pub-
lished early in 1943 with title-page credit given for the assis-
tance of three prominent AVG pilots (Paxton, Neale, Dupouy)
and mentioning at the start that Hotz was presently serving
under Chennault's command in China, this volume spoke
with apparent authority. The message it conveyed exagger-
ated even further the (nonexistent) RAF-AVG rivalry by de-
scribing how bets were taken on the outcome, something no
diary or subsequent memoir mentions. Yet the idea of a wa-
gering contest, replete with boastful challenges, long odds,
and exorbitant sums (400 Indian rupees, or $150, half a
month's pay for the ground crewman putting up the cash)
made the situation more exciting to report and more reward-
ing for American loyalties when Hotz concluded that "Shil-
ling flew rings around the stubby Buffalo and the RAF pilot"
(p. 107).
A year earlier, in 1942, the very first book on Chennault's
AVG had prepared readers to be skeptical about their Brit-
ish allies, at least as far as conduct in the Far East was con-
cerned. In The Flying Tigers, Russell Whelan strikes a different
note than sounded by the many current volumes celebrat-
ing the glamor of RAF pilots in the Battle of Britain and the
tenacious courage of Londoners surviving the Blitz; to him
the term "British" means senseless regulation for regulation's
sake in denial of any need for efficiency, much less wartime
commitment, as he illustrates when the first AVG recruits
arrive in Rangoon. These future heroes, Whelan notes, are
in either civilian clothes or plain khaki without insignia, but
what they see shocks every military bone in their bodies:
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As their ship approached the city they were vividly reminded
of their mission by the scene along the three-mile length of
wharves, where storage yards and warehouses bulged with
thousands of packing cases awaiting shipment by rail and road
to the north. This was American lend-lease material, the
lifeblood of fighting China.
They found upon inquiry that many of the packing cases
had been standing there for weeks and months, while China
clamored for the supplies, and clamored in vain. One of the
reasons for this, they learned, was the British custom ruling
that permitted clearance of any article only when every one of
its kind mentioned in the bill of lading was present on the spot
and accounted for. Hence, if the papers described a shipment
of five thousand automobile truck tires, and ten of these were
mislaid during an unloading, the other four thousand nine
hundred and ninety gathered dust on the wharves until the
missing ten turned up. If they remained missing, the four
thousand nine hundred and ninety stayed where they were,
thus serving the ends of red tape but not of nations and
empires fighting for their lives, (pp. 38-39)
It is important to note that Whelan doesn't need to write his
scene quite this way. He wants to tell about the hung-up
supplies, but his choice of exposition is rhetorical. By hav-
ing the AVG recruits perceive it, as their first sight in coun-
try, the effect is to stir American anger, their own and their
readers'. Here they are, having come over from a country
not yet at war to volunteer their services to a pair of nations
already declared as belligerents in World War II; the men-
tion of civilian clothes and no insignia is a reminder of this
fact. But what of the belligerents? One, China, is cut off from
desperately needed supplies by the criminally stupid prac-
tices of the other, Great Britain. Nor are these just "supplies,"
but rather American Lend-Lease material. Taxpayer dollars
are being wasted, money paid by the same Americans back
home reading Whelan's book. To drive the economic argu-
ment to its inflammatory conclusion, the author repeats the
accounting figures four times over, each time spelling out the
numbers to enhance their grating presence. By the time he
writes the words "red tape" readers are well stirred up. With
the reminder that people are "fighting for their lives" comes
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the appreciation that this spectacle is being viewed by a ship-
load of young Americans who will soon be doing just that.
When the war does come to Rangoon, Whelan scores
another critical point. True, the civilian government does a
good job of putting out the first air raid's fires, as good as
had been done by their compatriots in London. "But the Brit-
ish made one mistake of omission—the kind of mistake that
loses battles and wars" (p. 64), for, as the author notes, they
had forgotten to take care of the Indian coolies working on
the docks, nearly all of whom promptly walked off the job
and returned back home to the subcontinent. It was the type
of oversight that happens in unseen emergencies, a contin-
gency for which no regulations have been prepared. Yet
plenty of other regulations remained, many of them operat-
ing in a way that kept the absent Indian workers from being
quickly replaced. As Olga Greenlaw sighs in her own book
that reached American readers in the still-impressionable
year of 1943, "If you think [AVG attempts to overcome this]
succeeded you are ignorant of the intricacies of British red
tape as it existed in Burma at that time. All the lawyers in
Philadelphia couldn't have whipped that problem" (p. 24).
Olga Greenlaw could also find fault with British fight-
ing units, painting the first stroke in a portrait of noncoop-
eration that would emerge from a wide range of Flying Tiger
narratives. When the Japanese began bombing Rangoon in
late December 1941, by which time the United States and
the United Kingdom had become formal allies, each at war
with the same opponents in the same places, she had only
poor examples to cite in the official AVG diary, as reproduced
in The Lady and the Tigers:
No air raid signal was given at Mingaladon [the principal
defending air base]. All ships were suddenly ordered off
airdrome. No information of enemy prior to take-off was
known. Three minutes after take-off radio orders were given:
"ENEMY APPROACHING FROM EAST."—No co-operation
was given by anti-aircraft guns—pilots report that it was
practically nil and very inaccurate. Fourteen P-40's and sixteen
Brewsters (RAF) joined the fight. There was no friendly
support from nearby [RAF] airdromes, (p. 91)
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In the operations room back at AVG headquarters, pilot
Jack Newkirk was present with Greenlaw to hear the or-
der; his remark, "Hope the RAF won't let them do all the
work" (p. 90), becomes prophetic. More than two months
later, after a great deal of air combat, Greenlaw would indi-
cate that "at no time had the RAF in Burma ever co-oper-
ated with the AVG in giving us weather reports, arrivals and
departures, or other vital information" (p. 126). Other mem-
oirs corroborate this view. Sometimes the example is comic,
as when crew chief Frank Losonsky mentions that "the Brit-
ish absolutely refused to let us boresight in late afternoon.
The machine gun fire interfered with the peace and quiet of
their 'tea time'" (p. 43). In China: The Remembered Life, Paul
Frillmann faults the British for not having a warning net-
work such as Chennault had perfected and asked them to
devise one for Rangoon's defense, only to be told "that Brit-
ish spotters could not survive in the jungle, and the Bur-
mese were not to be trusted" (p. 88). Much worse was the
RAF practice of not sharing even the most vital information
when they had it. Pappy Boyington is surprised to learn this
when in Baa Baa Black Sheep he arrives at Mingaladon Field
and is told the first alert of any enemy attack will not be a
scramble order but the sight of two RAF Brewsters taking
off "in a westerly direction, regardless of the wind sock.
That's the signal" (p. 55). Wouldn't American pilots, with
their own lives at risk and just as eager to gain the altitude
needed to stand a chance against the Japanese, protest such
thoughtlessness? If they did, it was to no avail, for as Olga
Greenlaw tells it an AVG radioman had to loiter around the
RAF control office, "jump up and answer [the phone] quickly
before the British had a chance to get at it," hear the news
and then seize the tannoy microphone, audible all over the
field, and yell "Go get 'em, cowboys!" (pp. 126-27), a prac-
tice that worked only because the British controllers didn't
understand the American's slang.
Not surprisingly, as the war continues, diary confidences
turn nasty. "Had a sorry breakfast at the field mess and heard
that the Japs are driving on Singapore," Charlie Bond writes
106 • With the Tigers over China
on February 1. "Moulmein fell last night. The British cannot
stem the tide, and I wonder if they are waiting for the Aussies
or the Americans to do it for them" (p. 91). The ease British
personnel took in performing their duties was particularly
infuriating and gave larger appraisals such as Bond's a cred-
ibility well beyond any fairness. On a ferrying mission to
Africa, where urgently needed P-40E Kittyhawks were wait-
ing to be flown to the AVG in China, R.T. Smith found him-
self delayed in Egypt because of minor electrical problems,
something the RAF could easily fix for him. They eventu-
ally did, but at their leisure. "The damned stupid British tied
things up as usual" is how Smith tells it to his diary on March
7,1942, adding, "I get sicker of them every day—no wonder
the tea-drinking stoops get hell kicked out of them in every
battle." In a footnote added to this page when his diary is
published, Smith puts it in a more generous perspective:
My, my, it seems I was in a bit of a snit at this point, perhaps
with some justification. The RAF people often seemed deter-
mined to take their own sweet time about getting things done;
their attitude was sometimes expressed by "what's the bloody
'urry, Yank?" In fairness it should be remembered that the war
was new to us and with typical American impatience we
wanted to win it in a hurry and go home. The British, of
course, had been at it for over two years and seemed resigned
to the fact that it would go on indefinitely, (p. 239)
Yet the ill feeling carries on throughout the trip, and even
when things are going better and he's overnighting in
Bahrain on the Persian Gulf, Smith chooses the Imperial Air-
ways Hotel (and a hefty bill) to Royal Air Force accommo-
dations: "Could have stayed at the RAF camp, but we're all
getting so we can't speak to the damn Limeys with a civil
tongue, so we're glad to get away from them" (p. 248).
Disgust with their British allies eventually became a
staple of AVG mess hall comedy, as in the skit Olga Greenlaw
recalls as devised for visiting guests, the question "What is
the latest retreat the RAF has completed" being answered
with "We haven't caught them yet to find out" (p. 167). When
Singapore falls on February 15, the mood turns to serious
depression. "Everyone is disgusted as hell the way things
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are going and at the inadequateness of the British in all re-
spects," AVGer George Burgard is quoted in Duane Schultz's
The Maverick War. "Rangoon is certainly much more of a soft
touch than Singapore and here we sit, twenty-two AVG pi-
lots trying to defend it against a nation. What prize chumps
we are, holding down the hot spots for the British" (pp. 187-
88). Even retreating together proves a disaster. At one field
the RAF removes the sole radar set days before the AVG is
ready to leave; at another, where the two forces try to coop-
erate, attempts to fuel up the departing convoy fail when
the British forget where the gasoline is hidden. In the most
preposterous scene of all, an RAF squadron lingers at
Mingaladon and asks the AVG to help them dedicate their
new officers' club the night before they're scheduled to burn
it down for the evacuation. Finally, the AVG convoy that's
been limping back to China pauses overnight at the British
hill station in Maymyo, a colonial vacation spot maintained
as impeccably as any countryside retreat in Surrey or Kent.
Here Paul Frillmann is surprised to see everything as luxu-
rious and peaceful as it ever was, including a posh social
life: "I even saw two proper blondes in long-skirted evening
dresses, one blue, one pink, walking sedately with two young
British officers. Off to a dance, I supposed. They looked
strange as Martians to me" (p. 122).
What had been left behind was ghastly in its devasta-
tion. Rangoon was a wasteland of burned buildings, looted
shops, corpses decaying in the streets, and anyone remain-
ing caught in a riotous struggle between native and colonial
populations. Civil order had long since crumbled; rather than
being left to starve, criminals, lunatics, lepers, and people
otherwise critically ill were turned out of prisons and hospi-
tals to fend for themselves; the scenes of them wandering
through the blasted streets were nightmarish. When anyone
did look back, it was to see a landscape seemingly floating
in the dust. As historian Daniel Ford describes it in Flying
Tigers, "The spectacular sunsets resulted from the dust and
flame attending the collapse of the British Empire" (p. 252).
People of the American Volunteer Group were not sym-
pathetic witnesses to this scene, either in its realistic or sym-
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bolic dimensions. Too much of their attitude had been spoiled
by bad impressions beforehand, whether it be the red tape
on the docks or the failure at even minimal cooperation at
the airfields. In a novel that has no shortage of easy targets
for its satire, Pappy Boyington's Tonya takes indecent fun
with the British, such as when the AVG, hearing the first
news of the Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor and the crip-
pling of America's Pacific fleet, phones the British com-
mander in Singapore to ask if they're under air attack as
well. "Great heavens, no!" the Brigadier exclaims. "This is
an impregnable naval base, my good fellow!" Well, is there
anything at all out of the ordinary to report? "Let me think
a moment," comes the reply, then "—oh, I say we had a
corking good party at the Raffles Hotel last Saturday night!"
(p. 141). The tragedy in Boyington's slapstick is that the call
was really made, as was the reply quoted. Never to be out-
done, even by the former lover who made her look so bad
(along with everyone else) in Tonya, Olga Greenlaw packs
her own book with ridiculous scenes about the British, hi-
larious in every way except that they're brutally true.
Throughout The Lady and the Tigers she's drawn comic relief
from a person named Stanley Robins, the individual who
serves as her typically old-fashioned British colonial type.
For much of the narrative he's off tiger hunting or drinking
at his club. During the retreat from Burma it's in another
club that they meet, with Stanley eager to prove at last how
his skill bagging the great Bengal cats has not gone to waste.
"The last two nights in Rangoon I spent shooting native loot-
ers," he boasts. "I was surprised at what a good shot I was,
thought I'd lost the knack of it" (p. 243) But it's on the last
leg of her escape that Greenlaw makes her serious point
about the British, when during a breakdown she trades some
catnapping RAF pilots a carton of cigarettes and a bottle of
whisky for one of their spare Jeep tires:
"All right," said the first officer, "go and get it and it's yours."
"You are certainly taking it easy, aren't you?" I said to the
first officer.
"Oh, well," he answered, "we can't do anything about it. No
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planes to fly, might as well get out of the way and move
north." He laughed.
I said, "Why don't you get hold of a gun and do a little
fighting?"
"What for?" he asked. "Something went wrong here.
Maybe it is because we are not in the spirit of the thing. Now,
back there in Dunkirk—that was different. There we were
fighting for something. But here, who the hell cares for these
Burmans?"
I thought to myself—so that's the attitude of these British
soldiers toward the country they conquered. They take from it
but give nothing in return, (p. 166)
Being a writer who has looked over the American Vol-
unteer Group's Anglo-Burmese girlfriends and found them
"a little too much on the dusky side" to suit her sense of
decorum makes her the last person to be giving an anticolo-
nialistic critique. Britain may have benefited economically
from these people, but it had hardly enslaved them. And in
England itself, a generation beyond the Empire's end, preju-
dices and discriminations lingered far less than in America
nearly a century after emancipation. Just opposite the page
in Russell Whelan's The Flying Tigers where the author had
shown the AVG arrivals learning how American Lend-Lease
supplies were blocked by British red tape, he marvels at the
"sight of so many tanned and muscular young men with an
identical gleam in their eyes," diverse as their backgrounds
are: "a typical assortment of American names and racial
strains" (p. 37), not even considering the fact that there are
no African Americans in the unit (one of the strict USAAF
principles that this otherwise unconventional group retained
intact). Yet Greenlaw's stricture is not unfounded, for it was
being made at the time and even earlier by major English
writers such as George Orwell, whose novel Burmese Days
(1934) uses the author's experience as a police officer in the
region to underscore similar claims.
Well beyond such political issues is the culture clash
Chennault's AVG men experienced in the Burma of 1941.
The natives could be accepted as exotic, but the colonials
from England—that was where the trouble lay. Caught un-
awares by the lulling security of a common language and so
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many shared traditions, American flyers were thrown off
guard around the world, especially in England itself, where
the Eagle Squadron members had to make unforeseen ad-
justments to warm beer, cold food, damp weather, early clos-
ing hours at the pubs, low pay, rationed goods, and, above
all, the slower pace of British life. Thankfully one of the
Eagles was Jim Goodson, familiar with British life thanks to
family connections and prewar visits, who could advise his
more naive squadron mates that "the secret of enjoying life
in this country is never to be in a hurry," as he recalls in
Tumult in the Clouds (1983). "If you push them, they resent it.
It's kind of like an Old Folks Home" (p. 60). The Americans
in the AVG did push hard, and as Erik Shilling notes in Des-
tiny, "We could feel the resentment" (p. 118). Sometimes the
provocation was passive, as going to the fleabag of a movie
house in Toungoo not to view the film but, as Robert B. Hotz
reports it, "to watch the British colonials arrive in formal
evening dress and sit stiffly through a film while cockroaches
scuttled across the floor and swooping bats threw shadows
on the screen" (p. 118). Other times it was their own behav-
ior, such as the night after their first air battle over Rangoon
when much of the squadron descended on the plushly for-
mal Silver Grill wearing dirty shirts, oily shorts, and mos-
quito boots, pistols slung on their hips, and Anglo-Burmese
girlfriends (never allowed in the club) clinging to their arms,
ready to teach the girls how to jitterbug while drinking each
other under the tables. Such introductions did not bode well,
and when working relationships were built on the Ameri-
cans' belief that the British were waiting for the AVG to win
the war for them only the worst could be expected.
Not surprisingly, AVG men hit if off much better with
RAF personnel from elsewhere. Radioman Robert M. Smith
hears from a ground crewman just back from the first battles
in Rangoon that, although RAF officers showed little in their
own combats, "the New Zealand pilots were wonderful, and
some of the British sergeant pilots did all right on the sec-
ond raid" (p. 50). The best explanation for such a claim may
not be aerial records but, as historian Daniel Ford reports,
the fact that these New Zealanders were happy to play cards
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with their AVG buddies (p. 242). R.T. Smith's praise is simi-
larly centered on how things seemed on the ground, agree-
ing that when it came to pilots from New Zealand and
Australia "we hit it off much better with them than with the
more reserved Britishers who often seemed quite snobbish"
(p. 156). It will be remembered that on Smith's ferrying trip
across the Middle East he had to avoid spending time with
RAF people, so dilatory had their attitudes been toward get-
ting him and his new P-40E back to China on schedule. On a
similar trip Erik Shilling stops in Cairo and has an entirely
different type of experience, thanks to the special folks he
meets:
A couple of us were drinking at a bar one night and met
several friendly Aussies, fighter pilots from a group based in
the North African desert. They were in Cairo on a two week R
and R [rest and recreation leave], and incidentally, were from
the same group flying the shark nosed P-40 we'd seen in the
papers. Their sense of humor was similar to Americans', so we
got along famously and soon became friends. We palled
around with them until their leave was over, and with their
help we were introduced to many desirable bars, and also
some that weren't, (p. 160)
Apart from the stuffier civilians' shock at the AVG's
seemingly uncouth behavior, British views of their new
American allies were much more generous than the way
Chennault's people thought of them. But from the very top
there was a difference in both strategy and tactics that made
close cooperation a fatuous hope. General Archibald Wavell,
commanding the entire region from India, greeted America's
entrance into the war by expecting the AVG to be assimi-
lated into the RAF, from his point of view the only estab-
lished air arm in the area. Chennault, of course, succeeded
in resisting this. But when the two air forces took off to en-
gage Japanese adversaries, differences became more pain-
fully obvious. Having studied the enemy since 1937,
Chennault had learned that the only way to beat their vastly
more maneuverable aircraft was to swoop down on them
for a quick strike and then zoom away. These literal hit-and-
run tactics, which to this point were more characteristic of
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hot-rodders and gangsters than to the knighthood of the air,
were complemented by two-plane formations that also went
against the book. For the prewar RAF, there had been an
actual manual consisting of attacking styles numbered in
ascending sequence and involving a full squadron of twelve
fighters forming various ranks to approach the enemy in
orderly fashion; once engaged, the planes could then be ex-
pected to conduct themselves by classic mano a mano rules
of the dogfight. For Chennault, such practice was a formula
for disaster. Instead, he taught his volunteers to think in
terms of two-plane units for all stages of the fight—before,
during, and after—and to visualize what those two planes
did as the work of a boxer's pair of hands, one covering while
the other landed its punch.
Needless to say, tactics of the gangster and the boxer did
not appeal to the still inexperienced RAF commanders in
the Far East. As Chennault mentions in his Way of a Fighter,
"At Rangoon the RAF 221st Group posted a notice that any
RAF pilot seen diving away from a fight would be subject to
court-martial" (p. 114). On this same page, he contrasts the
results, RAF pilots barely breaking even against the Japa-
nese "while the Americans rolled up a 15 to 1 score." Granted,
British flyers were trained in methods that had worked
against the heavier German and Italian aircraft, but "against
the acrobatic Japs" the results were suicidal.
"Our losses were higher than they should have been
because the advice from the American Volunteer Group had
not been properly learned"—these words come from M.C.
"Bush" Cotton's Hurricanes over Burma (1995) and reflect the
educational experience British pilots underwent during the
first months of 1942, when the AVG's war in the Far East
became their own as well. Cotton, whose service nickname
reflected his Australian nationality, had left home to train in
Canada and begin operations in England, soon after which
he shipped out from Scotland for the Middle East. Leaving
on December 5, 1941, his destination was Basra on the Per-
sian Gulf, where he and his colleagues were to pick up their
Hurricanes and fly on to the Caucasus, where they expected
to help the Russian Army by destroying Panzer tanks. All
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that changed with the news of Pearl Harbor, a change the
quickness of which amazed the young flyer:
In retrospect, one can imagine the difficulties involved in
the reassessment of priorities of the whole field of battle that
the Allied war planners now had to make. It says a lot for the
speed with which they acted, for, within a few days of the U.S.
involvement, the Durban Castle was diverted to berth at
Freetown in Sierra Leone. Half of the pilots of the three
squadrons were off-loaded, and the remainder rejoined the
convoy to proceed to Singapore as reinforcements for the
squadrons there and, as it turned out, virtual oblivion. One of
these pilots was John Gorton of 135 Squadron, who survived
Singapore to become a prime minister of Australia, (p. 118)
Bush Cotton was one of those to leave the ship at Free-
town, from whence DC-2 transports of the RAF flew him
and his squadron mates to Khartoum. Here he met Barry
Sutton, flight commander in another squadron on its way to
the Far East, who would himself write a narrative starting
with this journey, Jungle Pilot (1946), a sequel to the already
famous account of his 1940 exploits flying in the Battle of
France and the Battle of Britain, The Way of a Pilot (1942).
These two pilots continued East until they reached Burma,
but en route to Singapore was another Battle of Britain vet-
eran and already published author, Arthur Gerald Donahue.
Art Donahue was an American flying with the RAF since
the summer of 1940, well in advance of his country's other
volunteers who would become the Eagle Squadrons, and
had written Tally Ho! Yankee in a Spitfire (1941). From his Far
East experience Donahue would write another book, Last
Flight from Singapore (1943). Donahue's contingent had left
earlier than Cotton's, the ground crews embarking from
Liverpool on November 11,1941, and most of the pilots fol-
lowing at month's end. Among them was not just Donahue
but a third author, Terence Kelly, who would in later years
publish three books on his years in the Far East with the
RAF. Like Donahue, he thought the desert equipment they
carried meant their fighting would take place in Libya; after
Pearl Harbor their convoy was reorganized in Durban with
Singapore as its new goal. Of these early reinforcements, only
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two subsequent authors knew from the start where they were
being sent: Kenneth Hemingway, who as a prewar journal-
ist had already published a book on industrial conditions
and would soon write Wings over Burma (1944), and Terence
O'Brien, who much later would author three volumes cov-
ering his participation in all aspects of the war from
Singapore's fall to its recapture in 1945. Hemingway left soon
after December 7, convoying to Africa and then flying a
Hurricane as escort to five Blenheims destined for Rangoon.
O'Brien flew all the way, taking a flight of Hudson bombers
the distance to Singapore, leaving England December 29, by
which point the nature of this new war with the Japanese
was all too clear.
Because his travels would take him to Singapore,
Sumatra, and Java before returning to a posting in England
via India and Ceylon, Art Donahue never met the American
Volunteer Group. Nor does he mention their existence. It is
unlikely, however, that he would have been their notable
advocate, for even the much better disciplined and excep-
tionally more regular Eagle Squadrons had not won any
enthusiasm from this earlier arrival, who'd learned every-
thing within the Royal Air Force and preferred it that way,
talking his way out of assignment to the Eagles when they
became operational. His Last Flight to Singapore does take a
unique angle on America's entry into the war, for Donahue
learns about it in the midst of his trip East, where in the East
he doesn't know but hopefully some place where the action
is as hot as it was during the Battle of Britain.
"I felt dazed and overwhelmed," Donahue recalls, hav-
ing been told the news of Japan's sneak attack. "After all the
fighting that we Americans in the RAF had been through,
believing that we were helping to make this unnecessary, it
had come at last, all in a twinkling, and our country was
committed to take part in the slaughter" (p. 18). His response
is much different from that of Chennault's volunteers just
finishing their training in Burma. The record of their own
reactions speaks for vindication of foresight and eagerness
to make war against the Japanese with their country's might
behind them. Donahue, as should be expected from his un-
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willingness to join the Eagles, responds less as someone who
has been flying for adventure than as a fighter pilot who
volunteered for Britain as a way of keeping America out of
the war rather than bringing his country into the fray. As his
convoy ship rests in Gibraltar, its destination even now be-
ing reconsidered, Donahue joins his colleagues in worrying
for what this newly restructured future bodes for them: "Ev-
eryone was subdued—we Americans because of the trag-
edy it spelled for our country, and the others because we felt
it would lengthen the war to have Japan added to our en-
emies. The only bright side for us Americans was knowing
that we wouldn't be outlaws any more in the eyes of our
own country—as we were when I went home on leave to
the States the previous winter and wasn't allowed to wear
my uniform" (p. 18).
As the other reinforcing pilots head to the Far East, their
thoughts are like those of American Volunteer Group recruits,
anticipating the experience in literary terms—Kipling's po-
ems and stories, the Rubaiydt verses of Edward FitzGerald,
and, as Barry Sutton admits in Jungle Pilot, "the India which
is the happy hunting-ground of the Romanesque novelist to
whom this country and its way of life is a melody on a theme
of breath-taking landscape, chukkas and chotah pegs, house-
boats and cocktails, gracious and cultivated rajahs; a lyric
India, admitting of no more than the echo of discords such
as disease, hate, and poverty; a microcosmic India, as un-
real and precious and remote as a snow scene within a glass
bowl" (p. 120). Although the literary references are made
early in Sutton's memoir, the comments on India come from
its conclusion, when he realizes how privileged he has been
to see these last views of a subcontinent already swept by
nationalist fervor and soon to go its own way from that of
the British Empire. In the full set of literary allusions can be
found a major difference between an AVG and RAF citation
of the same bookish source: for Americans, these writings
are aesthetic materials, matters for lyric art, belletristic in
the sharpest sense of that word, whereas for the English,
Kipling and FitzGerald and their like are readable not only
as the record of colonialism but as a testament whose fidelty
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to fact is fast fading (if not having been erased altogether).
Yet even along the way exotic sights and sounds distract
these pilots from the military reality awaiting them. Sutton
himself feasts on the sights and sounds of Africa, the Middle
East, and India. But he is also mindful of the different quality
of human life, especially at airfields swarming with low-caste
workers vulnerable to being run over like ants—for the bal-
ance of his trip the author keeps telling himself that the thud
he heard on takeoff could not have been his Hurricane's wing
striking and killing one of these unfortunates.
What the incoming RAF pilots saw among their compa-
triots was as disconcerting as any scene witnessed by the
AVG. Not even in the Middle East, where attention was fixed
on the Germans and Italians, was there much awareness of
danger from the Japanese. Wing Commander Cedric A.C.
"Bunny" Stone was another flyer diverted en route after Pearl
Harbor. His memoirs are reproduced as part of Bush Cotton's
Hurricanes over Burma, and early on Stone complains that
"the Middle East HQ were not interested in the rapidly Ris-
ing Sun casting its shadows in the Far East." As he and his
men make the customary stopover in Cairo, he's shocked to
hear what would become the customary expression that
'"Oh, the Japs; they cannot fly and are blind anyway—they
all wear glasses!'—comforting at the time, but how mis-
taken!" (p. 230). Closer to the action in Burma and even af-
ter the Japanese air offensive against Rangoon has begun,
Kenneth Hemingway marvels at the atmosphere that char-
acterizes India in the early months of 1942:
There had been a peace-time air about Karachi, Jodhpur,
Allahabad, Calcutta, like the feeling aboard a ship in a convoy
when you pace the deck and think of your wife at home, or one
of the quiet Hertfordshire villages you knew, comparatively
untouched by raiders. In Calcutta, at the open-air restaurant, I
had sat out listening to a good band, drinking as much as I
pleased, watching the crowd happy and gay as any in pre-war
England or France. If the possibility of being bombed was
discussed at all, it was a contingency remote as a raid from
Mars. It was not the people's fault. Although, a year later, they
were to crouch down as London had crouched, listening for the
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drone of radials, at the time when we were in Rangoon the war
had been kept out of India by the Afghanistan ranges, the
Tibetan plateau, and the jungle hills of Burma and Malay. They
were like inhabitants of a house on a hummock who still
played cards behind curtained windows, ignorant of the flood-
water rising up their garden path. And I remembered my wife
saving an egg for me when I went home on leave in England—the
menu at the Grand had about twenty items. For breakfast I could
have had two, three, four omelettes, if I had wished, (p. 27)
As the egg episode shows, English flyers could be even
more shocked by the unapparency of war out here; unlike
the AVG recruits, who'd left a country at peace, these RAF
flyers were coming from a country fighting for its life against
an enemy still with the odds in its favor. In Hurricanes over
Burma, Bush Cotton, notwithstanding his Australian nation-
ality and Canadian training, is likewise "staggered by the
peacetime attitudes of the military services in India, particu-
larly at Karachi, with life being lived as though nothing had
happened since 1939." Servants at hand, visiting cards re-
quired for dropping by clubs and the homes of senior offic-
ers, dances conducted with all the protocol of royalty being
present—to Cotton and his colleagues bound for a very real
shooting war in Burma these practices seemed preposter-
ous, "so we tried to break down some of this wasteful and
tiresome rubbish by being as anti-establishment as we could
get away with" (p. 121), to the extent of taking over the
orchestra's instruments for a jazz jam session and teaching
the locals how to jitterbug. After flying and fighting in
Burma, Cotton is all the more adamant. "It never failed to
make me mad as hell to meet up with some of the asinine
English fatheads who seemed to congregate in India," he
confides. "Perhaps the Brits got rid of them out of their is-
land, to India, in the same way as they used to send their
convicts to Australia" (p. 150), a sentiment more than one
AVGer might share. Even much later on, when formally sta-
tioned in Calcutta and operating his squadron off a street in
a suddenly threatened downtown, this outspoken memoir-
ist enjoys recounting how he and his friends bought
monocles and wore them to the officers' club, "Putting on
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the most frightful Pommy accents... and talking loud drivel"
until the resident Colonel Blimps threw them out of the place.
Bunny Stone puts it in perspective, observing how "the
whole Far East at that time" maintained an insufferable
laissez-aller attitude "until the arrival of Lord Louis
Mountbatten and General Orde Wingate in 1943," whose
presence finally answered the commonly voiced question
of "How did Britain ever win a war?" (p. 231).
Rear area complacency extended to Burma as well. Al-
though by the time these reinforcements arrived, Rangoon
was in the thick of it and could not provide scenes of colo-
nial ease and indolence that had shocked the AVG, hill-sta-
tion retreats such as Maymyo, positioned well above
Mandalay, maintained a sense of peacefulness even as the
capital burned and the whole country prepared to fall. Ken-
neth Hemingway earned a rest period here after several
weeks of combat; because it was an official Army canton-
ment, he expected rows of barracks and bare parade grounds.
Instead, he found Maymyo looking like a combination pre-
war English resort and Middlesex suburb where everyone
acted in proper style—a style that had once been expensive
and now was fully unobtainable at home, but which could
be purchased here for the paltriest of sums.
Trained as a journalist, Hemingway knows how to find
the right descriptive subject for the point he wants to make.
And so after quickly detailing the grass verges bordering
the well-built English homes and noting how even the local
waiters are acting just like their counterparts at Blackpool
and in the Lake Country, he sits back at dinner to observe
what is to him the most telling scene: how the British women
living at this station behave.
There were quite a number of them, he counts, appreci-
ating how they are mostly young, recently married or en-
gaged to officers or civilian careerists, each group having
chosen colonial postings for the obvious benefits of lifestyle,
earnings, and advancement. The men might well be facing
danger in these newly warlike times, but as for the women—
"My impression, and it holds to this day, was that they were
conscious of being women, and white!" Hemingway's frank-
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ness is redoubled when he gives the reason why, because
"their bodies were—and are—at a premium in tropical coun-
tries." With servants, housework is not their worry. Nor is
any type of work at all. Instead, "they have all day to make
themselves sleek by exercise, good food, a nap in the after-
noon—as a result of which they tend to fatten in the rump
earlier than women at home." The author doesn't blame
them for taking such an easy road, but nevertheless feels
"that there is something fundamentally amiss." None of
them, he fears, "appreciate^] the privilege of living as they
do in a stimulating, interesting foreign country." Instead,
"their brains become bemused by slavish male attention, gin,
and 'Oh, ayah, don't forget to put John to bed early/ or, 'Ten-
nis, darling, of course, just a set; then we'll have some of
those lovely cream cakes at Straboli's, eh!'" (p. 136).
Further east, in Singapore, Art Donahue would see much
of the same, and in an outpost even more direly threatened.
When it does fall and he gets out in a literal version of his
book's title, Last Flight from Singapore, he feels compelled to
review what he has seen of these peacetime conditions main-
tained throughout the coming of war and even to the mo-
ment of defeat. "I reflected that in two and a half months
these new enemies had overrun Malaya, Singapore, and
Sumatra in rapid succession. They were winning in the Phil-
ippines and other places, and I thought to myself, 'Where
are we going to stop them?'" But another thought soon fol-
lows, one that makes him shiver: "Are we going to stop
them?" Ultimacies pile up faster than Donahue can handle,
while his thoughts turn back to first causes:
Was it possible that we were really losing this war? Were
these perhaps the last days of our civilization?
Surely I had seen out here most of the things that had
preceded the fall of other great civilizations—the softness and
decadence that come from easy living—the lack of appreciation
for the good things of life that comes from the too easy attain-
ment of them—the failure to appreciate freedom that comes
from taking it for granted too long. (p. 153)
Yet it is just one theater, only a weakly garrisoned outpost
being overwhelmed by the full strength of a great nation
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near at hand. Above all, Donahue can see that colonial ease
is an entirely different issue from what is really at stake in
World War II:
I, if anyone, should certainly know that the "things that
were bad" out here were not typically British, for I had served
more than a year in England, where the universal fighting
spirit and loyalty had made me feel very inferior. The people
there were anything but decadent, and the miserable creatures
who had let down their King and country so woefully out here
were no more true British than the fifth columnists and sabo-
teurs in my own country were true Americans, (p. 154)
Despite the pride shown in England's determination
during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, Donahue's words
carry a sentiment that is more American than British. Un-
willing to feel much sympathy for the far reaches of empire,
he neglects the fact that some of his RAF colleagues could
trace family histories (and in some cases family fortunes) to
these colonies. Together with Canadians, Australians, and
New Zealanders, there were pilots from Rhodesia and South
Africa flying in these units, not to mention the massive con-
tribution made by the Empire Training Scheme. Without
these resources England could never have held out, let alone
eventually won the war, and one of its war aims was to main-
tain the colonies. John Slessor, who during the war held many
top command and staff positions, writes in The Central Blue
(1956) that his American allies never seemed to understand
that there were postwar considerations that shaped Britain's
role during hostilities. "You old Limeys are always thinking
about the Middle East and the route to India and all that
sort of thing after the war," he describes an American friend
complaining. "Our job is to beat the Germans and win the
war and to hell with anything else," went the argument that
would have none of Slessor's question of "what we wanted
to win the war for, if it was not to create the situation we
wanted to see after the war" (p. 345). What Britain envisioned
for the postwar world was not in line with American aims.
Geopolitically, the United States considered China an im-
portant force, and insisted on building a Far East strategy
around Chiang's armies and governments, neither of which
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interested the British (who rather than consolidating
strengths north of Burma wished to drive on to recapture
Rangoon, preferably with amphibious landings, and then
continue on to Singapore and the Dutch East Indies). While
American plans centered on blocking Japan's western flank
by strengthening China and moving for a knockout blow
across the Pacific from the east, Churchill lobbied for colo-
nial reestablishment, in a minute quoted by Henry Probert
in The Forgotten Air Force (1995). "The political importance
of our making some effort to recover British territory must
not be underrated," the Prime Minister emphasizes.
"Rangoon and Singapore are great names in the British east-
ern world, and it will be an ill-day for Britain if the war ends
without our having made a stroke to regain these places and
having let the whole Malay peninsula alone until it is even-
tually evacuated as the result of an American-dictated peace
at Tokyo" (pp. 217-18). From the moment in 1942 when the
first attempts to reoccupy Burma began, the two Allies were
at cross-purposes: the Americans under Stilwell marching
in, as they had marched out, covering the territory foot by
foot while strengthening supply lines to China along the way,
as opposed to British desires for quicker aerial and amphibi-
ous assaults with an eye to taking back the major commer-
cial centers. None of this, however, was as hostile as British
and American relations over clandestine operations in Indo-
China. Terence O'Brien's The Moonlight War (1987) tells of
the subterfuges he and his colleagues had to practice in or-
der to aid the French, whom the United States didn't want
assisted because of their Vichy association and their country's
postwar intent to maintain the region as a colony; Probert's
The Forgotten Air Force suggests that at one point American
fighters may have shot down RAF planes involved in such
work (pp. 211-12).
None of these geopolitical concerns was on the minds of
the RAF reinforcements when, in January and February of
1942, they met their AVG counterparts who, together with
the obsolete Brewster Buffalo squadrons, had been fighting
the Japanese over Rangoon since late December. Granted, in
their early planning the Royal Air Force leadership had tried
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to co-opt the AVG to the purposes of empire. In The Central
Blue, John Slessor tells of T.V. Soong approaching him and
Lord Lothian during staff conferences in Washington, D.C.,
to join in the organizational efforts, supplying veteran pi-
lots as squadron or flight commanders and sending over
some senior command and staff personnel. Although logis-
tics eventually made such cooperation impossible, Slessor
had nevertheless recommended it, knowing that if British
installations in the Far East were attacked they'd be on their
own, whereas being a part of the AVG would "prove a use-
ful investment" (p. 337). Now, almost exactly a year later,
the American Volunteer Group was more American than
ever, as memoirists such as Kenneth Hemingway, Bush Cot-
ton, and Barry Sutton were to record.
"We stood there and frankly eyed one another," the au-
thor of Wings over Burma recalls of a mess hall encounter
with the AVG, "like members of friendly bandit gangs meet-
ing" (p. 121). By this time the Hurricane pilot had learned
enough about Chennault's men to know they were good
company for a pint and a natter, but his first look at them
was rather disconcerting. Arriving at Mingaladon airfield
to take up his duties in the defense of Rangoon, Hemingway
is just being told about such essentials as Army positions
and the warning system when, as he notes, "My attention
was diverted to a newcomer, a well-built fellow of medium
height, dressed in shirt and trousers and having a revolver
slung in an unorthodox, finely-worked leather holster." Tired
and dusty, the man looks dangerous, but when he asks the
squadron commander "Got'ny beer, Stone?" Hemingway
realizes that "here was one of the AVG—the 'Flying Tigers'
whose pseudonym was no overstatement" (p. 18). The
American is Bob Neale, and he and the new RAF pilot get
along fine. Afterward Squadron Leader Bunny Stone assures
him that fears about "that tough gallimaufry of mercenar-
ies" are needless—that both the AVG and the RAF had their
reputations to maintain, but that "thank heaven we had the
sense to sit down quietly and listen to them, when we first
arrived" (p. 19).
Bunny Stone's own narrative, appearing at the end of
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Bush Cotton's Hurricanes over Burma, confirms that one of
the first things this squadron leader did was seek knowl-
edge from the AVG. Not that first impressions were any
easier for him than they were for Kenneth Hemingway. One
easily pictures Stone, ramrod straight and properly man-
nered as any English commanding officer should be, enter-
ing the American quarters and asking "one of the reclining
forms, cigar in mouth and Coke bottle in hand (which made
me feel that I had strayed onto the set of a Western), if I
could see the commanding officer" (p. 236). Lazily motioned
over toward Jack Newkirk, Stone is pleased to learn that the
AVG squadron leader is "polite, which was unusual because,
at that time, the British and Americans did not altogether
see eye to eye" (p. 237). Although Stone never got the AVG's
command structure straight—his memoir accords Chen-
nault's staff officer Harvey Greenlaw a general's rank, the
nickname "Pappy," and further confuses him with CAMCO
director William Pawley—he does listen closely to Newkirk
and learns the proper hit-and-run method for dealing with
the Japanese, "a reversal of our tactics in Britain with the
Hurricane and the Messerschmitt 109s, which we could out-
turn and shoot down if they stayed with us" (p. 238). What
helps most, however, is that Stone has two Americans in his
RAF squadron, Tex Barrick and Ken Wisrodt, who spend
much time in the AVG mess among their countrymen who
had previously been keeping to themselves.
Kenneth Hemingway himself hits it off well with the
AVG. Early passages find him doting on their Wild West
accents, while before long he's adopting their mannerisms,
he and a colleague visiting Rangoon with "both of us swing-
ing a gun at our hips like a couple of cowboys come to town"
(p. 60) and later counseling a style of vehicle dispersal at
their airfield "as the pioneers in America could have pre-
pared for a Red Indian attack" (p. 61). Even at the end, dur-
ing the retreat from Burma that brought renewed friction to
British-American relationships, he can remark that "the boys
had been enthusiastic at the prospect of carrying on with
the AVG" from bases in the north and regret that "it could
not be, no machines could be spared from the defence of
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India" (p. 188). Why the better RAF pilots liked flying along-
side the American volunteers is evident from Barry Sutton's
enthusiasm for this unit's elan—not just for their Wild West
manners, as so impressed Kenneth Hemingway, but for the
fighting spirit they brought to the two squadrons' joint op-
erations. Sutton sees it one morning at Mingaladon when
the air raid siren sounds and the Flying Tigers scramble from
their line across the field. "Through the trees I could see dust
rising from the AVG dispersal and hear the staccato swear-
ing of the Allison engines of the Tomahawks as they taxied
out to the strip before taking off," he says in a central pas-
sage from Jungle Pilot. "They had an air of aggression, these
Tomahawks, I remember thinking, and it was prompted by
something less obvious than the long, vicious nose painted
as a tiger. Their engines always sounded angry, and as they
took off they curled back their wheels into their bellies as
though writhing in fury." What a contrast to the machine
Sutton flies, the Hawker Hurricane powered so smoothly
by its Rolls-Royce engine that in Battle of Britain accounts
was often said to sigh rather than roar and designed so beau-
tifully by Sidney Camm that even its landing gear could dis-
appear into its thin dihedral wings. "When four sections had
taken off," Sutton compares, "there came the familiar
smoother 'whoo-oom' of Hurricanes and three charged down
another runway from the direction of our own dispersal
point" (p. 52). Like the AVG pilots themselves, their equip-
ment was rougher and meaner, mass produced in factory
assembly lines rather than hand built on benches by mas-
ters who in peacetime worked on the finest luxury automo-
biles. And the fighting style was more brutal, just the warning
Sutton and the other newly arrived pilots needed in this radi-
cally different theater of war.
How brutal the contrast could be is evident from Bunny
Stone's memoir, where he is less taken by the aggressive
aesthetics of the AVG than by the vicious way they treat their
adversary, part of a story that begins innocuously enough
with thoughts about finely made parachutes:
The Japanese were equipped with beautiful silk para-
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chutes—much in demand at home—but they seldom used
them. I only witnessed one occasion. We were watching a
fighter battle overhead, and a Japanese fighter pilot took to the
silk about 2 miles away. I sent our medical officer over in a
jeep. He was greeted by some of the American Volunteer
Group just putting their smoking Colts back in their holsters.
One of them drawled, "Guess you're too late, Doc. Reckon he's
dead." He was indeed, with about twenty revolver bullets in
him. This may sound barbarous now, but the American
Volunteer Group were shot on sight if captured, and we had
little time for the Japanese as a race because of their frightening
barbarity towards the vanquished. Apart from the strangeness
of the country, we were fighting with this added fear of
capture, (p. 251)
The fight for Burma brackets what British strategists con-
sidered the more important concern for Singapore, which
fell in mid-February of 1942, six weeks after Rangoon was
first bombed but three weeks before the Burmese capital was
evacuated. Air defense, particularly the mutual reinforcing
operations of the RAF and AVG, made the difference. In The
Forgotten Air Force, Henry Probert marvels at what "a nar-
row margin" prevailed in holding Rangoon so much longer.
"On 27 February the combined fighter strength of the RAF
and AVG was down to ten," yet even this small number al-
lowed Rangoon to be left in a more orderly fashion than
would have been obtained had the Japanese been allowed
to interfere from the air, making the results more like Dunkirk
(p. 89). Singapore was an entirely different matter, where
the RAF was at all times catastrophically outnumbered and
could expect little help from Britain and none at all from the
AVG. Terence O'Brien's flight of Hudson bombers was, in
fact, delayed at Toungoo, where he pulled up alongside a
line of AVG planes for refueling only to be detained by a
RAF commander who felt he should be staying there to help
hold Burma. "Not again, for Christ's sake!" he cries, one of
the many frustrations noted in his Chasing After Danger (1990,
p. 174), as obstacle after obstacle retards his progress to
Singapore. O'Brien's delay was just the most recent of many
disappointments for what England considered its premier
outpost in the Far East, a position so important to its global
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role that John Slessor, when taking part in the American-
British-Canadian Staff Conversations of February and March
1941, urged his counterparts in Washington, D.C., that "in-
stead of keeping the [U.S.] Pacific Fleet concentrated at Ho-
nolulu, thousands of miles from anywhere, they should send
a powerful force to be based on Singapore" (The Central Blue,
pp. 346-47). That didn't happen; but neither did Slessor and
his planning staff foresee how Singapore would fall, not to a
superior naval force but to air attack and a land advance
down the Malay Peninsula, which had been considered just
as impassable as the Ardennes Forest before Germany's sur-
prise thrust in May 1940 (p. 229).
"Everything hung on Singapore," Art Donahue could
appreciate as he convoyed east in Last Flight from Singapore.
"If it fell, the enemy would be able to conquer the Dutch
East Indies, which would give them rubber, tin, and oil that
they needed to continue the war" (p. 21). Indeed, the British
had known this since 1921, when the collapse of previous
naval agreements with the Japanese had dictated the need
for greater Royal Navy presence in the area, a region that in
the early 1930s was made part of Japan's designs for an "East
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" as a way of becoming a world
power itself. For the Western world, however, these were
decades of peace, a time scheme recognized by the British
government's planning according to the "Ten Year Rule" that
no war could be anticipated until at least that far in the fu-
ture. When Donanhue's reinforcing unit arrived at the end
of January, Sinagpore had been harried by air bombardments
and enemy land forces had advanced to the straits separat-
ing the city from the peninsula already in Japanese hands.
During the night he could hear the connecting causeway
being demolished, and the next morning, January 31, 1942,
"a BBC news broadcast began with the words, 'The Battle of
Malaya has ended and the Battle for Singapore has begun!'
We had arrived just in time to take part in the defense of an
island under seige" (p. 32).
"It was easy to imagine RAF Station Tengah before the
rot set in," Terence O'Brien recalls in Chasing After Danger,
"—a month before we arrived say,—back at the beginning
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of December 1941 and still in local peace." As one of the
fields defending Singapore, it had boasted an officers' mess
terraced above lush green grass with a vista stretching out
over a picturesquely cultivated rubber plantation and fad-
ing into the "misty blue hills" of the mainland to the north,
from which the Japanese would soon come. "You could pic-
ture officers and guests out there on mess nights chatting
under the Southern Cross, resplendent bearers in blue and
gold livery carrying silver trays of drinks, behind them the
strains of a waltz coming from the dance band in the spa-
cious lounge brilliantly lit and aswirl in colour" (p. 179).
Coming all the way by air with his flight of Hudson bomb-
ers, O'Brien was among the earliest reinforcements; yet even
as the new year began, windows were shattered, doors were
knocked loose, electricity and water and drainage had all
failed, and the servants were long gone, all of it reminding
the author of a doggerel about discovering a lighthouse aban-
doned in a disaster.
Devastation wrought by the first Japanese air attacks had
taken its toll in personnel as well, less in terms of physical
casualties than in spirit. In The Forgotten Air Force, Probert
describes a large military staff (numbering 116 officers) rig-
idly adhering to time-wasting procedures of peacetime ad-
ministration, as if routine order in their own offices would
abate the chaos outside:
Others echo the theme. A medical orderly at Selatar [the
chief defensive airfield] compares those who arrived in
Singapore in 1941 having been blooded in the United Kingdom
with the "fat cats" who had been there longer, many of whom
went to pieces after the shock of the first bombing. An LAC
[leading aircraftsman, the top ground crew rank] in the marine
section was struck when he arrived by the complacency and
inexperience of the long-term residents; having been on the
south coast of England during the Battle of Britain he was
threatened with disciplinary action on one occasion for remain-
ing at work after the sirens had sounded. An officer on 62
Squadron writes of the life of fair luxury and ease at Tengah in
1939/40 and the failure of the CO or squadron commanders to
bring home the dangers facing them: only in October 1941
when an intelligence officer visited them at Alor Star [airfield]
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did they become aware of the Japanese threat. An electrician
with the same squadron describes the conditions at Alor Star in
1941 as "definitely peacetime Air Force"—they were given no
training at all under wartime conditions, (p. 24)
Innocent of wartime realities to begin with, the established
Singapore forces were left that way, never given liasion visits
from the Air Ministry at home and rarely kept up to date with
news of recent operations and developments in tactics—hence
the surprise of flyers such as Art Donahue and Terence
O'Brien, who arrived fresh from an England at war to find
Singapore clinging so ludicrously to the trappings of peace.
There were more immediate command problems as well.
Though Japanese bombing raids were regular and predict-
able, basic precautions such as removing aircraft from the
theatened bases were not taken. "It was hard to contain the
anger and frustration felt at the stupidity of such a decision,"
Terence O'Brien explains, furious that his Hudsons brought
so dearly and desperately all the way from England were to
be left in the open as such easy and inevitable targets. "You
longed to trace it back, track it carefully through the corri-
dors of command until at last you found the fool who origi-
nated it, then kick him literally out of his office." If this
sounds revolutionary, the author agrees, recalling how "we
were not far from revolt that night," a group of the newly
arrived pilots conducting "a mutinous session" character-
ized by heavy drinking, loud criticism "of the calamitous
order," and damnations of those in control, none of whom
"made any attempt to quell the protest" (p. 184). Yet neither
did any of these staff officers make even the slightest attempt
to explain their reasoning, "an indication of the quality of
command in the Far East. It also explains why in that first
week the feeling among aircrews in the squadron varied
between mutinous fury and black despair" (p. 185).
From this initial low level, morale would only drop fur-
ther as conditions worsened and odds grew hopelessly
longer. One line of study, the most obvious, suggests that
apart from any strengths of spirit and brilliance of command
the simple numbers were never there for even a chance at
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holding off the Japanese, much less repelling them. Prewar
planning had determined that 336 aircraft would be needed
to defend Singapore adequately. Yet by the time European
hostilities with Germany began, there were only twenty-four
Blenheim medium bombers, ten flying boats (six of them
obsolete), and twenty-four obsolescent biplane torpedo
bombers on hand, with no fighters at all, meaning that while
a naval assault might be at least minimally harried, there
was no defense whatsoever against attack from the air. In
view of this threat, four fighter squadrons were assigned to
Singapore between February and October of 1941. Unfortu-
nately, they were equipped only with what an embattled
Britain could spare, which was the inferior Brewster Buffalo
that had been tested and rejected by the RAF's Eagle Squad-
rons. When the Japanese attack came, there were just sixty-
seven of them ready to fly. Counting everything, the RAF at
Singapore could muster 181 aircraft, or scarcely more than
half of what plans called for as the minimum—plans that
anticipated neither land nor air assault.
Calendar dates in Japan's offensive turned quickly. On
December 8,1941, the international dateline allowed the first
aerial bombardment of Singapore to coincide with the Pearl
Harbor attack. On December 10, the Royal Navy's Prince of
Wales and Repulse were sunk, in part because of ineffective
use of air defense but mostly because their presence had been
to act as a deterrence with no thought to what would hap-
pen if Japan were not deterred. By mid-December the Japa-
nese Army had made key breakthroughs in its advance down
the Malay Peninsula. By Christmastime, when aerial attacks
on Rangoon began as well, Singapore had suffered repeated
bombardments and on New Year's Day was anxiously await-
ing help. By January 3, 1942, Terence O'Brien's flight of
Hudson bombers and the first reinforcing convoy had ar-
rived, followed on January 13 by a second convoy carrying
fifty-one Hurricane fighters (supplemented between Janu-
ary 27 and 30 by forty-eight more flown off the aircraft car-
rier HMS Indomitable). But by then, as Art Donahue noted
on arrival, the Japanese had chased the British off the main-
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land and were facing them across the straits separating
Singapore Island from Johore.
On February 15, Singapore surrendered, a surprise to no
one except the pilots who defended this key outpost. Al-
though all the memoirists are in agreement that their talents
could have been used more effectively, the most vehement
in assigning blame is Terence Kelly, a Hurricane pilot in the
Indomitable group who fought on through Sumatra. As he
argues in Hurricane and Spitfire Pilots at War (1986),
"Singapore fell not because the water supply was taken by
the Japanese nor because the guns pointed in the wrong di-
rections, but because by the time the outnumbered and
lightly equipped Japanese had reached the north bank of
the Johore Baru Strait the morale of the Allied troops was
utterly broken." Why had morale collapsed so far in advance
of actual surrender? A major factor was "the Japanese air
superiority," which well beyond the relatively light tonnage
of bombs dropped convinced the troops that they were de-
feated even before a final engagement could begin. After all,
"the sight of apparently unresisted groups of bombers in
Hendon Air Display formations arriving punctually every
morning is distressing for an army which has known noth-
ing but retreat for weeks and has believed, indeed been en-
couraged to believe, that once it has withdrawn to an island
fortress all will be well" (p. 104).
Such evident Japanese air superiority need not have been,
or at least the pilots claim. Because of the commanders' un-
founded belief that Japanese Zeroes and Hayabusas could
outfight Hurricanes, never were more than fourteen of the
hundred or so available to the RAF sent up at a time. Yet,
because there had been no thought given to intelligence
work, Kelly and his colleagues took off from the Indomitable
expecting "to clear the Jap wooden biplanes from the skies"
(p. 106). When more formidable contemporary opponents
were discovered, information was not collected and analyzed
as had been done in the European theater. Comparisons of
pilots' accounts could have determined just how well or how
poorly Hurricanes and Spitfires matched up against newer
Japanese fighters. In the rush to get men and planes to the
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Far East, diverting them en route to other destinations, no
squadron intelligence officers had been provided. Individual
pilots surely knew how their planes performed against this
newly encountered enemy, but there was no way to pool
their information and organize successful strategies. Instead,
the unexpected appearance of high-performance mono-
planes was taken in official quarters as one more piece of
alarmingly bad news to be added to the overall collapse of
morale; by assuming that the Hurricane was no match for
the Zero and its cousins, defeat was all the easier to accept
and explain.
Bloody Shambles—the title of the two-volume study (1992
and 1993) by Christopher Shores and Brian Cull with Yasuho
Ozawa—aptly characterizes how things went for the British
in the Far East, and in Singapore especially. Command prob-
lems reached all the way down to the municipal engineers
responsible for digging air raid trenches. One said dig them
straight, and they were; then another official from the gov-
ernment said no, dig them zig zagged, and that was redone;
finally, a third official insisted that the trenches should be
refilled, lest mosquitos be encouraged to breed. "A compro-
mise was reached," the authors report, "and the trenches,
which were only three feet deep to start with, were subse-
quently half-filled!" (1:150). More seriously, an inability to
agree on labor rates prevented the construction of north coast
defenses for the island until it was too late, the local council's
excuse being that such payments would promote economic
inflation. The authors' quotations from the unpublished di-
ary of a sergeant-pilot reveal dismay at how the first day-
light air raid (on January 12) was handled, "the big day" on
which "our lads have been doing our best" but which,
"thanks to the inability of lots of people to organize, train
and run a fighter force" turned out to be "just a great big
shambles" (1:293). The next day was also a bad one—"no
organization, no leadership, no aircraft. Morale as low as it
could be. . . . I wonder if I will be alive tomorrow" (1:296).
Throughout the last weeks of Singapore's resistance, a
towering column of black smoke dominated the horizon,
coming from the Navy's oil storage tanks. Pilots used it as a
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navigational aid, and as a landmark it appears in most of
the panoramic photos Art Donahue shot during his time on
the island. Oil was a major reason the British Empire was
here, and its burning suggested that the old colonial aspira-
tions were now the makings of a funeral pyre. It was also a
major reason why the Japanese Empire was extending it-
self; the thought of an already militant enemy in command
of such mighty resources was as chilling as the defenders'
more immediate fates. Donahue finds himself among the few
remaining pilots when, after most of the remaining Hurri-
canes are moved south to Sumatra (for what was claimed to
be a crucial role defending Palembang and shipping in the
Banka Straits), the last two flyable planes are moved from
the overrun RAF fields to Kallang Airdrome, Singapore's
municipal airport. "This was a sorry sight if there ever was
one," he laments in Last Flight from Singapore:
The road entering the airdrome passed under imposing stone
archways, now pitifully scarred and chipped by blast and
shrapnel and bullets. The beautiful hangars and terminal
buildings of what had been a great airline base were barren
and empty, with windows gone, walls gashed and torn. It
reminded me of the buildings at Croydon Airdrome, London's
great airline terminal, as they look today—deserted, because
there are no airlines, with ticket and information booths silent
and empty, windows blown in and walls shattered and scarred,
results of the great mass bombing raid Croydon received in
August 1940. (pp. 51-52)
The domestic scene is disconcerting for just the opposite rea-
son. Donahue's quarters are at the lavish Sea View Hotel, as
yet untouched by war, and the room he's given is furnished
as if for a movie star, "a strange lair from which to go forth
into battle" (p. 53). Dinner is seven courses, and breakfast is
taken on the cool veranda, where the pilots sit "nonchalantly
discussing how we should go about the bizarre and un-
earthly business that might occur in that other eerie world
miles above us before the morning was out, while ordinary
civilian men and women lounged around us, finishing their
coffee, reading the morning papers, chatting as ordinary
people anywhere might, not planning to kill anyone" (p. 58).
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The only trouble comes from "one grumpy old codger"
whose day of sipping pink gins at poolside is disturbed by
some of the flyers splashing around after operations. They
shouldn't be there, he insists, "because they hadn't been 'in-
troduced' !" Cheerfully stating their names and shaking hands,
the pilots "introduce" themselves and go on swimming (p.
71). Meanwhile a battery of guns answer the enemy's distant
artillery, sounding "like two doors being slammed in another
part of the building" (p. 89), and a lovely young English
woman, as graceful as a dancer, exercises her two greyhounds
on the lawn. "It seemed that either she or the approaching
enemy and the terrible fighting must be unreal," Donahue
ponders. "It just didn't make sense—but neither did a lot of
things, in the last days of Singapore" (p. 90).
Because they were pilots, Donahue and the others es-
caped the city's fall, taking the fight on to bases in Sumatra.
Among them, Terence Kelly remained incredulous that the
fortress was being surrendered. In Hurricane in Sumatra
(1991) he looks back on the Singapore experience and shares
the amazement of the Japanese generals who were "aston-
ished by the paucity of the resistance offered by an enemy
which so outnumbered them" (p. 39). In Hurricane and Spit-
fire Pilots at War he makes the charge directly, that "we would
fail but the fault would not be ours—the fault would lie at
the doors of the incompetent commanders who lost us
Singapore" (p. 117), and in Hurricane over the Jungle (1977)
he generalizes that "Singapore, Sumatra and Java fell not
because of any vast preponderance of men and arms by the
Japanese but because the men who should and could have
fought them off lost their courage, were bust in morale or
were cowards" (pp. 47-48). As Churchill himself kept insist-
ing, adequate numbers were surely there; even if all of the
100,000 plus personal on hand were not front-line soldiers,
couldn't everyone at least hold a bayonet? Even the 50,000
British and Australian troops, supplemented by 20,000 na-
tive soldiers, outnumbered their attackers by far. Kelly's first-
hand observations, recorded in Hurricane over the Jungle,
show how little these numbers meant by January 29, when
his squadron landed at Seletar airdrome and "within ten
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minutes of ordering a drink in the mess we realised that the
pall of defeatism was so thick you could have cut it with a
knife" (p. 49). In coming weeks he'd see nothing substantial
to credit Japanese superiority. Their air raids were predict-
ably by the clock, with airfield personnel strolling from the
mess to eye the approaching formations, placing their beers
at the trench's edge before taking shelter, then finishing off
their brew before the bombers returned again same time next
day; far from being a situation of panic, "it was clearly rather
removed from Armageddon" (p. 48). As for the mighty na-
val guns being fixed in the wrong direction, the straits were
not being crossed by capital ships but by sampans and bam-
boo rafts, targets for light artillery and even small arms rather
than for the fortress's blockbusters. The problem, Kelly in-
sists, was "the easy going, high flying way of life of both
civilians and servicemen alike in the months and years be-
fore the war," an orientation that had made the reality of
combat something unthinkable. Constructed as a fortress and
successful as a kingpost of empire, Singapore was expected
to remain that way, as if by definition. "Morale is an elusive
quality which depends above everything else on leadership
and example and without which it is hardly anything dif-
ferent from a ship without an engine or rudder which is
blown by the winds of rumours and drifts in the currents of
despair" (p. 53). After the war, Kelly would become a play-
wright, so his sense of motivations for these fey colonialists
is well explained, but he also has a managerial understand-
ing, which blames "the intermingling in an active theatre of
war of mainly executive class civilians and servicemen" as
unhelpful (pp. 53-54).
A specific complaint against leadership is made by sev-
eral pilots. In Chasing After Danger Terence O'Brien describes
how disastrous it was not to be used, a consequence of the
Singapore leadership's obsession with preservation. "Those
who wish to fight become frustrated and angry, rebellious
against an authority that denies them use of a fighting ma-
chine when its need is clearly desperate" (p. 217), he con-
fesses, establishing that for the entire month before
mid-February's surrender full aircraft strength and crew ca-
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pability were never employed, with night searches neglected
and sorties against the Japanese forces assembling on the
mainland never even considered. Hence, to the prevalent
defeatism could be added the decay of aggressive morale.
Terence Kelly's several books repeat how, whereas as many
as a hundred Hurricanes could have inflicted severe
casualities on a Japanese air force already stretched beyond
prudent limits, this strength was "dribbled away piecemeal"
(Hurricanes and Spitfire Pilots at War, p. 107) and only used in
"penny numbers" (fewer than twelve [Hurricane over the
Jungle, p. 56; Hurricane in Sumatra, p. 22]), the inevitable con-
sequence of which was their one-by-one destruction. The
madness of this strategy cries for protest, and protest even-
tually was voiced by an American in Kelly's squadron soon
after it had been withdrawn from Singapore to Sumatra:
Cardell Kleckner was a huge, tall American from Florida, a
wide eyed man with a splendid laugh and a tremendous
personality, a man with the way about him and the temerity to
stroll, hand outstretched out on to the tarmac when General
Wavell [the British theater commander] en route by Liberator
from Singapore to Australia landed at Palembang to refuel, and
to keep the great man chatting in the blazing sun until the job
was done.
"General," Kleckner had said wagging a finger at him while
we gaped. "May I have a word with you." And Wavell had let
him have his word, or many words—all about why we were
going to lose Singapore, what we should have done in
Singapore and where we went wrong in Singapore.
And Wavell had listened attentively and been heard to
answer, and more than once, "Thank you very much. That's a
very good point you've made."
And when it was all over Kleckner had wound up, "Well,
Sir, nice to have met you" and by then the Liberator was
refuelled and Wavell didn't even make it to the terminal
building.
But by the evening of February 4th, Kleckner . . . was dead,
power diving, engine roaring, straight in. (Hurricane over the
Jungle, pp. 70-71)
Another American, Art Donahue, was to follow Kelly
and Kleckner to Palembang as the last RAF pilot to leave
the collapsing fortress. Without a commanding general to
136 • With the Tigers over China
Last Allied view of Singapore and its burning oil storage tanks,
taken from the cockpit of Art Donahue's Hurricane fighter. (Cour-
tesy of Robert Donahue)
Flight Lieutenant Arthur
G. Donahue, an Ameri-
can volunteer in the
Royal Air Force and
veteran of the Battle of
Britain and the Fall of
Singapore. (Courtesy of
Robert Donahue)
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berate and without any specific thesis to argue, his commen-
tary that gives the title to Last Flight from Singapore stands as
a conversation with himself. As his squadron was withdrawn
from one airfield to another, he had always been left with
the token remaining force, in this last case just two Hurri-
canes stationed at the municipal airport. Now, driven by
Japanese rifle fire, he hurries to take off, and as he completes
the circuit is shot at by enemy antiaircraft guns—over his
own field, he notes with ironic dismay. At safe altitude he
circles the city, taking photographs that he presumes will be
the last air pictures of Singapore from someone on his side.
These photos grace the endpapers of his book, but just as
valuable are the thoughts he recalls from this moment, the
last notes taken by any defender who would have another
chance to fight:
My final memory of Singapore, as it appeared to me looking
back for the last time, is of a bright green little country, resting
on the edge of the bluest sea I'd ever seen, lovely in the
morning sunlight except where the dark tragic mantle of
smoke ran across its middle and beyond, covering and darken-
ing the city on the seashore.
The city itself, with huge leaping red fires in its north and
south parts, appeared to rest on the floor of a vast cavern
formed by the sinister curtains of black smoke which rose from
beyond and towered over it, prophetically, like a great over-
hanging cloak of doom. (p. 99)
From Sumatra, Donahue and his colleagues undertook a
defense that was only slightly less fated to fail, fighting on
thanks to a second airfield that was unnoted on maps and
hence secret from the Japanese. Air Vice-Marshal P.C. Maltby,
also in retreat from Singapore, addressed his men to say that
Sumatra would be held to the end, winning back the RAF's
good name even if it meant putting everyone from pilots to
cooks in the front lines. This did not impress the flyers—not
even their leader, Wing Commander J.R. Jeudwine, who in
the second volume of Bloody Shambles regrets that Maltby "had
no conception of the conditions under which we were oper-
ating, which precluded shaving every day and keeping our
buttons polished" (p. 75). It did not help that immediately
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Art Donahue's Hurricane fighter being serviced on Sumatra.
(Courtesy of Robert Donahue)
after his speech the air vice-marshal took off for Java, where
by February 16 everyone else would be obliged to follow, given
that Japanese paratroops had secured Palembang
Yet the RAF's Hurricane squadrons accomplished some
real fighting in Sumatra, for once in this campaign. Closely
packed Japanese invasion boats and barges were strafed by
Hurricanes, a tactic that was gruesomely effective. In Last
Flight from Singapore the episode inspires Art Donahue's best
writing—not just because aggressive action is (for once) in-
volved but because for a moment the RAF's best spirit has
been revived. "It was the first time we'd taken off in squad-
ron formation since we came to the Far East," he boasts. "I
felt we must be making a magnificent show as we roared up
over the boundary of the field all together, and climbed away
into the northeast" (p. 138). Sighting the invasion force,
Donahue is excited all the more, for "this was one of the
moments for which we had been sent halfway around the
world!" (p. 139). The shoot up is brutal but personally ab-
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stract. "There's nothing to it, really—you just press in with
your thumb," even though one is firing right into the enemy's
easily visible faces (p. 141). But before the author can con-
sider this spectacle, he is hit himself, suffering a serious leg
wound which nearly prevents him from guiding his plane
back to base. Terence Kelly flies a similar mission just pre-
ceding Donahue's but regrets that the only offensive action
is being taken by a handful of British, Commonwealth, and
American pilots—the Dutch, he believed, were resigned from
the start to accepting Japanese domination and assuming it
would mean no more than different postage stamps and rules
for commerce, unless the nations represented by his RAF
squadron stepped in and changed the outcome. He could
see that the casualities being inflicted on the Japanese ad-
vance force were horrendous; later, as their prisoner of war,
he heard so many stories about this massacre from his cap-
tors that he hid his flying brevet in defense. "Yet we were
ordered to evacuate to Java," he writes in Hurricane in
Sumatra. "I think the answer has to be that the sense of panic
generally prevailing clouded calm and reasoned judgement
for there was still not one Japanese soldier within forty or
fifty miles" (p. 121). Even when paratroops landed at
Palembang and sealed off the RAF's first airfield, the wing
commander managed a coup over the enemy forces demand-
ing his surrender. As told in several memoirs, including
Donahue's and Kelly's, this RAF officer confounded the Japa-
nese by demanding that they surrender to him, leading to
some confused conferencing behind the lines during which
the Palembang squadron escaped. It was not for lack of ag-
gressive spirit or ingenuity that the RAF had to leave
Sumatra. "Unless a cool, unshakeable decision to resist, how-
ever bloody the battle might prove to be, was to be taken the
moment that the [paratroop] drop had been reported," the
author of Hurricane in Sumatra decides, "a moral vacuum
filled with rumour and exaggeration was bound to ensue.
And this is exactly what occurred. Both airfield and oilfield
were evacuated not because the Japanese had seized them
but because the enemy's mythical reinforcements rendered
the defenders' positions untenable" (p. 145).
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Sumatra could have been Japan's first reverse; something
crucial when Kelly considers how the Pacific War was not
one of ebb and flow, of victories mixed with defeats, but of
steady forward momentum—which, when broken for the
Japanese, "never gathered pace again" (p. 149). He makes
another analogical argument for holding Java. Kelly suggests
similarities between the Germans and Japanese positions in
Hurricane over the Jungle. Just as Germany lost the Battle of
Britain in large part by having to fly long distances to and
from the field of operations, being thus short of fuel and
limited by how long they could fight, and being unable to
land damaged aircraft quickly or recover pilots who had
bailed out:
Exactly the same conditions would have applied to the Japa-
nese who could only have attacked from Palembang several
hundred miles to the north or from vulnerable aircraft carriers
operating in an area subject to sudden and fierce tropical
storms. Sumatra could have been a nasty thorn in the side of
the Japanese but Java might have held. It was the one possible
base for operations on a grand scale granted time to prepare;
fought for tenaciously it had the size and terrain to absorb
reverses; its southern coast was never for long a Japanese sea.
A spirited air of resistance which would have been apparent to
the native troops who fought with varying degrees of courage
and to the Dutch who never, with the honourable exception of
their Navy, fought at all might have helped build a different
attitude, (p. 130)
Yet difference in attitude is the key, for nowhere in ei-
ther the larger strategies of the Far East air war or the par-
ticipants' memoirs resulting from that conflict is there an
orientation comparing to the one that continued to fight at
odds when Britain had its back to the wall. This is so not
because of any lack of skill or courage, but rather because
in Singapore, Sumatra, Java, and eventually Burma there
was no wall to back up against, just the limitless expanse
of space that separated England from her far-flung colo-
nies. It is ironic to find one of Kelly's squadron mates in
Hurricane and Spitfire Pilots at War "reading a book about
Cobber Kain" (p. 113), the Battle of France hero of Noel
Monks's Squadrons Up! (1940), because everything regard-
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ing both Kain and the style of book that tells his story is so
radically different from what was transpiring in the Far East.
Not that the RAF memoirists don't try to find analogies—
in his Last Flight from Singapore Art Donahue compares the
strain of constant flying to Battle of Britain days when oper-
ating from Hawkinge and links the heroic ground crews at
Singapore's ravaged Kallang Aerodrome to their embattled
cousins back at RAF Manston, the air base closest to the
Luftwaffe's fields in occupied France. By 1941 and 1942, of
course, the Battle of Britain was being perceived as a great
victory, and so ultimately even the most sincere compari-
sons between it and what was happening in the Far East
break down. The Battle of France would seem to be a more
useful model, from Fighter Command's refusal to commit
additional squadrons (no Spitfires were sent) to the inevita-
bility of complete withdrawal. "It was France all over again"
(p. 160), Kenneth Hemingway writes in Wings over Burma,
when resistance is suspended in favor of the necessary de-
fense of India; as civilians flee from Rangoon to India, it re-
minds Bunny Stone of French peasants cramming the roads
in flight from the German army's advance.
But even in the Battle of France there was room for opti-
mism, albeit of the quixotically defiant nature. In Squadrons
Up! Cobber Kain flies his Hurricane with brave abandon, an
important element for Monks' s characterization of how
fighter pilots are so different from their counterparts in
bombers. "Bomber pilots, with a crew of four or five depen-
dent on their skill and judgment, have to be serious-minded,"
the journalist explains. "One reckless act, and five or six lives
pay forfeit instead of one." On the other hand, and so im-
portant for the spirit in a war where at the time RAF fighters
rather than bombers are the key element, "In the fighter pi-
lot recklessness is a virtue. Fighting alone in his flying bul-
let, he can afford to be reckless. It gets him out of tight corners
at times" (p. 37). As the RAF's first popular hero, Kain is
seen achieving this success by his wild, exuberant style of
flying and fighting—absolutely necessary attributes consid-
ering the Luftwaffe's great superiority. That the Battle of
France is lost matters no more to Britain's spirit than the fact
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that Kain himself dies when the book ends, taking a fare-
well fling in his Hurricane before being posted back to En-
gland and, as he shows off some daring aerobatics, losing
control and diving into the ground. What a flamboyantly
romantic way to go—so different from the Empire's overly
cautious husbanding of forces and ignominious retreat be-
fore even facing an enemy they actually outnumbered. "All
right, then—alone!" read the defiant caption on the political
cartoon depicting a fist-shaking British serviceman on the
south coast beaches railing against an enemy now in control
of everything but England itself. The way the RAF was used
in the Far East allowed no such rallying sentiment.
The most evident contrast in attitudes is found in the
different styles of memoirs Art Donahue and Barry Sutton
wrote before and after their Far East experience. Each had
been Battle of Britain pilots, Sutton fighting in the Battle of
France as well, and their initial stories reflect the better spirit
of the air war being fought from England. Donahue's Tally-
Ho! Yankee in a Spitfire starts with a rousing title and never
loses its enthusiasm for a good fight being especially well
fought. All of the typical American-in-the-RAF themes are
there, from the humor of his countrymen playing so insou-
ciantly with Royal Air Force custom to the high esteem in
which the British people hold these gallant volunteers. His
action descriptions are high spirited, and when listening to
an interception overhead while recovering from injuries in
a hospital the author's imagination is able to vitalize, even
sensualize the scene:
I would be listening to the humming of a Daimler-Benz
cruising, and the rhoom-rhoom of a Rolls Royce turning pretty
fast: and all at once there would be the roar of guns from a
Spitfire or Hurricane. That would be answered instantly by the
quick crescendo of the Daimler-Benz changing from its normal
cruising right up the scale to its most agonized whine, over the
space of about a second, as the surprised Nazi pilot "pushed
everything forward" and opened up with every ounce of his
engine's power to get away. The response was similar to what
you get from stepping on the tail of a cat. (pp. 78-79)
Sutton's The Way of a Pilot in much similar manner con-
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forms with all the traditions of early British air war narra-
tives. Like many of them, it is written while its author is
recovering from combat injuries, in Sutton's case burns suf-
fered in his shot-up Hurricane's cockpit before he could bail
out. As he looks back on what has brought him to this point,
Sutton touches on all the familiar facets of fighter-pilot lore:
a love of speed, a fine aesthetic appreciation of beautiful
prewar planes such as the Hawker Hind and Hart, and the
understanding of how in both sport and glory his style of
warfare above the clouds surpasses unpleasantries on the
ground. There is a feeling of sympathy for his Luftwaffe vic-
tims, born of kinship in the air, but most of all a firm grasp
of what he is doing and why, a sensation evident in his book's
penultimate episode when he is almost shot down by a
Messerschmitt 109:
Heading home at last, I became aware of a strange emotion I
had never known before.
I have since been in tighter corners, been much more
conscious of danger and perhaps become more casual with the
experience, but that feeling of supreme elation, almost
lightheadedness, has never left me immediately after a battle.
I slid back the roof of the cockpit, put my seat in its proper
notch, and took a deep breath of the fresh air. Looking over the
side, I thought the fields of Kent had never looked more green.
Crossing over the Estuary, I looked towards the west—surely
the setting sun had never smiled so genially through the
smoking sky-line of London.
I began to sing. (p. 105)
Neither Sutton's subsequent Jungle Pilot nor Donahue's
Last Flight from Singapore enthuses with sentiments like these.
Looking back on his experience in Burma, Sutton rues how
it is not the excitement of operations he remembers any more
than the chess games played during rest periods with a col-
league. "It is something more," he recalls, "something which
may be now difficult to explain. Perhaps it was the one un-
spoken truth that we were fighting a losing battle" (p. 84).
True, France had been a losing battle as well, but not in the
way Burma presented itself. In Burma instead of bold reck-
lessness and heroic gestures against an iron-crossed enemy
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of mighty Teutonic knights, Sutton and his pilots had sim-
ply tried "to stop a swarm of locusts with a few flit guns"
(p. 85). When Rangoon is about to fall and its oil wells are
put to the torch, "the firelight proclaimed a message of de-
spair and wrote it across the heavens." So different from his
departure from France, when it was so clear that the real
fight lay ahead in a context that the RAF much preferred,
prematurely abandoning Rangoon prompts Sutton to do
what a good fighting man should never do: interrogate his
purpose. "Did the sight of those fires at a time like this mean
only one thing to all of us?" he asks. "The negation of all our
efforts? So then it certainly seemed to me" (p. 86).
Sutton's despair comes near the end of his second mem-
oir, but Donahue's is voiced from the first page of Last Flight
from Singapore, where as opposed to the sense of purpose
guiding his Tally Ho! Yankee in a Spitfire he can now regret
how "my accomplishments in the Far East proved to be so
small and my attempts at accomplishment so regularly
crowned with frustration, that there could hardly have been
any design about it." As opposed to such rewarding service
in the Battle of Britain, this young American was now party
to "the greatest military disaster ever suffered by British
arms." By the end of his adventures, he is "sad, too, and
spiritually very tired," with "no need denying that I was
terribly disillusioned by much of what I had seen and expe-
rienced out here—things I have avoided or passed over in
this story because it isn't in my province as a member of the
forces to speak of them, and because I could only do harm
by telling about them now [in 1942]. The enemy don't ad-
vertise their failings either, you know" (p. 153).
Yet the failings of this entire theater were everywhere to
be seen. Preparation had been lax, attitudes were unrealis-
tic, planning was unnecessarily abstract, reinforcements were
extremely slim, and command bordered on the inept. It is
not surprising that spirit would fail, completing the vicious
circle of despair and defeat. Above all, it was a different style
of conflict, one not to be decided by beautifully crafted ma-
chines flown by chivalrous adversaries over the English
Channel and the hop fields of Kent but by land armies of
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different races and vastly different cultures with little knowl-
edge and even less appreciation for each other. In Hurricane
and Spitfire Pilots at War, Terence Kelly notes, "This was a sly,
stealthy war, a mean war fought in the mud and slime of
foetid jungles, under the cover of dense overgrowth, by two
opposing armies each of whose total strength was consider-
able but which, for the most part, operated in small units"
(p. 140). Being able to fight in the skies rather than on the
ground failed to make it more attractive, for being shot down
did not mean parachuting into a Kentish haystack, being
plucked from a dinghy in a twenty-two-mile-wide Channel,
or being hidden by French resistance fighters before being
spirited back to England, all of which happened again and
again and again, but bailing out or coming down in the most
atrocious conditions imaginable. Whether in Malaya, Sumatra,
or Burma, RAF pilots faced a geography and ecosphere far
different from anything previously experienced. "In some of
the earth's most inhospitable terrain, such as icy mountains
or raging seas or burning deserts, you can imagine means of
survival," Terence O'Brien allows in Chasing After Danger, "but
nothing on earth I have ever seen offered less hope than that
dark steamy jungle swamp, and no death more frightening
than the lingering horrors it threatened" (p. 177).
Beautifully written aerial descriptions are a rarity in RAF
memoirs from the Far East. The makings for picturesque lit-
erature are on the ground—and all of it, from the riotous
color of flowers and other vegetation to the splendor of the
colonial way of living, is simply a trap for unsuspecting at-
titudes and an indication of how things have been allowed
to go so terribly wrong. It is appropriate, therefore, that when
the skeptical Terence Kelly lets himself loose for a moment
to depict the aesthetic pleasures of a combat adventure in
the air he nearly brings himself to grief.
The passage in question comes near the end of Hurri-
cane over the Jungle, when the last shred of his squadron is
flying against the Japanese from its last base in Java:
It was a day of towering cumulus and our attack was made on
a circle of Navy Os orbiting within a chasm between two such
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cloud formations. I happened to be the first to peel off and
having passed through the Japanese I steepened almost to the
vertical, engine full bore, and looked back on the off chance of
seeing if I'd had any luck. And I saw one of the most beautiful
things I ever saw flying. Following me down were the other
three and after them was peeling the whole formation of Navy
Noughts. Every aircraft was sharp and clear against the
background of white cumulus. It was like a film set but
gigantic in scale, the actors miniscule but giving life to it—
twenty, thirty aircraft all in a screaming vertical power dive
against a pure white background with the green and red of the
land hurtling upwards and the blue above. It was quite
unforgettable, (p. 138)
Unforgettable but also quite futuristic, for soon Kelly real-
izes that he has watched it far too long and is now about to
experience something that would become part of postwar
air lore, breaking the sound barrier.
Here, too, all the familiar parts of aviation writing fall
into line: the frozen controls, buffeting wing surfaces,
shriekings of wind and engine, and the earth rushing up
from below. Then, too, there is the calm, rational pilot, a
model Chuck Yeager would make so famous after the war
and that would become a staple of movies from Breaking the
Sound Barrier to The Right Stuff a generation later—the state
of mind, as Kelly puts it, in which "you understand very
clearly the predicament you're in and that if you don't find
a way out of it quickly you will soon be dead" (p. 139). His
critical thinking comes to the rescue, and by using the
Hurricane's sturdy trim tabs he manages to bring his plane
out of its nearly 180° dive. Once more straight and level,
he's astounded to see that his air speed is 590 miles per hour,
and concludes that moments before he could well have ex-
ceeded the speed of sound.
In the era of peace that followed, such adventures would
replace air combat as materials for the most vivid aviation
memoirs. For now, in these words written about an episode
coming just days before the RAF's withdrawal, Terence Kelly
epitomizes the radical change that would overtake Britain
and the empire he had been sent here to defend. Indefen-
sible it proved to be, and even after the land was retaken in
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the long, slow, tedious advances of 1943, 1944, and 1945,
Britain's hold on these outposts was extremely tenuous. By
1947 even India, from which the reconquest was launched,
would be independent. Like crashing through the sound
barrier, the postwar years would provide an entirely differ-
ent world for Britain to cope with, turning away from two
centuries of empire to prepare for a new millennium in ori-
entation with Europe. None of this was evident to flyers in
the Battle of Britain, but the picture seemed all too clear to
those who fought in Far Eastern skies during the last month
of 1941 and the first quarter of 1942.

An
Adventurers'
War
- • - By the end of spring 1942, Singapore and its envi-
rons to the south plus Burma had been taken by the Japa-
nese. The Flying Tigers and, after July 4, regular United States
Army Air Force units would fight on from China, their origi-
nal destination, while the Royal Air Force would regroup in
India and begin a different style of operations (largely ground
attack and air supply) toward the retaking of Burma and
points east. As opposed to the swiftness of Japan's assault
against ragtag, disorganized, and sometimes dispirited de-
fenses, the new allies' advance was painfully slow. Deliber-
ate as it was against a strong, deeply entrenched military
force, this campaign was conducted in a different spirit from
that which had characterized the war's first phase. But ac-
tivities in the China-Burma-India theater, as it was now
called, still distinguished themselves from other theaters of
operations. Weather and terrain remained unique threats to
the ill-supplied and differently equipped forces flying in such
conditions. And the men who did the flying remained some-
thing of a different breed.
In several ways this much longer second portion of the
war that still wasn't first reflected Western aviation's earli-
est interest in the Far East. When something is not a priority,
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it tends to operate by its own rules rather than by the regimen
where crucial matters are at stake. A different type of pilot
may be drawn there; without doubt, only a different kind of
aviator working under such conditions could succeed.
In looking over how the Far East air war was resolved, it
is helpful to consider the nature of American and British
participation in the region as much as ten years before, for
there is a great continuity in styles. By 1937, for example,
Royal Leonard had already been in China for a year and a
half and had risen in employment from flying the Young
Marshal on his warlord adventures to working as the per-
sonal pilot of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In 7 Flew for
China, there is a remarkable scene where, just after the Marco
Polo Bridge incident on July 7,1937, Leonard is surprised to
meet another of Chiang's new hires, the man who had taught
this commercial adventurer to fly during his military train-
ing at Kelly Field in 1923. Hearing a knock at his door at
Nanking's Metropolitan Hotel, Leonard responds to find "a
stocky, leather-faced man with grizzled hair and sharp black
eyes. He was dressed in unpressed flannels and a leather
jacket." He's recognized immediately. "For the love of Mike,"
Leonard exclaims, "Come on in, Chennault!" (p. 116). Chiang
has brought both men here for a reason: to consider whether
Japan's act of war should be treated as such. Leonard's re-
sponse, published in July 1942 just as the USAAF took over
what had been an exceedingly irregular war, is typical of
how matters were arranged in the Orient:
We started to discuss the sad condition of the Chinese air force.
The picture was certainly not encouraging. The Chinese lacked
almost everything—pilots, planes, training, guns—all that goes
into making a first-class aviation group. I could see
Chennault's jaw harden as I told him this.
"Well," he said, "there are a bunch of American flyers
around. Maybe we can do something." (pp. 116-17)
When the Colonel's jaw hardens, one sees his classic
portrait and the impression by which most who ever met
him anchored their descriptions. And the act of setting it
matches perfectly with what is being said, as if a stern vis-
age and a few American pilots can make a difference. Though
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springing from an entirely different culture, British attitudes
toward what could be done in the Far East at times coin-
cided. Though overshadowed and overpowered by colonial
dispositions that had nothing to do with air power at all, a
similar feistiness could be found in the flyers who stood and
fought. Once they saw the nimble Nakajima Ki-27 Nates flit-
ting like gnats around their more powerful though less ma-
neuverable Hurricanes, British pilots guessed that one of the
planners' supposedly sick jokes—that obsolete Gloster Gladi-
ator biplanes be sent to Singapore—might have indeed
worked if tried. After all, just three of these little antique
aircraft had defended Malta until reinforcements could be
sent. As for adventuring in China, that was a potential des-
tination as well for flyers subsequently famous in the RAF.
Johnny Kent thought of going there in the early 1930s to help
the Chinese Air Force fight the Japanese in Manchuria. In-
stead, he left his native Canada to join the Royal Air Force in
England, where he rose to command 303 Squadron in the
Battle of Britain—a squadron made up mostly of Polish air-
men who'd fled their own country's collapse. One of the most
famous of these was a flight lieutenant named Witold A.
Urbanowicz, who after shooting down seventeen German
planes was assigned as the assistant Polish air attache in
Washington, D.C. Allegedly "too famous" to return to com-
bat status with the RAF, Urbanowicz pulled diplomatic
strings and managed to get an observer's assignment to
China, trusting that in his unorthodoxy Chennault might
give him a job. By the winter of 1943-44 Urbanowicz, now a
major in the USAAF, flew combat missions with the 75th
Fighter Squadron. "A bunch of American flyers around"?
Before the war's end, this line would have been expanded
well past any credibility likely in 1937, given all that hap-
pened with the American Volunteer Group, the RAF's con-
sideration of helping out the AVG, and Urbanowicz's
postwar choice of American citizenship.
Of course in the China-India-Burma theater there were
other types around as well, some of whom went in the op-
posite direction. There were Germans in China that Royal
Leonard had to deal with, some of them quite famous, in-
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eluding Eric Just, an ace from Baron Manfred von Richt-
hofen's World War I fighter squadron, and Captain Walther
Stennes, the head of Chiang's personal bodyguard unit, who
in 1938 sat Leonard down for a stern lecture:
"You Americans are damned fools!" he said. "You should
realize that you cannot hold the Philippines. You should realize
that Japan wants your blood even more than the blood of the
British. I give you this warning now, my friend! Tell it to some
army officers you know. In a few years it will be too late!"
Stennes, who originally fled from Nazi Germany because he
opposed Hitler (he commanded the German army squad that
locked Hitler up in 1923), has gone back to what he believes is
the winning side. He is now [1942] head of the Gestapo in
Shanghai, (p. 142)
Yet for every German who made a wrong choice, there were
a hundred Americans who profited from a good decision,
among them a German-American adventurer named Albert
"Ajax" Baumler. Baumler already had tangled with Nazis—
not Hitler and his inner circle directly, but with Luftwaffe
pilots in the Condor Legion flying for Franco's revolution-
aries in Spain. As a Loyalist pilot during the Spanish Civil
War, he had downed eight German and Italian planes and
was one of Chennault's top picks for the AVG. It took him
until April 1942 to get there, but he stayed to become com-
mander of the USAAF's 74th Fighter Squadron; one of the
first targets he'd personally attack would be the Gia Lam
Airdrome in Hanoi, well known to another generation of
American pilots a quarter century and two wars later.
By the time American and British operations were over
in the Far East, a stellar cast of characters had played roles
in this theater. Some of them were important Air Corps
careerists, such as General Caleb Haynes, who commanded
Chennault's new USAAF bomber forces. Because Haynes
had most recently directed the Army Air Force's Transport
Command, Radio Tokyo repeatedly taunted this pioneer of
the four-engine bomber as being "the old broken-down trans-
port pilot." As Robert L. Scott reports in God Is My Co-Pilot,
Haynes responded with propaganda of his own, printing
up thousands of multilingual leaflets reading "COMPLI-
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MENTS OF THE OLD BROKEN-DOWN TRANSPORT PI-
LOT" and dropping them on each mission—some tied to
bombs, others falling from the bomb bays, and still more
tossed out over Japanese-occupied cities after his planes had
made their attack (pp. 222-23). Others were prominent fig-
ures from American life, such as Chennault's first official
chief of staff, Colonel Merian C. Cooper. A heroic World War
I flyer, Cooper had fought on by helping lead the Kosciusko
Squadron in the Polish-Russian war that followed. After-
ward, he became an explorer on three continents and went
on to become a Hollywood producer, having a hand in King
Kong and other classics. World War II brought him back into
the service working for Air Corps Intelligence in Washing-
ton, D.C., but like so many other colorful characters he
yearned for Chennault's action in China. Joe Alsop was back
there as well, having talked his way out of internment in
Japanese-held Hong Kong. In one case, prominence would
emerge only much later and be discovered well after that, as
in the story Scott tells in The Day I Owned the Sky. On his own
way to China, the author's unit had adopted a local officer's
son as an unofficial mascot. Decades after the war, Scott
would make an otherwise impossible visit to what was now
Pakistan thanks to some curious intervention at the top; only
later, after the man's tragic execution, was it learned that the
one-time mascot named "Ali" had grown up to be the
country's prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (pp. 143-44).
Surely the most colorful (and at times outrageous) ad-
venturers in this Far East air war were the improbable trio
of Harvey Greenlaw, his wife Olga, and Greg "Pappy"
Boyington. As Chennault's unofficial chief staff officer,
Greenlaw was capping a life of Oriental adventuring, hav-
ing resigned an Army Air Corps commission in 1932 to ac-
company the Jouett aviation mission to the Chinese
government and returning again to represent the North
American Aviation Company in its dealings with Chiang Kai-
shek's air force. When he joined the American Volunteer
Group, Olga became the unit's official diarist, in addition to
taking notes for her own memoir, The Lady and the Tigers,
published in 1943. Boyington, of course, was the AVG's most
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notorious pilot, but from both Baa Baa Black Sheep and Tonya,
published in 1958 and 1960, respectively, it was clear that he
was in Harvey's hair (and in Olga's bed) as often as he was
tangling alternately with Chennault and the Japanese.
Only in the movies could a character like Olga Greenlaw
be imagined with any real credibility. As it was, her appear-
ance and behavior in the Far East air war were fantastic to
describe, as Wing Commander Bunny Stone recounts in his
part of Bush Cotton's Hurricanes over Burma: "There was a
frightful row of a battle going on overhead when, to our as-
tonishment, a bejewelled goddess appeared through the
door, looking as if she had just stepped from a New York or
Paris salon." It was Olga, and though her husband contin-
ued with his briefing to the RAF, "we found it hard to con-
centrate" (p. 294). In The Lady and the Tigers, Olga maintains
this image, forever throwing little snits (like Scarlett O'Hara
in Gone with the Wind's movie version) and remarking that
when fleeing Japanese bombardments she'd simply grab her
most vital possession, an Elizabeth Arden makeup kit. She
further plays up the feminine by having long heart-to-heart
talks and developing sentimental attachments to pilots who
will soon die, a habit Pappy Boyington makes much fun of
in Tonya. As for Harvey Greenlaw, Boyington makes him an
impotent martinet in both books, a pathetic character for-
ever threatening to court-martial everyone and having no
idea whatsoever that his much younger and quite beautiful
wife has become the tramp of the outfit, memoir and novel
replicating such scenes:
Harvey Greenlaw, the self-made executive officer, called
himself Lieutenant Colonel Greenlaw, although no one else
would. The manner in which Harvey was forever talking
courts-martial to threaten a group of civilians gave me the
impression that he must have been at least one jump ahead of a
few himself in his military days. The poor guy gave the
impression that he hated everybody. Maybe Harvey had his
reasons. Who knows? (Baa Baa Black Sheep, p. 43)
"Yes sir." With a sharp salute, Auggie [as he is called fictively]
jumped into his jeep and started driving about the area like an
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ant on a red hot stove, ordering each man officiously. "You'll
report to the clubhouse at exactly 1100. Failure to do so will
result in a court-martial."
"Where in hell does he get this court-martial crap?" a
crewman snarled after Auggie had departed. "We're
civilians, not servicemen, under a year's contract like any
other employee."
"The bastard hates everybody, including himself," another
crewman observed. "Must have nightmares of facing general
courts in his brilliant past." (Tonya, p. 31)
Boyington himself remains the essentially harmless bad
boy, being threatened with one of Greenlaw's courts-mar-
tial for engaging in a rickshaw race (where he and a col-
league pulled the Burmese drivers in their own vehicles) and
doing no worse in the air than having his section of five P-
40s run out of gas and crash land near the Indo-China bor-
der, even then returning to salvage three of the five and
managing to fly them out, a piece of brilliant airmanship
that impressed Frank Losonsky as noted in the latter's Fly-
ing Tiger: A Crew Chief's Story. Of course, both actions proved
rather unnecessary points; the rickshaw exploit was suppos-
edly an exercise in cross-cultural, translingual relations,
whereas for all the great bravado in flying the planes from
an airstrip hacked out of the jungle, "We could have easily
'hauled' them back to Kunming," as Losonsky notes (p. 86).
Others drawn to the Far East had higher motives and
responded in a better spirit to what they saw. Donald S.
Lopez's Into the Teeth of the Tiger describes a flight from
Kunming to Assam that stops to refuel at Gaya, a place that
for Lopez was "just another airstrip to me until a few years
ago when my son, a professor of eastern religions, told me
that Gaya was where, some five hundred years before Christ,
Siddartha Gautama attained the enlightenment that made
him the Buddha and founded one of the world's great reli-
gions" (p. 118). Robert L. Scott, the first of the regular Air
Force pilots to make a name for himself in China (as the first
commander of the 23rd Fighter Group, the AVG's immedi-
ate successor), once flew a mission that took him over the
Great Wall of China; since childhood he had been haunted
by a picture of the Wall, and after retiring from a long Air
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Force career he made an almost impossible return to a coun-
try not yet reopened to the West and walked this same al-
most inaccessible portion, a journey celebrated in The Day I
Owned the Sky. Just getting to China the first time had been a
major challenge, struggling with the Air Corps for combat
status, taking a Transport Command post (for which he had
to fake multiengine qualifications) to get as far as India, and
then wrangling a P-40 from Chennault himself (by showing
how he could get a supposedly unserviceable plane off the
ground in an air raid).
With his own fighter, Scott began freelancing as a one-
man escort to the otherwise undefended transports and as
an occasional intruder into enemy airspace. He'd tune his
radio to the AVG's band and listen eagerly to their commu-
nications, learning tactics as he eavesdropped but mostly
just experiencing the vicarious thrill of pretending to be a
Flying Tiger. His greatest service to the group was how he
took personal initiative to change General Clayton Bissell's
supply priorities, dumping his tons of paperwork in the
jungle and reloading with vitally needed war stuffs. When
he finally met some AVG pilots during a lull in the fight-
ing—in a scene right out of an RAF flyer's Wild West imagi-
nation, akin to a new U.S. marshal being cold shouldered by
a cowboy town's vigilantees—he won them over not with
tales of his own fighter prowess but by explaining how he'd
reformed their supply line.
One of the best endorsements of Robert L. Scott comes
from James H. Howard as noted in the latter's Roar of the Tiger
(1991). Howard was an exceptional personality himself, the
child of missionaries to China who by being raised there had
a special understanding of the country and its people. He flew
both in China with Chennault and then from England as part
of the equally famous Mustang squadrons in the 354th Fighter
Group, single-handedly attacking thirty Messerschmitts and
downing three while driving the others away (an achieve-
ment that had journalists calling him a "one-man air force").
Of Scott's freelancing he has this to say:
The next air officer to come through was Col. Bob Scott.
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Scott had borrowed a Kittyhawk from Chennault while he was
still assigned to stagnant staff duties with the Tenth Air Force
in India. His urge to get into action had prompted him to carry
out some spectacular one-man bombing and strafing missions
against Japanese installations in Burma. He flew several
missions with us [in the AVG], usually as a wingman to an
element leader. Imagine, if you will, a full colonel flying the
wing of a pilot who had been a second lieutenant less than a
year before. Scott, in his humble way, said, "I consider it an
honor to fly in a formation of pilots who have been tested in
combat." (p. 157)
Whereas other regulars of the USAAF had been disliked and
distrusted, this different style of man was warmly accepted.
"Scott's enthusiasm and good humor appealed to all of us,"
Howard reports. "Needless to say we gave him the thumbs-
up, and he became commander of the newly formed Twenty-
Third Fighter Group, successor to the AVG" (p. 159).
Flying in China fulfilled a dream for Scott and led to life-
time ambitions later achieved with great panache. As a very
young officer he'd dared the elements by flying the mail (in
a pioneering experiment the dangers of which prompted the
government not to continue with Air Corps personnel) and
had undertaken a 14,000-mile trip by light motorcycle from
France to Mount Ararat in Turkey, retracing part of Marco
Polo's journey. In God Is My Co-Pilot, published to great ac-
claim in 1943 and released as a Warner Brothers motion pic-
ture early in 1945, he influenced wartime opinion supporting
America's presence in China, just as his Damned to Glory
(1944) helped build a legendary reputation for the otherwise
maligned P-40. With Flying Tiger: Chennault of China (1959)
Scott became one of his old boss's advocates at a time when
cold war politics were heating up in military quarters. At
times he could be lyrical, wondering at the psychological
separation a flyer feels when leaving his own continent—no
longer able, "in a pinch," to "walk home," as he writes in
God Is My Co-Pilot (p. 59)—and marveling at how even a
routine flight takes him far above territory "listed as 'unex-
plored and unadministered'" (p. 92) from which he can see
both the Dalai Lama's palace and the common source of the
five big rivers of Asia: the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the
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Mekong, the Yangtze, and the Yellow. His present war would
encompass the first two; subsequent conflicts would make
the other three by-words in military reports. Most dramati-
cally Scott distinguished himself in the air as both a coura-
geous fighter and sharp tactician and on the ground as
something a regular Army Air Force officer might never pre-
sume to be: a younger version of Chennault himself, defy-
ing buUheaded officers, standing up (on just the near side of
insolence) to General Clayton Bissell, and being defended
by Chennault to the extent of the latter threatening General
Stilwell with a resignation submitted directly to President
Roosevelt himself should his fighter commander be subjected
to any type of reprimand at all.
The most colorful adventurer of all was Claire Lee
Chennault. His autobiography, Way of a Fighter, catalogues a
lifetime of combats well beyond the specifics of fighter air-
craft. This was a man who had to fistfight his overgrown,
scrappy country-school pupils, who had to fight his way into
the sky as a trainee pilot and then fight the bomber adver-
saries throughout his frustrating career in the Air Corps, who
had to battle against long-held custom and deeply en-
trenched interests to get a Chinese Air Force into even mini-
mal shape, who struggled in Washington to get the American
Volunteer Group formed and struggled all the more to get
them trained and keep them in line, and who throughout
his years of command in China faced conflict after conflict
with his superiors (notably Bissell and Stilwell) in India, all
the time working hard to keep relations with Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek on an even keel. As a reward, he was re-
tired soon after China had been secured but only a month
before the Japanese surrender, prompting General MacArthur
to study the otherwise complete ranks of commanders on
board the USS Missouri in Tokyo Harbor and ask, "Where's
Chennault?" Hence, after the war, as evidenced in his 1949
autobiography, he was still compelled to fight for the acknowl-
edgment that all along he had been right.
There are obvious reasons why Claire Chennault was
absent. Throughout his service career he had bucked the
system, getting only more unmanageable as he reached the
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top, an ascendancy only possible during times of duress
when the military needed his successes whatever the cost.
At several points during the war he had made it clear that
he'd be much more trouble to get rid of than to keep;
Roosevelt had taken up the practice of writing him directly
and encouraging the man's responses—and if direct appeal
to the President failed, there was always the media to or-
chestrate, beginning with the Luce empire that had discov-
ered his Flying Tigers as a newsworthy item back in 1941
and kept Chennault's exploits in the forefront of war report-
ing. But with the war almost over, such threats lost their
power; brashly unconventional commanders might have
been needed to fight the fight, but they were hardly neces-
sary to keep the peace. Indeed, a loose cannon like Chennault
could well be taken as a threat to continued security. And as
the war wound down suspicions arose that this old fighter
might be shifting targets in favor of a new enemy.
One of the many arguments between Chennault and
Stilwell was over how closely the U.S. command should
work with the Communist forces under Mao Tse-tung.
Stilwell wanted more cooperation; Chennault, knowing how
the Generalissimo had managed only a temporary and at
times imperfectly executed rapprochement with his old ad-
versaries, was increasingly wary of a Communist threat, both
to Chiang and to American postwar interests. This contro-
versy extended to high levels in both military strategy and
Roosevelt administration policy and remained an issue well
into the second half of the twentieth century. Most immedi-
ately, there was some belief that as the summer of 1945 con-
tinued Chennault was using his forces less to solidify
Chiang's victory over the Japanese than to improve his po-
sition in relation to the Communist armies.
Within the boundaries of World War II, Chennault never
had the chance. But in January 1946 he returned to China as
a private citizen, just as he'd been in 1937 after his first re-
tirement from U.S. military service, and at once began plan-
ning how to fight for what he felt China needed. For a cold
war, weapons would be economic and tactics those of com-
merce, and he rightly construed that without a decent trans-
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portation system both China and Chiang's government
within it would be helpless. And so he returned to the United
States and undertook a mission similar in many respects to
his formation of the AVG. This time the initials were CAT,
standing for Civil Air Transport, and the supporting power
was not the U.S. government but the United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRAA), directed by the avia-
tion-minded former mayor of New York City, Fiorello La
Guardia. Once again the organization was a commercial one,
and the people involved included Chennault and a number
of Roosevelt administration insiders and holdovers from the
old days of China Defense Supplies. Many of its 1,100 flying
and ground crew personnel were former Flying Tigers and
veterans of the Fourteenth Air Force, the AVG's ultimate
successor. An independent but parallel company formed by
AVG pilot Bob Prescott to fly produce from the California
Fruit Growers Association to China soon became known as
the Flying Tiger Line, and so even the old mythical name
was kept alive in this new style of Far East air adventuring.
The nature of Chennault's adventure became transpar-
ently anti-Communist. During the civil war that began in
1948, CAT C-46s and C-47s kept beseiged Nationalist cities
supplied. In her A Thousand Springs: The Biography of a Mar-
riage (1962), Anna Chennault places her husband's work with
CAT in the context of his larger plans for the country:
It was after George Marshall left China, blaming both sides
for failure to achieve a coalition, that General Chennault
realized that only a radical shift in American policy could now
save China.
In the hope that this might yet happen, he began a dramatic
and effective fight for time. As the Reds swept south, he used
the only physical weapon against Communism available to
him—CAT, as an evacuation and supply line. The big transport
planes carried no machine guns and their pilots made no
attacks on the Reds. But the CAT personnel planes, unarmed,
fought as bravely as the soldiers of Free China, and sometimes
more effectively, (pp. 190-91)
As the airline's publicist, Anna Chennault worked on its ret-
rospective image as well, emphasizing how "it acquired a
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personality reminiscent of the old AVG, the Flying Tigers"
(p. 156). In her present book, she strives for continuity, trac-
ing the AVG's spirit through the Fourteenth Air Force to CAT,
where "its flame burned brightly still, sustained through-
out by the fire of the man who had first inspired it, Claire
Chennault." She adds that during this period several AVG
and USAAF veterans urged their old General "to create an-
other volunteer group to fight the Reds," something he de-
clined to do, preferring "after years of using planes for
destructive purposes to be able to use them in building up a
country" (p. 261). In fact, Chennault spent much of July 1949,
in Washington, D.C., lobbying for just such a plan. Life gave
the appeal publicity and praised it as a great idea; Congress
thought not, and President Truman was of a different mood
toward China than had been Roosevelt.
Undaunted, Chennault returned to China in time to re-
establish his CAT in Taiwan in the service of Chiang's exiled
government, a story told best by Felix Smith in China Pilot:
Flying for Chiang and Chennault (1995). With the outbreak of
hostilities in Korea beginning in 1950, CAT became a con-
tract hauler for the United States, transporting both cargo
and troops. By 1954, CAT found a new customer in the gov-
ernment of France, which had Chennault's pilots dropping
supplies to French troops at beseiged Dien Bien Phu. One of
these flyers was AVG veteran Erik Shilling, who also flew
missions along the coast of mainland China to monitor that
nation's radar system. The nature of this work was so secret
that Shilling was never sure for whom he was really work-
ing. "The French ignored the help given to them by Ameri-
can pilots," he writes in Destiny, "although we were Dien
Bien Phu's only source of supply after the fall of the airfield"
(p. 273). This program lasted two months and was flown in
C-119 transports provided by the USAF. As Duane Schultz
notes in The Maverick War, "One of Chennault's pilots, James
McGovern, was shot down and killed on one of these mis-
sions, along with his co-pilot, Wallace Buford, and several
French cargo handlers. They may have been America's first
casualities in the long war in Vietnam" (p. 312). There might
easily have been more, had not President Eisenhower
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quashed an idea Chennault was promoting to lobbyists and
via feature articles in Look: that a 470-man force of volunteer
American pilots be equipped with F-84 Thunderjets and
begin fighting for the French.
As it happened, Chennault's legacy survived into the
Vietnam era when his partners sold CAT to the CIA, which
renamed it Air America as its own airline. One of these part-
ners, Whiting Willauer, also remained active in the world of
clandestine operations, planning great portions of the Bay
of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. Claire Chennault himself
had died in 1958 from lung cancer. One of his last activities
had been to leave his hospital bed for a photo shoot adver-
tising a famous brand of cigarettes, saying he needed money
for medical bills. Even at the very end, he was acting with
such flamboyance as to make his work with the American
Volunteer Group just one of many such acts in his death-
defying adventurer's life.
Britain's air experience in the war that wasn't first did not
yield figures as adventurously colorful as Claire Chennault—
nor as outrageous as Pappy Boyington or inspiring as Rob-
ert L. Scott. Its bona fide heroes had achieved iconic status
in a war that was first, both chronologically and by military
priority: the Battle of Britain. What happened in Singapore
and Burma was something to be forgotten, a "bloody
shambles" in execution that as a military action was consid-
ered a disgraceful defeat and which even as eventual vic-
tory was achieved became a region where United Kingdom
and United Nations aims were sometimes painfully distinct.
If there was a figure to be cut, it was by Lord Louis
Mountbatten, who was the first overall commander to bring
effective order to the theater and who later, as the last vice-
roy of India, supervised the end of Britain's empire there
when independence came in 1947.
It was during their regrouping at bases in India when
flyers of the Royal Air Force began noting the anticolonial
stirrings so evident to AVG members getting a first look at a
colonial outpost in 1941. But from these same bases squad-
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rons of Mohawks, Hurricanes, Beaufighters, and eventually
Spitfires and Mosquitoes developed something revolution-
ary themselves: a radically new style of air war for the RAF
that had them flying close support for slow, methodical
ground advances back across the territory abandoned so
hurriedly in the early months of 1942. It is significant that
by the summer of 1944 this became a method for RAF fighter
and fighter-bomber squadrons in Europe, as well, and led
to the force's role in NATO planning afterward and execu-
tion in the Gulf War of 1991.
Another revolutionary element, at least as the RAF was
concerned, involved contributing to a major offensive with
air supply. The long march from India back across Burma
was supplied entirely by air, the first such major campaign
to depend exclusively on such logistical support. Like later
wars, it could be directed from a great distance away:
Mountbatten maintained his headquarters in Ceylon (today's
Sri Lanka). In addition to keeping the advance of main
ground forces moving, the RAF dropped the raiding columns
of General Orde Wingate behind Japanese lines and kept
them supplied in their marauding, disruptive activities—a
thousand men doing a job as effectively as an entire divi-
sion or more, all of it impossible without RAF Dakotas slip-
ping in by moonlight to take out their sick and wounded
and keep them going in ways that made the enemy believe
they were much more potent than facts would have revealed.
Here the USAAF chipped in as well, offering a dozen B-25
bombers, 30 P-51 Mustang fighters, 25 transport planes, 100
light aircraft, 150 gliders, and even 4 helicopters for Wingate's
efforts, a virtual private air force commanded by Colonel
Philip Cochran, model for Colonel Flip Corkin in the ever-
present Terry and the Pirates comic strip that had inspired and
then reflected so much American behavior earlier in the war.
The Chindits, as Wingate's raiders were called, had an
RAF pilot on the ground with each column, coordinating
these vital air drops. One of them was Terence O'Brien, who
had taken part in the air defense of Singapore and was to
write about it in Chasing After Danger. In his book about the
164 • With the Tigers over China
Wingate experience, Out of the Blue: A Pilot with the Chindits
(1984), O'Brien describes what the General brought to the
campaign in terms of both color and its effects:
Our theatre of war had been starved for good news, and the
fact that this first expedition had cost hundreds of lives for no
direct military benefit was irrelevant against the powerful
psychological boost it had given our forces; all the talk about
Japanese mastery of jungle warfare, it was suggested, had now
been proved unfounded by the march of Wingate's brigade
right through the enemy lines into Burma and out again. In
effect, its major achievement was to spotlight Wingate. He was
carried on the crest of the publicity wave not only to London
but thence onwards to the Quebec conference so impressing
both Churchill and Roosevelt with his personality and ideas
that he was given practically all he wanted—at the moment.
His wants became wildly excessive, delirious perhaps, later on;
but although his imperious manner and grandiose plans
antagonized many of the staff at Delhi we in the columns
certainly benefitted materially when he rocketed to stardom.
Special equipment and rations began to pour in for us. The title
of Special Forces began to have practical benefits as well as
those for morale, (p. 21)
The parallels with Chennault are obvious, from the first good
news in the face of presumed Japanese superiority to the
swashbuckling methodology and its success with both the
media and political leaders. But there was only one Wingate
and just a few thousand of his raiders. Overall, British ef-
forts in the Far East remained a much more deliberate affair.
One other way the RAF developed new methods was in
clandestine operations. Here, too, Terence O'Brien played a
role, flying the many such missions over Burma, Siam, Laos,
and French Indo-China that form the narrative of his The
Moonlight War. "Ours was the only theatre of the war in
which four-engined aircraft did more parachute-dropping
than bombing" (p. 62), he notes, and the distinction between
who was covertly aiding who made for a fateful contrast.
British forces flew American-made Liberators, ironically
named, because the people they dropped and forces they
supplied were, in the case of Indo-China, Gaullist French;
the American Office of Strategic Services, at times using the
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British-built Mosquito for its quick intrusions, preferred to
help the Vietnamese directly, including a favorite named Ho
Chi Minh. Nine years later some of these same OSS (now
CIA) stations would be involved with sending in Chennault's
pilots to help the French hold off Ho's forces for a time at
Dien Bien Phu.
Hence, it was a colorful war, one for adventurers on all
sides, few of whom fought by established rules of strategy.
When it came to the Far East's war in the air, conduct was
even more atypical, with revolutionary fighter doctrines
developed by Chennault's AVG at the beginning and new
emphases on ground attack, air supply, and clandestine op-
erations. It was a style of air warfare that began in comic
strips, flourished on the cover of Life magazine, and did not
end until the last helicopter lifted off from the American
Embassy's roof in Saigon a world later. At the time, an old
AVG veteran named Charlie Bond was just beginning to
enjoy his retirement as a major general in the United States
Air Force, a career in which his penultimate posting had been
in Thailand during the Vietnam War. "The chief stated that
he chose me to represent the Air Force in Thailand because
of my background and experience with American diplomats
and foreign military officials, noting that I had been in the
Orient with Chennault," Bond recalls in A Flying Tiger's Di-
ary. "Leaving his office, I wondered if after twenty-five years
my days with the Flying Tigers were still influencing my
career" (p. 221).
They certainly were, just as Chennault's efforts with the
AVG and on through the 1950s with CAT were influencing
the war in Vietnam itself. During his eighteen months in this
old theater for an even radically newer style of war, Charlie
Bond would fly over airfields he'd bombed as a Flying Ti-
ger, including the infamous target at Cheng Mai that inspired
the AVG pilots' revolt. Although he never flew over China,
he was certainly within range of where his old AVG colleague
Erik Shilling had crash-landed on a hillside and been so ter-
rified by the inquisitive mountain tribespeople reminiscent
of threatening creatures from Terry and the Pirates.
Shilling's brief adventure with those tribesmen serves as
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an apt encapsulation of the war that wasn't first. His P-40,
just five years beyond being a state of the art example of
what modern technology could produce, had fallen into a
lost corner of the world where life was still in the Stone Age.
If Shilling was off base by thinking these people were from
a comic strip, they themselves were even more confused,
believing this stranger who dropped from the skies was a
visitor from outer space. In a circumstance as suggestive as
anything in A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, Erik
Shilling could have done many things to amaze his hosts,
albeit that he feared for his life. Because he was transporting
personal gear on this mission, he was able to retrieve his
wind-up gramophone from the crashed fuselage and for
hours entertain these primitive people with the marvel of
jazz records, to which they listened with rapt attention. As
much as the Far East changed as a result of what began hap-
pening in 1941, this tiny hillside area was even more so never
the same again.
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